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INTRODUCTION
Citizens and politicians perceive a significant and frighten-
ing increase in youth crime and violence. Concerns about the
inability of juvenile courts to rehabilitate chronic and violent
young offenders, while simultaneously protecting public safety,
accompany the growing fear of youth crime. A desire to "get
tough," fueled in part by frustration with the intractability of
crime, provides political impetus to transfer some young offend-
ers to criminal courts for prosecution as adults and to
strengthen the sanctioning powers of juvenile courts.
Within the past two decades, judicial, legislative, and ad-
ministrative reforms have fostered a substantive and procedural
convergence between juvenile and criminal courts.' This con-
vergence has transformed juvenile courts from nominally reha-
bilitative welfare agencies into scaled-down, second-class
criminal courts for young people. As juvenile courts approach
their centenary, more general concerns about juvenile justice
administration and the future of a separate court for young of-
1. See generally Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing the American Juvenile
Court, in 17 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REviEW OF RESEARCH 197
(Michael Tonry ed., 1993) (analyzing substantive and procedural transforma-
tion of juvenile court).
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fenders emerge. Either juvenile courts will remain "different"
than criminal courts, administering a form of penal social con-
trol to which no adult would consent, or they will further con-
verge and call into question the need for a separate judicial
process.
I have participated in these policy debates as a scholar and
researcher, as a member of law reform advisory groups, as a
speaker at judicial conferences and professional associations,
and as a witness before state and federal legislative committees.
I recently served as a member and committee chair of the 1992-
1994 Minnesota Juvenile Justice Task Force ("Task Force"),
which recommended major revisions in Minnesota's juvenile
code.2 The 1994 Minnesota Legislature enacted virtually all of
the Task Force's recommendations and significantly changed
many aspects of juvenile justice administration. 3 Importantly,
as other states contract the scope of juvenile court jurisdiction,
the Minnesota Legislature expanded it. Rather than weakening
the role of the juvenile court, the new Minnesota laws
strengthen it. The legislature blended elements of juvenile and
criminal courts, enhanced juvenile courts' sentencing authority,
and acknowledged the juvenile courts' responsibility to promote
public safety as well as the welfare of young offenders.
This Article provides an "outsider's" inside view of the pro-
cess of law reform and analyzes of the ensuing legislation,
although I am hardly an impartial commentator. The Article
places specific legislative initiatives in a broader legal and policy
context. It provides a detailed case study of juvenile and crimi-.
nal courts' converging responses to serious young offenders.
Hopefully this study will provide insight into the processes of
legislative change, a contextual understanding of the legal
changes, and an example of legislative policies and rationality
for other states struggling to develop legal responses to serious
youth crime.
Part I of this Article provides a general background for the
1994 juvenile justice law reforms by analyzing changes in youth
demographics and crime, and assaying the public and political
concerns that these disturbing trends instill. Part II analyzes
the process of law reform. Although several previous task forces
2. See ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYS., MINN.
SUPREmE COURT, FINAL REPORT 5-11 (1994) [hereinafter TASK FORCE, FINAL
REPORT].
3. 1994 Minn. Laws 576 (codified in various parts of MINN. STAT. § 260
(1994)).
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and commissions examined similar issues of penal policy, only
the Juvenile Justice Task Force saw its recommendations en-
acted. Part III of this Article analyzes in detail the specific 1994
legislative changes: certifying some juveniles for adult criminal
prosecution, excluding first degree murder from juvenile court,
expanding the sanctioning powers of juvenile courts, using juve-
nile convictions to enhance adult sentences, requiring juvenile
courts to promulgate "delinquency disposition principles," and
increasing the procedural safeguards afforded juveniles. The
Conclusion considers the implications of these far-reaching
changes for juveniles and justice.
In essence, the 1994 Juvenile Crime Act used the "modified
just deserts" presumptive framework of the Minnesota Sentenc-
ing Guidelines to structure the most important juvenile court
sentencing decisions. If a prosecutor charges an older youth
with a crime for which the Sentencing Guidelines presume com-
mitment to prison, the new statute creates a presumption of cer-
tification. It shifts judicial focus from clinical subjectivity and
an offender's "amenability to treatment" to more objective "pub-
lic safety" offense criteria that mirror the Sentencing Guidelines'
emphases on the seriousness of the present offense and prior
record. The 1944 Act parallels the mandatory provisions for
sentencing adult defendants convicted of first degree murder by
excluding youths sixteen years or older and charged with first
degree murder from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and
placing them automatically in adult criminal court.
The new law creates an intermediate category of serious of-
fenders called Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile ("EJJ") prosecu-
tions. EJJ youths are tried and sentenced initially as juveniles,
but receive all adult criminal procedural safeguards, including
the right to a jury trial. The EJJ legislation uses the offense
criteria of the Sentencing Guidelines to determine which youths
enter this blended juvenile-criminal jurisdictional status. A
court executes the adult criminal sentence only if an EJJ youth
fails in juvenile probation.
Further bridging the two systems, the 1994 Act greatly ex-
pands the use of juvenile and EJJ convictions in the Sentencing
Guidelines' criminal history score to enhance the sentences of
young adult offenders, and to systematize control of chronic of-
fenders in both systems. Finally, because of the increased sig-
nificance of all juvenile convictions for subsequent juvenile and
adult sentences, the new law expands some of the procedural
968 [Vol. 79:965
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safeguards available in juvenile court, especially access to de-
fense counsel.
Taken as a whole, the new juvenile code uses age and of-
fense criteria to rationalize and integrate juvenile and criminal
court sentencing practices. It creates a graduated continuum of
controls from ordinary juvenile delinquency to EJJ prosecutions
to adult criminal court, and provides escalating responses to se-
rious youth crime. The new law demonstrates a significant pro-
cedural and substantive convergence between the juvenile and
criminal justice systems.
I. JUVENILE COURTS, JUVENILE CRIME, AND THE
POLITICAL REACTIONS TO YOUTH VIOLENCE
A. THE JuvENmE COURTS
The juvenile court originated at the end of the nineteenth
century from the Progressives' 4 reformulation of two ideas:
strategies of social control 5 and the cultural conceptions of chil-
4. The Progressive movement emerged around the turn of the century in
response to the social problems caused by rapid industrialization, urbanization,
and modernization. See generally ICHAD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM:
FROM BRYAN To F.D.R. (1955); GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVA-
TISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916 (1963); JAMES
WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE: 1900-1918 (1968);
ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920 (1967).
5. Progressives introduced a number of criminal justice reforms at the
turn of the century-probation, parole, indeterminate sentences, and the juve-
nile court-all of which emphasized the use of open-ended, informal, and highly
flexible policies to rehabilitate the deviant. See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, Legal Values
and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 25, 25-27
(1964); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE 43-61 (1980). All
Progressive criminal justice reforms included discretionary decision-making,
because identifying the causes and prescribing the cures for delinquency re-
quired an individualized approach that precluded uniformity of treatment or
standardization of criteria. Id. at 50-53.
Progressives reformulated criminal justice strategies as ideological as-
sumptions about the causes and cures of crime changed, and as positivism chal-
lenged the classic formulations of crime as the product of free will. ALLEN,
supra, at 25; DAVID MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRr 5 (1964); ROTHMAN, supra,
at 50-51. Attributing criminal behavior to external, antecedent causal forces
rather than to deliberately chosen misconduct reduced an actor's moral respon-
sibility for crime and focused efforts on the reform of the offender as well as
punishment for the offense. ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS 22 (1978).
The new criminology asserted a scientific determinism and sought to identify
the causes of crime and delinquency. See MATzA, supra, at 4-12; ANTHONY M.
PLATr, THE CHILD SAvERs: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 46-74 (2d ed.
1977); ROTHMAN, supra, at 50.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:965
dren.6 Many Progressive programs share a unifying, child-cen-
tered theme;7 the juvenile court combined this new imagery of
childhood with approaches to social control in a specialized
agency designed to accommodate the child offender.
Progressive reformers envisioned juvenile court profession-
als using indeterminate, informal procedures to make discre-
tionary, individualized treatment decisions.8 They substituted a
6. Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the
Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083
(1991), provides a thorough analysis of the social construction of childhood and
its role in sustaining the juvenile court.' A modernizing of the family and a
changing cultural conception of childhood accompanied the economic moderni-
zation and industrialization of the 19th century. Demographic changes in the
numbers and spacing of children and a shift of economic functions from the
family to other work environments modified the roles of women and children.
JOSEPH F. KETr, RrrEs OF PASSAGE: ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA 1790 TO THE
PRESENT 114-16 (1977); CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD:
THE FAMILY BESIEGED 6-10 (1975); Anne Foner, Age Stratification and the
Changing Family, in TURNING POINTS: HISTORICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYS
ON THE FAMILY 5340, 5344-52 (John Demos & Sarane S. Boocock eds., 1978).
The upper and middle classes perceived children as corruptible innocents
whose upbringing required greater physical, social, and moral structure than
had previously been regarded as prerequisite to adulthood. The family, particu-
larly women, assumed a greater role in supervising a child's moral and social
development. See PHILIPPE ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD 329 (1962); KErr,
supra, at 111-13; PLATr, supra note 5, at 75-83; BERNARD WIsHy, THE CHILD
AND THE REPUBLIC: THE DAWN OF MODERN AMERICAN CIILD NURTURE 115-16
(1968).
7. The changing cultural conception of childhood informed the Progres-
sives' policies embodied in juvenile court legislation, child labor laws, child wel-
fare laws, and compulsory school attendance laws. See generally LAWRENCE A.
CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCHOOL: PROGRESSrviMS IN AMERICAN
EDUCATION, 1876-1957, at 127-28 (1961) (compulsory education legislation); JU-
VENILE JUSTICE: THE PROGRESSIVE LEGACY AND CURRENT REFORMS (LaMar T.
Empey ed., 1979) (juvenile court legislation); SUSAN TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST IN-
TEREST? CHILD WELFARE REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1982) (social wel-
fare legislation); WALTER I. TRATTNER, CRUSADE FOR THE CHILDREN: A HISTORY
OF THE NATIONAL CHILD LABOR COMMITTEE AND CHILD LABOR REFORM IN
AMERICA (1970) (child-labor legislation); WIEBE, supra note 4, at 169 (noting
that children were the central theme of humanitarian progressivism).
8. The juvenile court movement attempted to remove children from the
adult criminal justice and corrections systems and to provide them with indi-
vidualized treatment in a separate system of their own. PLATT, supra note 5, at
137-45; RYERSON, supra note 5, at 32-37; Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Re-
form: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1187-1220 (1970); Ju-
lian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REV. 104, 106-09 (1909). Under the
guise of parens patriae, an emphasis on treatment, supervision, and control,
rather than punishment, allowed the state to intervene affirmatively in the
lives of more young offenders. See Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1838)
('Mhe infant has been snatched from a course which must have ended in con-
firmed depravity; and, not only is the restraint of her person [by the House of
Refuge] lawful, but it would be an act of extreme cruelty to release her from
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scientific and preventative alternative to the more punitive ap-
proach of the criminal law. Juvenile court judges thus exercised
enormous discretion to make dispositions in the "best interests
of the child." In their social and psychological inquiry into the
whole child, the specific criminal offense a child committed was
of minor significance because it indicated little about a child's
"real needs." The misdeeds that brought a child before the court
affected neither the intensity nor the duration of intervention
because each child's "real needs" differed and no limits could be
defined in advance. Indeterminate, nonproportional disposi-
tions could continue for the duration of minority.
By separating children from adults and providing a rehabil-
itative alternative to punishment, juvenile courts rejected both
the criminal law's jurisprudence and its procedural safeguards
such as juries and lawyers. Court personnel used informal pro-
cedures and a euphemistic vocabulary to eliminate any stigma
or implication of a criminal proceeding.9 From the juvenile
court's inception, judges could deny some young offenders its
protective jurisdiction and transfer them to adult criminal
courts.' 0 The option to waive jurisdiction and remove highly vis-
ible or serious cases to adult courts also protected juvenile
courts from political criticism.
For the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, juvenile
court practices followed their Progressive origins. In 1967, the
Supreme Court in In re Gault mandated procedural safeguards
in adjudicating delinquency,"3 and began to alter juvenile court
operations. In Gault, the Court reviewed the history of the juve-
nile justice system and the traditional rationales for denying
procedural safeguards to juveniles.' 2 In rejecting these ratio-
nales, the Court observed that "unbridled discretion, however
benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for prin-
it."); Neil H. Cogan, Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of "Parens
Patriae", 22 S.C. L. REv. 147, 180-81 (1970) (noting the juvenile court's ex-
panding jurisdiction under the parens patriae rationale); Douglas R. Rendle-
man, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C. L. REv. 205,
207-10 (1971) (describing early English developments in the Chancery courts).
9. See PLATT, supra note 5, at 137-45; Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court
Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference it
Makes, 68 B.U. L. REv. 821, 823-25 (1988).
10. RoTEmAN, supra note 5, at 285.
11. 387 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1967).
12. Id. These traditional reasons included that hearings involving juvenile
offenders were not adversarial, the adjudication of delinquency was civil, not
criminal, and a child was entitled to custody, not liberty, when the state acted
as parens patriae. Id.
1995]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ciple and procedure" and concluded that the denial of procedural
rights frequently resulted in arbitrariness rather than "careful,
compassionate, individualized treatment."'3
The Gault Court mandated elementary procedural safe-
guards because of the juvenile court's failure to realize the
Progressives' ideals. These safeguards included the right to ad-
vanced notice of charges, a fair and impartial hearing, the right
to the assistance of counsel with the opportunities to confront
and cross-examine witnesses, and the protections of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. 14 The Gault Court narrowly
confined its decision to the adjudicatory hearing which deter-
mines whether a child is a delinquent, without considering the
entire procedural apparatus, jurisdictional reach, or disposi-
tional practices of the juvenile justice system.15 The Court
noted that its rulings would not impair the court's unique proce-
dures for processing and treating juveniles separately from
adults, 16 and asserted the importance of adversarial procedural
safeguards both to determine truth and to preserve individual
freedom.17
The Supreme Court subsequently elaborated on the proce-
dural and functional equivalence between criminal and delin-
quency proceedings. In In re Winship, the Court held that
juvenile courts must establish delinquency "beyond a reasonable
doubt," rather than by the lower standards of proof used in civil
trials.'8 Similarly, in Breed v. Jones the Court held that the
13. Id. at 18-19.
14. Id. at 31-57.
15. Id. at 13. Several commentators have analyzed the narrow holding in
Gault and the limitations on juvenile procedural rights. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld,
Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69
MiNN. L. REV. 141, 153-54 (1984); Francis B. McCarthy, Pre-Adjudicatory
Rights in Juvenile Courts: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 42 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 457, 459-60 (1981); Irene M. Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights
of Children Charged with Crimes: Proposal for a Return to the Not So Distant
Past, 27 UCLA L. REv. 656, 661-63 (1980).
16. Gault, 387 U.S. at 22.
17. Id. at 20-21. The Court's holding that the privilege against self-incrim-
ination applies to delinquency adjudications dearly implicated the dual func-
tions of procedural safeguards: to provide factual accuracy and prevent
governmental oppression. See id. at 49-50; see also Feld, supra note 15, at 155-
56 nn.46-47 (discussing the Fifth Amendments procedural role). By recogniz-
ing the applicability of the privilege against self-incrimination, juvenile adjudi-
cations could no longer be characterized as either "non-criminal" or "non-
adversarial," because the Fifth Amendment privilege acts both as the guarantor
of an adversarial process and as the primary mechanism to maintain a balance
between the state and the individual.
18. 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
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Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits adult
re-prosecution of a youth previously convicted of the same
charges in juvenile court.' 9
The Court did not, however, extend to juveniles all the pro-
cedural criminal safeguards available to adults-in McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania the Court denied to juveniles a constitutional
right to jury trials in state delinquency proceedings. 20 The McK-
eiver Court held that the due process standard of "fundamental
fairness" in juvenile proceedings, as interpreted and applied in
Gault and Winship, emphasized "accurate fact-finding," which a
judge could provide as readily as a jury.21 The Court also ex-
pressed concern that requiring jury trials would disrupt tradi-
tional juvenile court practices,22
Despite the Court's reluctance in McKeiver to hasten the de-
mise of the juvenile court system, its earlier decisions in Gault
and Winship drastically altered the form and function of the ju-
venile court. By emphasizing procedural regularity as a prereq-
uisite to a delinquency disposition, the Supreme Court shifted
the focus of the juvenile court from the "real needs" of a child to
proof of criminal guilt. Those decisions provided the impetus for
the continuing procedural and substantive convergence of juve-
nile and criminal courts.
B. JuvFmzF CRImE
Both youth and violent crime rates fluctuate markedly over
time.23 Thus, any description of crime trends is especially sensi-
tive to the baseline selected for comparison. For example, com-
paring current serious crime rates with those in 1980 would
show only moderate changes, whereas comparing them with the
lower 1985 base rates would show more substantial increases.
24
The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") annually pub-
lishes national data on crimes known or reported to police and
19. 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975); see infra note 180 and accompanying text
(describing the impact of the Breed decision).
20. 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion).
21. Id. at 543.
22. Id. at 550.
23. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIO-
LENCE 50 (Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1993). During the 20th
century, for example, homicide rates peaked in the 1930s, slowly declined until
the early 1960s, rose steadily during the 1970s to another peak in 1980, de-
clined in the early 1980s, and then began to escalate rapidly again in 1985. Id.
24. Id.
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arrests made by law enforcement. 25 Figure 1 presents both na-
tional and Minnesota crime trends for the decade of the 1980s,
and indicates relative stability in serious crime rates. In 1980,
there were 5950 serious crimes per 100,000 inhabitants nation-
ally.26 Following a decline in the mid-1980s, the rate rebounded
by 1991 to 5898 per 100,000.27 Although the trends and fluctua-
tions follow similar patterns, Minnesota enjoys a somewhat
lower rate of serious crime compared with the rest of the United
States.28 Following the national pattern, rates of serious crime
dipped during the mid-1980s and then began to increase. In
Minnesota, the rate of serious crimes known or reported to law
enforcement in 1980 was 4780 per 100,000.29 That rate dropped
to below 4000 in 1984, and more recently rose again to 4496 per
100,000 in 1991, still four percent below the peak rate of 1981.30
25. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE
UNITED STATES: 1991 (1992) [hereinafter 1991 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS]. Lo-
cal law enforcement agencies transmit data to state agencies and the FBI based
on reports from victims of crimes or investigations. Id. at 1-3. The FBrs Seri-
ous Crime Index includes both violent and property crimes and provides the
most widely cited measure of trends in offenses. Id. at 1. The Crime Index
records four violent crimes: murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible
rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Id. It also reports four property crimes:
burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. Id. Typically, both re-
ported crimes and arrests are standardized as rates per 100,000 persons to con-
trol for changes in population composition.
26. Id. at 58.
27. Id.
28. In 1991, Minnesota had a serious crime rate of 4496 per 100,000 per-
sons as compared with the national average of 5898. Id. at 72. By contrast, the
serious crime rate per 100,000 was 10,768 in the District of Columbia, 7819 in
Texas, and 6773 in California. Id. at 68-76.
29. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE
UNITED STATES: 1980, at 52 (1980).
30. Daniel Storkamp, Overview of Juvenile Crime in Minnesota 5 (Feb. 26,
1993) (unpublished report, on file with author).
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Figure 1
Serious Crime Rates
Trends in Minnesota and the Nation
6,500 per 100,000 Population
55,950 ,8 8
5,500
5,000 
~M innesota 4,9
4,000
3,500 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Note: Includes murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault,
burglary, larceny, auto theft and arson.
Prepared By: Criminal Justice Center, Minnesota Planning
Data Source: Bureau of Criminal Apprehension/OJP
1. National Trends
Young people commit a disproportionate amount of crime.
Their arrest rates for most serious crimes peak in mid- to late-
adolescence and then gradually decline. 31 During the mid-
1980s, serious juvenile crime patterns mirrored the overall na-
tional decline. Serious juvenile crime rates gradually increased,
31. David P. Farrington, Age and Crime, in 7 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN AN-
NUAL REVIEw OF RESEARCH 189, 189 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds.,
1986) (analyzing age-specific crime rates and noting that crime rates peak in
mid- to late-teenage years and then decline). See generally Travis Hirschi &
Michael Gottfredson, Age and the Explanation of Crime, 89 Am. J. Soc. 552
(1983) (critiquing the substantive justification for the longitudinal study of
crime); David F. Greenberg, Delinquency and the Age Structure of Society, in
CRIMINOLOGY REVIEW YEARBOOK (Sheldon Messinger & Egon Bittner eds.,
1979) (discussing delinquency theory and age distriution of crime); FEDERAL Bu-
REAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES:
1992, at 227-28 (1993) [hereinafter 1992 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS] (tabulating
total United States arrests by age and offense charged).
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but those rates only now approximate the peak rates of 1980.32
Significantly, however, as a result of the demographic "baby
bust," youths aged ten to seventeen constitute a smaller seg-
ment of the population structure, and their overall contribution
to serious crime is decreasing.3 3 Between 1980 and 1990,
juveniles aged ten through seventeen decreased from 14% to
11% of the total United States population.34 Their share of all
arrests for Crime Index property crimes declined from 41% to
32%, and of all arrests for Index violent crimes, from 22% to16%.35
The bulk of all FBI Part I serious crime consists of property
offenses rather than violent crimes, and during the 1980s the
juvenile rate of property crimes was stable or only slowly in-
creasing.3 6 By contrast, although violent crimes comprise a
much smaller component of the overall serious crime index, the
rates of juvenile violence, especially homicide, have surged dra-
matically since the mid-1980s.3 7 While Index property crime by
juveniles increased 11% nationally between 1983 and 1992, vio-
lent crime increased by 57%.38 In a special section on juveniles
32. Arrest Rates Per 100,000 Population for Juveniles Aged 10-17
1980 1985 1990
Index Violent Felonies 393.6 334.3 392.8
Index Property Felonies 2,887.2 2,491.0 2,689.3
All Index Felonies 3,280.8 2,825.3 3,082.1
Peter W. Greenwood, Juvenile Crime and Juvenile Justice, in CimE 91, 96 tbl.
5.2 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 1994).
33. Percentage of Total Population and Index Felony Arrests
Accounted for by Juveniles Aged 10-17
1980 1985 1990
Total U.S. Population 14 12 11
Index Violent Felonies 22 17 16
Index Property Felonies 41 34 32
Id. at 95 tbl. 5.1.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See HowARD N. SNYDER, OFFICE OF JuvENiLE JusTicE AND DELIN-
QUENCY PREVENTION FACT SHEET #3, 1992 JUVENILmE AmuisTs (May 1994) (re-
porting that 1992 FBI Uniform Crime Report data indicate that juveniles
account for 18% of all arrests for violent crime, and 33% of all property crimes;
juvenile property crime arrests increased by eight percent between 1988 and
1992, and by 11% between 1983 and 1992).
37. See 1991 UN IoRw CRium REPORTS, supra note 25, at 279; Francis B.
McCarthy, The Serious Offender and Juvenile Court Reform: The Case for
Prosecutorial Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 629,
636-40 (1994).
38. SNYDER, supra note 36, at 2.
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and violence in 1991, the FBI reported a record juvenile violent
crime rate in 1990.39
From the public's perspective, the most frightening change
in juvenile crime patterns is the increase in murder rates accom-
panying the proliferation of guns among youths.40 Juvenile of-
fenders account for about one homicide arrest in seven. 41 These
arrest rates may overstate somewhat juveniles' violent criminal
involvement because youths, more than adults, tend to commit
crimes in groups, and one criminal event may produce several
juvenile arrests.42 Arrests of increasingly younger juveniles for
violence, and the dramatic rise in homicide by mid- to late-ado-
lescents, however, certainly justify public concern.43
The public's concern over violent crime has a clear racial
component. The increase in murder rates and the proliferation
of guns are especially dramatic among black juveniles. 44 The
39. The FBI reported that "[i]n 1990, the Nation experienced its highest
juvenile violent crime arrest rate, 430 per 100,000 juveniles.... The 1990 rate
was 27 percent higher than the 1980 rate." 1991 UNIFoRM CRIME REPORTS,
supra note 25, at 279.
40. Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-Drug Industry,
85 J. CaIm. L. & CRIMNOLOGY (forthcoming 1995) (analyzing changing patterns
of age-specific homicide rates in conjunction with proliferation of guns in the
illegal drug industry); see also 1991 UNIFoRM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 25, at
279 ("Another item of concern is that during the past decade, there has been a
79-percent increase in the number ofjuveniles who commit murders with guns.
In 1990, nearly 3 or 4 juvenile murder offenders used guns to perpetrate their
crimes.").
41. See 1992 UNn'o~m CRnA REPORTS, supra note 31, at 227 (reporting
that in 1992 juvenile homicide arrests accounted for about 14.5% of all homicide
arrests; juveniles were arrested for 2829 murders or negligent manslaughters
while adults over 18 years of age were arrested for 16,662).
42. See Franklin E. Zimring, Kids, Groups and Crime: Some Implications
of a Well-Known Secret, 72 J. CRm. L. & CRMINOLOGY 867, 868-75 (1981).
43. 1992 UNIFORm CRIME REPORTS, supra note 31, at 227; BARB AILEN-
HAGEN ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION
FACT SHEET #19, JUVENILES AND VIOLENCE: JUVENILE OFFENDING AND VImIT-
ZATION 1 (Nov. 1994) ("Between 1988 and 1992, the number of Violent Crime
Index arrests of juveniles increased by 47%-more than twice the increase for
persons 18 years of age or older. Most alarming, juvenile arrests for murder
increased by 51%, compared to 9% for adults."); see also Greenwood, supra note
32, at 96 ("In 1980, juveniles accounted for just 10 percent of all arrests for
homicide. By 1990, juveniles accounted for 13.6 percent of all homicide arrests.
Between 1984 and 1992, the number of juveniles arrested for homicide, who
were under the age of fifteen, increased by 50 percent.").
44. The FBI reported that
[t]he Nation experienced an upsurge in the juvenile murder arrest rate
for blacks during the 1980s.... This upward trend had a profound
impact on the overall juvenile murder arrest rate.... Specifically, be-
tween 1980 and 1990, the arrest rate for this [black] group increased
145 percent, while the rate for whites rose 48 percent.... When con-
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FBI data show that minority youths are substantially more
likely to commit violent crimes.45 Other research that does not
rely on official statistics also documents the disproportionate mi-
nority youth involvement in violent crime.46 Thus, legislative
policies that focus on violent offenses, although seemingly neu-
tral on their face, have the potential to impact upon minority
youths because of racial patterns of offending.47
2. Minnesota
As nationally, youths in Minnesota commit a disproportion-
ate amount of serious crime. The amount and rate of juvenile
crime have also increased in the past decade. 48 Because of the
relationship between age and crime, these trends are of particu-
lar concern. In the 1990 census, Minnesota juveniles aged fif-
teen to nineteen constituted the smallest segment of young
sidering the difference in the arrest rate for black and white juveniles,
the black rate was 7.5 times that of whites in 1990. From a historical
perspective, 1965 to 1990, the overall murder arrest rate for juveniles
increased 332 percent from 2.8 to 12.1.
Id.
45. "Of particular note is the upward trend that started in 1988 for both
white and black youths.. . . In 1990, the juvenile violent crime arrest rate
reached 1429 per 100,000 black juveniles, five times that for white youths." Id.
46. See ELLIOTT CURRIE, CONFRONTING CRImE: AN AMERICAN CHALLENGE
144-71 (1985) (documenting the positive correlations among race, poverty and
violent crime); PAUL E. TRACY ET AL., DELINQUENCY CAREERS IN Two BIRTH Co-
HORTS 277 (1990) (stating that violent offense rate for nonwhites in cohort is
nearly six times the rate for whites); MARVIN E. WOLFGANG Err AL., DELIN-
QUENCY IN A BmT COHORT 247 (1972) ("the more serious forms of bodily harm
are committed by nonwhites" in the cohort); Michael J Hindelang, Race and
Involvement in Common Law Personal Crimes, 43 Am. Soc. REv. 93, 103-04
(1978) (showing that rape, robbery, and assault are disproportionately commit-
ted by blacks).
47. See infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
48. Indicative of Minnesota youths' involvement in serious crime, in 1991
juveniles accounted for 15% of the 134 murder arrests, 14% of the 656 rape
arrests, 35% of the 1075 robbery arrests, 22% of the 3990 aggravated assault
arrests, 42% of the 4703 burglary arrests, 45% of the 27,142 larceny arrests,
54% of the 3551 auto theft arrests, and 55% of the 293 arson arrests.
Storkamp, supra note 30, at 8-9.
In Minnesota between 1980 and 1991, the absolute number of serious
crimes known to authorities increased by about four percent. Id. at 4. In 1980,
there were 195,992 FBI Part I offenses reported to police. Id. In 1991, 203,107
crimes were reported. Id. Between 1980 and 1991, arrest rates for all crimes
increased by 84% for adults and 22% for juveniles, although arrests of adults for
violent crimes increased about 113% for adults and 88% for juveniles. Ray
Lewis, Presentation to the Minnesota Corrections Association, Overview of Ju-
venile Crime in Minnesota: An Update 6-7 (Oct. 13, 1993) (on file with author).
Police arrested 737 juveniles for violent crimes in 1980 as compared with 1383
in 1991. Id. at 7.
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people in the population.4 9 Fifteen- to seventeen-year-olds, how-
ever, had the largest numbers of arrests and highest rates of
arrest for both serious property offenses and violent crimes.50
Thus, a relatively small youth population had to be somewhat
more criminally active in order to produce overall increases in
reported crimes over the past decade.
There are more youths aged ten to fourteen, and even more
children aged five to nine, and from birth to age four, waiting in
the demographic wings.51 As these younger people mature and
reach their "crime-prone" adolescence over the next decade,
there likely will be a significant increase in youth crime and vio-
lence based solely on the age-demographic shift, and without re-
gard to any other social forces affecting youth crime.52
Changes in Minnesota's racial composition affect both crime
rates and political reactions to youth and crime. Only 6.3% of
Minnesotans are members of racial minorities, as compared
with 24.4% nationally, making it proportionately the seventh
smallest minority population in the nation.53 The minority pop-
ulation in Minnesota, however, grew 71.7% during the 1980s,
the fourth highest rate of growth in the nation.54 African-Amer-
icans are Minnesota's largest minority group.55 As a result of
49. Storkamp, supra note 30, at 3.
50. Id. at 12-13.
51. See 1991 UNwoFmi CRIME REPORTS, supra note 25, at 289 ("The recent
increase in the juvenile arrest rate for crimes related to violence may be indica-
tive of future trends when considering concomitant social/demographic
trends. ... The population group 10-17 is projected to increase significantly
between 1990 and 2000. This development may lead to further escalation in
juvenile crimes/arrests."). Based on data presented by the Minnesota State De-
mographer and population projection, the youth population aged 10-19 will in-
crease almost 14% beyond 1990 levels by the year 2000 and not return to the
1990 level until about the year 2015.
Minnesota Youth Population of 10-19 Year Olds
1990 1995 2000 2010 2020
Population Population Population Population Population
Projection Projection Projection Projection Projection
610,906 663,860 694,930 640,080 595,220
Lewis, supra note 48, at 2.
52. Cf Alfred Blumstein et al., Demographically Disaggregated Projections
of Prison Populations, 8 J. CmId. JUST. 1, 8-9, 11-13 (1980) (showing, however,
an overall decline in crime rates due to aging of baby-boom cohort).
53. MINNESOTA STATE DEMOGRAPHER, MINNESOTA MINORITY POPULATIONS
GROW RAPIDLY BETWEEN 1980 AND 1990, at 1 (Sept. 1991).
54. Id. at 3. By contrast, the non-hispanic white population rose only 4.7%,
about the same as the national average (4.4%). Id.
55. Id. at 7. The 1990 census counted 94,944 African-American Min-
nesotans. While African-Americans are Minnesota's largest minority group,
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both natural increase and net migration, the African-American
population increased 78% during the 1980s. 56 Moreover, Afri-
can-Americans are heavily concentrated in the Twin Cities of
Minneapolis and St. Paul. Between 1980 and 1990 the total mi-
nority population rate in the Twin Cities nearly doubled from
12.5% to 21.3%.57
Minority status is linked to involvement in crime, especially
violent crimes against the person. As the FBI Uniform Crime
Reports indicate, minority youths are five times more likely than
white youths to be arrested for crimes of violence, and seven and
a half times more likely to be arrested for homicide. 58 Because
of population differentials, white juveniles in Minnesota consti-
tute the majority of all youths arrested for violent offenses,
although the disproportionate minority involvement in violent
crime figures prominently in public perceptions and political re-
sponses to serious youth crime.59 To the extent that minority
youth disproportionately commit violent crimes, penal policies
that focus on violence will have a disparate impact on children of
color.
There is also a relationship between Minnesota's changing
racial composition and the proportion of children in poverty,
which increased more than 20% during the 1980s.60 Three dem-
they constitute only 2.2% of the population, well below the national average of
12.1%. Id.
56. Id. Starting with a smaller population base, Asian and Pacific Island-
ers had the greatest increase, 193.5%, between 1980 and 1990. Id. at 3. They
now constitute the state's second largest minority group. Id.
57. Id. at 7. Seventy-two percent of all African-Americans reside in Minne-
apolis or St. Paul, and an additional 23% are in the Twin Cities suburbs. Only
six percent are outside the seven-county metropolitan area and most live in
either Duluth or Rochester. Id. at 8.
58. 1991 UNIFORM CRimE REPORTS, supra note 25, at 279; see BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATITIcs-1993, at
447 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1994); supra notes 44-46 and
accompanying text.
59. In 1991, police arrested white juveniles for 738 violent crimes, as com-
pared with 512 black juvenile arrests. MINNESOTA BUREAU OF CRIMINAL APPRE-
HENSION tbl. 14 (1991). Given the differences in relative populations, however,
the black juvenile disproportionality mirrored the differences in national rates.
Moreover, police arrested 12 black juveniles for murder as compared with four
white youths. Id.
60. See Martha McMurry, Child Poverty in Minnesota, POPULATION NOTES
(Minnesota Planning, St. Paul, Mini.), Feb. 1994, at 5 ("Children in poverty are
increasingly likely to be nonwhite, living in the Twin Cities and living in a sin-
gle-parent family.... Minnesota's minority children are... much more likely
to be poor than minority children in the rest of the United States."); see also
Minnesota KIDS COUNT 2 1994 (noting that between 1980 and 1990, the per-
centage of Minnesota children in poverty grew 21.6%; in 1989, 45.1% of minor-
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ographic changes contributed to the dramatic increase in the
number of Minnesota children living in poverty: a growing pro-
portion of nonwhite children, an increasing proportion of chil-
dren living in single-mother families, and a greater probability
that children in minority and single-parent households will be
poor.61 Although the poverty rate for white children in Minne-
sota is relatively low compared to that of the rest of the nation,
the poverty rates for Minnesota's minority children, the fastest
growing segments of the youth population, are among the high-
est in the nation.62 The largest growth in the number of poor
children occurred in the Twin Cities.63 Because younger chil-
dren are at greater risk of being poor than are older children,64
the more numerous younger generation is further exposed to ad-
verse social circumstances that produce greater probabilities of
criminal involvement.
Changes in Minnesota's racial composition, a growing con-
centration of poor and minority children in urban settings, and
the disproportional involvement of minority youth in crime, es-
pecially violent crime, sustain public and political perceptions of
a threatening structural "underclass."65 Scholars contend that
ity children lived in poverty as compared with 9.7% of white children). See
generally MINNESOTA PLANNING, CHILD POVERTY IN MINNESOTA: TRENDS AND
IssuEs (1994).
61. McMurry, supra note 60, at 1. Single mother families account for about
57% of poor families with children. Id. at 7. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, LOSING GENERATIONS: ADOLESCENTS IN HIGH-RIsK SETTINGS 41-56
(1993) (summarizing research on demographic changes in family structure,
their relationship to poverty, and the risks that poverty and single-parent
households pose for adolescent development).
62. While Minnesota's white child poverty rate (9.7%) ranks 41st in the
nation, the situation for minority children is much more bleak. Of Minnesota's
African-American children, nearly half (49.4%, seventh in the nation) live in
poverty, as do more than half (54.8%, fourth in the nation) of its Native Ameri-
can children, and more than one-third (37.1%, third in nation) of its Asian chil-
dren. McMurry, supra note 60, at 3. Although nonwhite children are more
likely to be poor, because of Minnesota's relatively small minority population,
the great majority of poor children, about 71%, are white. Id. at 8.
63. Id. at 4 ("In the two central cities combined, the child poverty rate went
up from 16.3 percent in 1979 to 28.5 percent in 1989.").
64. Id. at 8. "In 1989, 14.8 percent of Minnesota children under age 5 were
poor. The poverty rate declined to 10.6 percent for 12- to 17-year-olds." Id.
65. See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) (arguing
that residential segregation is structurally responsible for the "mutually rein-
forcing and self-feeding spirals of decline" in black neighborhoods); THE URBAN
UNDERCLASS (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991) (collecting es-
says on the economic condition of the underclass, the causes and consequences
of concentrated poverty, and public policy responses); WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE
TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
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these structural and contextual indicators of inequality affect of-
ficial social control policies and practices. 66 They argue that in
settings characterized by racial inequality-a "large concentra-
tion of the 'underclass' (i.e., minorities, poverty, female-headed
families, welfare)"-political leaders and the public will view
such populations as threatening and offensive, and will use the
juvenile justice system to subject the "underclass" to increased
social control.6 7 The confluence of Minnesota's changing racial
composition, increasing poverty and urban concentration of mi-
nority young people, disproportionate minority involvement in
serious youth violence, and demographic projections of more
poor and minority urban youths in the decade to come, provide
an additional backdrop against which politicians formulated the
1994 juvenile justice reforms and criminal sentencing policies.
C. MEDIA COVERAGE OF YOUTH CmME, PUBLIC OPINION, AND
POLITCAL PERCEPTIONS
The mass media shape public and political attitudes and
perceptions, and thereby indirectly influence the legislative pro-
cess. 68 The question of "what is news," and whether changes in
column-inch crime reportage correspond proportionately to ac-
tual changes in "real" rates of crime or constitute "media hype,"
are beyond the scope of this Article. Even proportional press
coverage of youth crime and juvenile justice administration,
(1987) (examining the "complex web" of factors contributing to social dislocation
in the urban ghetto as well as the shortcomings of current public policy
approaches).
66. Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, Structural Variations in Juvenile
Court Processing: Inequality, the Underclass, and Social Control, 27 LAw &
Soo'y Rxv. 285, 305 (1993).
67. Id. at 293; see Barry C. Feld, Justice by Geography: Urban, Suburban,
and Rural Variations in Juvenile Justice Administration, 82 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMNOLOGY 156, 166-69 (1991) (analyzing a number of the structural features
that the author hypothesizes affect juvenile justice administration).
68. Julian Roberts notes that
[t]he beliefs of public officials about public preferences for criminal jus-
tice policies affect political campaigns, decisions in individual cases,
and criminaljustice policy. Politicians' beliefs about the nature of pub-
lic opinion probably derive from three sources: shared conventional
wisdom, the perception of an association between electoral success and
support for repressive criminal justice policies, and the publication of
survey findings that seem to demonstrate public support for harsher
sentencing.
Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, Crime, and Criminal Justice, in 16 CRimE
AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REviEW OF RESEARCH 99, 101 (Michael Tonry ed.,
1992).
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however, shapes public perceptions and political responses. 69
Significantly, a 1986 amendment to the Minnesota juvenile code
opened to the public and to the press juvenile court hearings in-
volving youths aged sixteen or older charged with a felony,
thereby allowing greater press coverage of juvenile court pro-
ceedings involving serious young offenders. 70 As a result, the
media acquired greater access to youths' names and the details
of their crimes at the same time that youth crime trends began
to escalate.
Within the past five years, the Minneapolis-based Star Trib-
une, the largest circulation paper in Minnesota, reported many
stories about alienated youth and crime,71 violent crimes by
teenagers, 72 and criminal victimization of children. 73 Other sto-
ries discussed guns,74 gangs,75 drive-by shootings, 76 random vio-
69. Greenwood discusses the role of the media in amplifying public con-
cerns about youth crime:
One part of the answer is clearly the attention being given to the sub-
ject by the media and elected officials.... [T]he popular media are
often careless in distinguishing juveniles from those over eighteen
years of age. Since so many young adults and gang members continue
to dress and act like teenagers, adult offenders may often be mistaken
for juveniles, when in fact they are not.
Greenwood, supra note 32, at 96.
70. See MINN. STAT. § 260.155(1).
71. See, e.g., Mark Brunswick, Rise in Homicides Shows Minneapolis Is
Changing, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Dec. 27, 1988, at 1A (discussing the "sub-
culture of violence" now present in Minneapolis); Mark Brunswick & Jill
Hodges, More Crime Happening at Hands of Kids: Assailants Are Less Re-
morseful, STAR Tam. (Minneapolis), Nov. 19, 1990, at 1A ("In the first nine
months of this year, every fourth person arrested for murder in Minneapolis
was a kid.... Kids who commit crimes are committing them more violently.");
Pat Doyle, "Lost boys" Were on a Road Leading to Lost Lives, STAR TRIB. (Minne-
apolis), June 12, 1988, at 1A (describing a brutal murder by street teenagers
who shattered the victim's skull).
72. See, e.g., Bill McAuliffe, Court Rules Brom Should Be Tried as Adult in
Ax Murders, STAR TRB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 18, 1988, at 1A (teenager killed
mother, father, younger sister, and brother with axe); Maureen M. Smith &
Kevin Diaz, Anoka Youth Held in Slayings at Brooklyn Park Home, STAR ThM.
(Minneapolis), Oct. 14, 1992, at 1A (16-year-old arrested for murder of woman
and her three-year-old daughter during apparent burglary); Margaret Zack,
Boy, 16, Guilty of Murdering Neighbor, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Feb. 9, 1988,
at 1A (14-year-old killed neighbor during a burglary); see also Barry C. Feld,
Bad Law Makes Hard Cases: Reflections on Teen-aged Axe Murderers, Judicial
Activism, and Legislative Default, 8 LAw & INEQ. J. 1 (1989) (analyzing three
courts' Brom opinions and the administration of juvenile waiver statutes).
73. 4-Year-Old Sexual-Assault Victim Is Released from Medical Center,
STAR TRIa. (Minneapolis), July 23, 1988, at 3B (describing a "girl left for dead
behind a grocery store after being beaten and sexually assaulted").
74. See, e.g., Kevin Diaz, Armed and Dangerous at 16: More Kids Are Car-
rying, Using Firearms, STAR Tam. (Minneapolis), Dec. 11, 1991, at 1A (describ-
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lence,7 7 and "senseless" lethal encounters with juveniles. 78
Additional stories described an epidemic of teen-age drug
abuse,7 9 expanding caseloads in juvenile courts,80 and the in-
ability of the juvenile justice system to respond adequately to a
"new breed" of youthful offenders.81
Without regard to whether such coverage accurately de-
scribes objective reality, the intensity and tenor of youth crime
coverage inevitably colors both people's perceptions of reality
ing shootings by teenagers and noting that "[j]uvenile aggravated assaults, half
of which involve guns, have tripled in the past 10 years in Minnesota").
75. See, e.g., Mark Brunswick, Now Dealing in Drugs and Violence, Gangs
Are Blamed for More Bloodshed, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), July 22, 1990, at 1A
(describing the seemingly random murders of "the world of Twin Cities street
gangs" and the "new lawlessness associated with this lack of internal gang dis-
cipline; police say gang members are younger and more trigger-happy, equally
as willing to shoot a rival gang member as shoot a bystander for making a
wisecrack").
76. See, e.g., Conrad de Fiebre, Four Incidents of Gunfire from Cars Re-
ported, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis), Dec. 18, 1991, at 1B (discussing recent inci-
dents of gunfire from cars).
77. See, e.g., Mark Brunswick, Troubled Neighborhood Awaits Fate of Inno-
cent Victim, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis), Dec. 27, 1991, at 1A (describing innocent
12-year-old victim of unprovoked shooting on Christmas evening).
78. See, e.g., Conrad de Fiebre, 15-Year-Old Fired Shots, 3 Others Say,
STAR Tam. (Minneapolis), June 10, 1992, at 1B (alleged killer of convenience
store clerks was a 15-year-old member of gang); Kevin Diaz, Family, Friends
Shocked that Man Slain for Bicycle, STAR Tam. (Minneapolis), Oct. 7, 1993, at
1B (describing shooting during confrontation over stolen bicycle); Tatsha Rob-
ertson, Police Arrest Three Suspects in Shooting at Mall of America, STAR TRm.
(Minneapolis), Feb. 25, 1993, at 1B (mall-shopper shot by juveniles over
"Starter" jacket); James Walsh & Bill McAuliffe, Man, 3 Juveniles Held in St.
Paul Slayings, STAR Tam. (Minneapolis), June 9, 1992, at 1A (teenagers ar-
rested for slayings at convenience store robbery).
79. See, e.g., Conrad de Fiebre, Teens Found in 'Crack Houses, STAR TRm.
(Minneapolis), Mar. 11, 1989, at 1B (eight boys found in crack house raid).
80. See, e.g., Dennis Cassany, Boom in Suburban Teen Crime Puzzling,
STAR TRm. (Minneapolis), Mar. 23, 1992, at 1A (describing "skyrocketing" juve-
nile crime in Twin Cities suburbs); Kurt Chanleer & Bruce Benidt, Juvenile
Crime Is Up in Numbers, Violence, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis), July 24, 1988, at
1B (discussing factors causing increased juvenile crime and violence); Kevin
Diaz, Youth Felony Cases Crowd Hennepin's Courtrooms, STAR Tam. (Minneap-
olis), Sept. 11, 1991, at 1A (describing increase in juvenile crime and stating
that "[jiuvenile rape arrests are up 42 percent; robbery is up 71 percent; aggra-
vated assault is up 118 percent").
81. See, e.g., Paul Gustafson, Hard Young Criminals Scary, Costly to Ram-
sey Board, STAR TaB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 5, 1988, at 3B (describing a "new
breed of hard-core young criminal offender in Ramsey County that scares offi-
cials and is costing the county hundreds of thousands of additional dollars to
handle"); James Walsh, Gangs Causing Problems for Juvenile Detention Cen-
ters, STAR TaB. (Minneapolis), May 18, 1990, at 2B (comparing gangs of the
1960s and 1970s with current gangs).
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and politicians' reactions.8 2 Public opinion polls over several
years evidence Minnesotans' increasing concern about crime.83
A recent opinion poll indicates increasing public fear of victimi-
zation, particularly in urban centers.8 4 They provide an addi-
tional context for the 1994 legislative session.
In January 1994, the Minnesota Planning Agency issued a
comprehensive crime report, Troubling Perceptions, which sur-
veyed citizens' actual experiences as victims of crimes and their
fears of it.85 In that study, 31% of Minnesotans reported that
they were victims of crime, as were 68% of fifteen- to twenty-
four-year-old respondents in Hennepin and Ramsey counties.8 6
Fear of becoming a victim of crime was even more pervasive
than the actual victimization experience.8 7 Moreover, respon-
dents were "pessimistic about the possibility of reducing violent
crime," and most "expected it to get worse in the next three
years."88
These crime statistics and public opinion polls prompt many
complex policy questions. Is youth crime actually rising, and, if
82. It is difficult for individuals to develop a realistic perception of
their risk of becoming victims of crime. The number of articles in
newspapers or magazines or the minutes of television and radio broad-
casts given to crime reporting do not necessarily reflect the true inci-
dence of crime. Media reporting of exceptionally violent crimes may
increase fear beyond actual crime risk levels.
MnMESOTA PLANNING, TROUBLING PESRCEMoNS: 1993 MINESOTA CRIm SuR-
vEY 3 (Jan. 1994).
83. See, e.g., Lauri Blake, Crime, Drugs Top Worries for Twin Citians, STAR
Tam. (Minneapolis), Feb. 21, 1989, at 1B ("Crime and drugs have replaced eco-
nomic concerns as issues uppermost in the minds of Twin Cities residents
84. Bob von Steinberg, Another Survey Shows Crime as Minnesotans' Top
Worry, STAR Tam. (Minneapolis), Feb. 10, 1994, at 5B ("[Tihree out of 10 Min-
nesotans believe crime is the single most important problem facing the state.").
85. MRNESOTA PLANNING, supra note 82. According to the study:
Both the incidence of crime and fear of crime were highest among re-
spondents who said they lived in a city in Hennepin or Ramsey county.
Forty-five percent of this group said they were crime victims, 41 per-
cent were victims of property crime, and 14 percent were victims of
violent crime.
Id. at 1.
86. Id. at 1. While young people were at greatest risk of victimization,
"[florty-three percent of all victims of violent crime ages 15 to 24 said their as-
sailant was a juvenile." Id.
87. Id. at 6-9. "The expectation of becoming a crime victim far exceeds the
actual experience of respondents in the survey." Id. at 9. Although most people
did not fear becoming a victim of violent crime themselves, many feared for
their loved ones and 44% were afraid to walk alone at night within a mile of
their homes. Id. at 6-7.
88. Id. at 2.
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so, by how much? Is the current juvenile system capable of pro-
viding adequate social control of young offenders within tolera-
ble limits, and, if not, what additional measures are necessary?
How much more tax money should the state spend in an effort to
increase social control, and what other public programs will re-
ceive less state support as a consequence? Legislators often allo-
cate scarce resources and make value judgments about social
policies based on subjective perceptions, rather than on objective
data. Formulating a youth crime policy is no exception.8 9
II. THE MINNESOTA JUVENILE JUSTICE TASK FORCE
As part of the 1992 Omnibus Crime Control Act, the 1992
Minnesota Legislature directed the Minnesota Supreme Court
to create an Advisory Task Force on the Juvenile Justice Sys-
tem.90 The 1992 Omnibus Crime Act charged the Task Force to:
conduct a study of the juvenile justice system and make recommenda-
tions concerning the following:
1) the juvenile certification process;
89. Cf. Alfred Blumstein, Making Rationality Relevant, 31 CRIMNOLOGY 1,
1 (1993) ("[Slince policy choices inevitably involve issues of value as well as fact,
in any weighing of costs and benefits, different people will assign different utili-
ties to any particular degree of crime reduction or any kind of pain imposed on a
guilty person.").
90. 1992 Minn. Laws 571, art. 7, § 13. The enabling legislation specified
that the legislature, governor, supreme court, and heads of certain state agen-
cies responsible for youth and crime, would each appoint certain members to
the 20-person Task Force. Id.
A legislative impasse provided the impetus to create the Task Force. Some
legislators wanted to "get tough" by amending the juvenile certification statute
and expanding the use of juvenile felony convictions to enhance adult
sentences. See Mu-N. S.F. 1850, 77th Leg. (1992) (proposing adult criminal
prosecution of any previously waived juvenile, and modification of the Minne-
sota Sentencing Guidelines to count all felony convictions of juveniles 15 years
or older as equivalent to adult felony convictions within the criminal history
score). Some legislators wanted to expand juveniles' procedural protections, es-
pecially the right to counsel. Additional proposals emerged to implement juve-
nile sentencing guidelines and probation standards. MmN. S.F. 2006, 77th Leg.
(1992); MINN. S.F. 1687, 77th Leg. (1992). Without the votes necessary to pass
either conservative "get tough" sentencing laws or more liberal procedural re-
forms, some legislators introduced bills to create an advisory juvenile justice
task force. MINN. S.F. 1687A, 77th Leg. § 2 (1992); MmN. S.F. 628, 77th Leg.
§ 1 (1992). The legislature recognized the complex inter-relation of juvenile
waiver, sentencing, and procedural issues, and created a Task Force to develop
a coherent and systematic response to youth crime and violence. See Interview
with Sen. Allan Spear, Chair, Senate Judiciary Committee (Oct. 6,1993) (on file
with author) ("We recognized that we couldn't deal with the issues piecemeal.
We needed to create a coherent, systematic response so that the pieces fit
together.").
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2) the retention ofjuvenile delinquency adjudication records and
their use in subsequent adult proceedings;
3) the feasibility of a system of statewide juvenile guidelines;
4) the effectiveness of various juvenile justice system approaches,
including behavior modification and treatment; and
5) the extension to juveniles of a nonwaivable right to counsel
and a right to a jury trial.91
In May 1993, the legislature expanded the Task Force's man-
date to assess the need for secure juvenile facilities. 92
The Minnesota Supreme Court formed the Advisory Task
Force on the Juvenile Justice System on October 22, 1992, and
the Task Force presented its Final Report to the legislature in
January 1994.93 The final legislation unanimously passed both
houses on April 29, 1994.9 4 Governor Arne Carlson signed the
legislation on May 5, 1994, although he line-item vetoed most of
the funds appropriated to implement the legislation. 95
Although the 1993 Juvenile Justice Task Force was not the
first group in Minnesota to examine issues of juvenile justice ad-
ministration-transfer of juveniles to criminal court, expanded
procedural safeguards, access to counsel, or sentencing policy-
it was the only group whose recommendations the legislature
enacted. In the previous decade and a half, at least five major
state-sponsored law reform groups examined some or all the
problems that the Juvenile Justice Task Force considered.
9 6
Their research, analyses, recommendations, and especially polit-
ical failures provide the context for the 1993 Task Force.
A. PREVIOUS MINNESOTA JUVENILE JuSTIcE TASK FORCES
The first recent state-sponsored body to consider issues of
juvenile justice was the Minnesota Supreme Court's 1975-76 Ju-
91. 1992 Minn. Laws 571, art. 7, § 13, subd. 4.
92. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
93. Id. at iii.
94. The Senate approved the conference committee report on April 29,
1994, by a vote of 62-0. Juvenile Justice Bill Passes, BRIEFLY: MINN. SENATE
WK. IN REV. (Senate Pubs., St. Paul, Minn.), May 10, 1994, at 3, 3. The House
bill, which was somewhat different, was passed on March 17, 1994, by a vote of
129-0. Juvenile Justice, SESSION WEuY. (Minn. House of Reps.), Mar. 18, 1994,
at 6, 6. The House and Senate approved a compromise bill on April 29. Patricia
L. Baden, Legislature OKs Juvenile Crime Bill, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis), Apr.
30, 1994, at lB.
95. See infra notes 713-715 and accompanying text (discussing Carlson's
vetoes and ensuing public reaction).
96. See infra notes 97-149 and accompanying text.
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venile Justice Study Commission.97 This Commission found
that juvenile court judges' discretion in making waiver decisions
frequently yielded disparate results.98 Specifically, the Commis-
sion found pronounced differences in certification practices in
urban and rural counties throughout Minnesota. 99 Urban of-
fenders considered for certification generally had committed
more serious offenses and had more extensive prior records than
their rural counterparts.100 Yet, despite these differences, juve-
nile court judges certified more rural youngsters for adult prose-
cution.10 ' In addition to urban-rural disparities, the Study
Commission also found that discretionary waiver may produce
racial disparities.' 0 2
The Study Commission attributed the geographic and racial
disparities to the inherent ambiguity in the "suitability to treat-
ment" and "threat to public safety" waiver criteria.' 03 Despite
its criticism of the statutory criteria, however, the Commission
did not recommend specific changes to clarify the standards.' 04
Susequently, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in In re Dahl,10 5
urged the legislature to revise the statute. 10 6
97. In September 1975, Minnesota Supreme Court Chief Justice Robert J.
Sheran appointed a panel of 17 people to examine the role ofjuvenile courts and
to recommend changes in a number of areas, including referral of some youths
for adult criminal prosecution. JUVENUE JusTica STUDY COMM'N, MINN.
SUPREME COURT, REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT 1 (Nov. 1976).
98. See id. at 61-79. See generally Barry C. Feld, Reference of Juvenile Of-fenders for Adult Prosecution: The Legislative Alternative to Asking Unanswer-
able Questions, 62 MINN. L. REv. 515, 551-54 (1978) (analyzing Study
Commission findings).
99. JuvEImLE JUSTICE STUDY COmMeN, supra note 97, at 67.
100. Id. at 71 tbls. 13-14, 73 tbl. 16. In addition to more recorded offenses,
certified urban youths had records extending over a longer period of time and
more appearances on delinquency petitions than did rural youths. Id. at 72-73
tbls. 16-17.
101. Id. at 74 tbl. 19; see also Feld, supra note 72, at 41-46 (reporting similar
geographic disparities a decade later).
102. For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court Study Commission found
that although only 15.1% of the offenses referred to Hennepin Juvenile Court in
1975 were committed by African-American youths, 44.8% of the cases consid-
ered for certification in Hennepin County involved black juveniles. JUvENLE
JUSTICE STmUY COMM'N, supra note 97, at 68.
103. Id. at 21, 77.
104. Id. at 22. Rather, the Study Commission recommended that the De-
partment of Corrections assume greater responsibility to develop treatment
programs and facilities for those older and more sophisticated juveniles who are
most likely to be involved in certification proceedings. Id.
105. In re Dahl, 278 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1979).
106. See infra notes 217-236 accompanying text (discussing Dahl and legis-
lative response).
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In 1980 the Minnesota Legislature created a rebuttable pre-
sumption-a prima facie case-that youths charged with cer-
tain offenses and prior records should be tried as adults.' 07 The
Minnesota Supreme Court officially reactivated the Study Com-
mission'08 and it compared certification practices before and af-
ter the revisions.' 0 9 Analyses of certification practices from
1979-81 revealed that very few rural juveniles met the new
prima facie case criteria. In urban counties, prosecutors did not
file reference motions" o against many juveniles who did meet
the criteria, and two-thirds of those youths that judges actually
referred to adult criminal courts did not meet the presumptive
criteria."' Although the Commission concluded that "the prima
facie criteria do not provide reliable guides to reference deci-
sions,"112 the legislature did not reconsider the 1980 "prima fa-
cie case" certification statute.
In 1980, Governor Albert Quie created a Juvenile Justice
Task Force to focus on juvenile criminal offenders and justice
administration. 113 The Task Force recommended that counties
develop uniform, written guidelines to divert all similarly situ-
ated juvenile offenders away from the juvenile justice system
107. See infra notes 229-232 and accompanying text.
108. JUVEILE JUSTICE STUDY COMl'N, MINN. SUPREIE COURT, CHANGING
BOUNDARIES OF THE JUVENILE COURT: PRACTICE AND POLICY IN MINNESOTA
(Mar. 1982) (noting that the Commission was reactivated to draft uniform rules
of procedure for Minnesota's juvenile courts and to examine further juvenile
court jurisdiction over status offenders, diversion practices, and certification of
serious offenders).
109. Id. at 2.
110. A reference motion is filed to refer a juvenile to be tried as an adult.
111. Juvmqmx JUSTICE STUDY COMM'N, supra note 108, at 20-21. An evalua-
tion of the Minnesota waiver process found similar data. Lee A. Osbun & Peter
A. Rode, Prosecuting Juveniles as Adults: The Quest for "Objective" Decisions,
22 CRIMINOLOGY 187, 194-95 (1984). As the authors note, however, "[flollowing
enactment of the revised statute, there was a slight increase in the proportion
of transferred cases that did satisfy the [offense] criteria-from 22.2% before
enactment to 34.5% after enactment." Id. at 195. Furthermore, the adoption of
prima facie offense criteria for waiver seems to have had little impact on the
numbers or characteristics of youths criminally prosecuted in Minnesota. Id. at
197-98. Osbun and Rode conclude that "[diespite its defects and potential for
abuse, the traditional discretionary process used by prosecutors and juvenile
court judges to make waiver decisions appears to be more successful than the
objective criteria alone in identifying the more serious juvenile offenders." Id.
at 199-200.
112. JUVENILE JUSTICE STUDY COMM'N, supra note 108, at 22. Despite this
conclusion, the Commission again did not recommend alternatives, but simply
reiterated its support for judicial discretion. Id. at 23.
113. Exec. Order No. 80-2., reprinted in Final Report of the Governor's Task
Force on Juvenile Justice 19 (Nov. 1981) (on file with author).
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equally.114 It also found that juvenile detention facilities often
operated over capacity, in part because of a lack of objective cri-
teria to regulate detention decisions. It thus recommended that
only juveniles who pose an "imminent danger of causing serious
harm to others or who have a history of not appearing for court
hearings" be placed in secure detention. 1 5
The Task Force found that many juveniles did not receive
procedural justice."16 To remedy these procedural deficiencies,
it recommended that all citizens charged with crime receive the
same constitutional rights," 7 including the right to a jury
trial 18 and a public trial.119 Finally, the Task Force noted that
individualized sentencing discretion resulted in extensive dis-
parities, with little evidence of corresponding treatment effec-
tiveness. 120  Accordingly, it recommended proportional
sentencing guidelines based on the seriousness of a juvenile's of-
fense and prior record.121
In 1983, at the direction of the legislature, the Minnesota
Juvenile Justice Advisory Committee awarded a grant to the
State Planning Agency to appoint a Task Force to study and rec-
114. Final Report of the Governor's Task Force on Juvenile Justice, supra
note 113, at 7 ("The Task Force ... feels compelled to support a new emphasis
on equal treatment of children in like situations.").
115. Id. at 8.
116. Id. at 10-11. A lack of statewide rules of procedure in juvenile court,
substantial procedural variations between counties, and "carelessness in some
courts" in adhering to due process and evidentiary standards denied juveniles
procedural justice. Id. In 1983, the Minnesota Supreme Court promulgated
uniform, statewide rules of procedure for juvenile court. See generally Feld,
supra note 15 (discussing changing conceptions of juvenile courts and critiquing
Minnesota procedures adopted in 1983).
117. Final Report of the Governor's Task Force on Juvenile Justice, supra
note 113, at 5 ("[Ihe basis for a fair and humane juvenile justice system in
Minnesota includes provision of the same constitutional rights ... to all citizens
subject to the criminal justice system regardless of age.").
118. Id. at 10. The Task Force noted that jury trials would reduce the ef-
fects of judicial bias, enhance the visibility of the process, facilitate appellate
court review by requiring trial judges to articulate through jury instructions
their views of the applicable law, and honestly acknowledge the "punishments
now hidden under terms like 'rehabilitation! and 'best interest of the child'." Id.
at 11.
119. Id. at 10. The Task Force concluded that confidential juvenile court
hearings frustrate accountability and foster abuses: "[Pkivate trials can serve
to establish a 'star chamber' atmosphere in court proceedings. Currently ac-
tions by judges and the faults and weaknesses of the juvenile system occur
without the benefit of public scrutiny .... " Id. at 12.
120. Id. at 13.
121. Id. The 1980 Governor's Task Force did not introduce any legislation to
implement its far-reaching recommendations.
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ommend changes to juvenile delinquency and child protection
laws. The Code Revision Task Force prepared a draft report and
sponsors introduced proposed legislation in the 1986 legislative
session.122 The recommendations proposed comprehensive revi-
sion of the juvenile code and procedures for involuntary civil
commitment of young people.
The Code Revision Task Force proposed major changes in
the legislative purpose statement,123 the scope of juvenile court
jurisdiction 124 and pretrial detention procedures. 125 It recog-
nized that access to counsel is fundamental to redress the imbal-
ance of power between the individual and the state. 126 It
proposed limits to judicial sentencing discretion, and required
courts to impose the least restrictive disposition appropriate and
sanctions proportionate to the seriousness of the offense. 127 De-
spite the Code Revision Task Force's proposals to convert Min-
nesota's juvenile courts into a "just deserts" model like adult
criminal courts, 128 it did not recommend any changes any in
waiver procedures or substantively rationalize transfer criteria.
The Code Revision Task Force also proposed major revisions
in the process to involuntarily commit adolescents for mental
health or chemical dependency "treatment."12 9 Existing law
provides minimal procedural or substantive protections for
youths whose parents "voluntarily" commit them to restrictive
122. See MINN. H.F. 774, 74th Leg. (1985); MIN. S.F. 753, 74th Leg. (1985);
Preliminary Draft of the Minnesota Juvenile Code Revision Task Force's Report
to the Legislature (Oct. 3, 1985) (on file with author) [hereinafter Code Revision
Report].
123. Code Revision Report, supra note 122, at 1-2.
124. Id. at 3-9 (proposing minimum ages for juvenile court delinquency
jurisdiction).
125. Id. at 14-17 (proposing restrictive criteria for pre-trial detention).
126. The legislative proposals strengthened juveniles' access to an attorney
at interrogation, as well as after the filing of a formal delinquency petition, and
established a presumption against waiver. Id. at 23-25. In addition, there was
a presumption against waiver. The Task Force also recommended the right to a
jury trial. Id. at 25-27.
127. Id. at 28-29. The Task Force expressed concern that juvenile court
judges' abuse their broad discretion to sentence in a youth's "best interests." Id.
at 30.
128. For a discussion of continuing vitality of separate systems for juveniles
and adults see generally Stephen Wizner & Mary F. Keller, The Penal Model of
Juvenile Justice: Is Juvenile Court Delinquency Jurisdiction Obsolete?, 52
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1120, 1133 (1977) (noting that determinate and proportional
criminal sentences erode the rationale for a separate juvenile system), and
Francis B. McCarthy, Delinquency Dispositions Under the Juvenile Justice
Standards: The Consequences of a Change of Rationale, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1093
(1977) (questioning the need for a separate juvenile court).
129. Code Revision Report, supra note 122, at 41-48.
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in-patient psychiatric or chemical dependency facilities. 130 Ac-
cordingly, the Code Revision Task Force proposed provisions
similar to those used to commit or admit mentally ill or chemi-
cally dependent adults to regulate the civil commitment of
adolescents. 131
130. MxNN. STAT. § 253B.04. Many youths who formerly would have been
status offenders, especially those who are middle-class and female, now are di-
verted into the private mental health or chemical dependency treatment sys-
tems by diversion, court referral, or voluntary parental commitment. Ira M.
Schwartz, Hospitalization of Adolescents for Psychiatric and Substance Abuse
Treatment, 10 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 473, 473 (1989).
The Supreme Court inParham v. J.R. ruled that the only process juveniles
are due when their parents "voluntarily" commit them to secure treatment fa-
cilities is a physician's determination that it is medically appropriate. 442 U.S.
584, 609 (1979). As a consequence, most states' civil commitment laws to not
provide juveniles with as stringent procedural safeguards as they do adults.
See generally Beverly Balos & Ira Schwartz, Psychiatric and Chemical Depen-
dency Treatment of Minors: The Myth of Voluntary Treatment and the Capacity
to Consent, 92 Dim. L. REv. 631 (1988); Louis A. Chiafullo, Innocents Impris-
oned: The Deficiencies of the New Jersey Standard Governing the Involuntary
Commitment of Children, 24 SEroN HALL L. REv. 1507 (1994); James W. Ellis,
Volunteering Children: Parental Commitment of Minors to Mental Institutions,
62 CAL. L. Ruv. 840 (1974).
Many civil commitments of juveniles result from status-like social or be-
havioral conflicts, self-serving parental motives, and medical entrepreneurs
coping with under-utilized hospitals. See Lois A. Weithorn, Mental Hospitaliza-
tion of Troublesome Youth: An Analysis of Skyrocketing Admission Rates, 40
STAN. L. REv. 773, 774 (1988) (arguing that hospitalizing troublesome youths is
generally an inappropriate way to deal with them). Coinciding with the deinsti-
tutionalization of status offenders in Minnesota, the rate of juvenile psychiatric
commitments in Minneapolis-St. Paul hospitals doubled between 1976 and
1983, from 91 to 184 youths per 100,000. Ira M. Schwartz et al., The Hidden
System of Juvenile Control, 30 Cruim & DELNQ. 371, 375 (1984). Similarly,
between 1978 and 1984 in Minnesota, juvenile psychiatric inpatients as a pro-
portion of total inpatients increased from 16% to 26%, and juvenile chemical
dependency inpatients in hospitals and treatment centers increased from 17%
to 22%. Marilyn Jackson-Beeck, Institutionalizing Juveniles for Psychiatric
and Chemical Dependency Treatment in Minnesota: Ten Years' Experience
(Sept. 27, 1985) (unpublished report, on file with author). The combination of
psychiatric hospitals seeking profits, insurance, and medicaid coverage for in-
patient mental health care, and the malleability of diagnostic categories, per-
mits deviance to be "medicalized" and troublesome children to be incarcerated
without meaningful judicial supervision. See Schwartz et al., supra, at 378;
Schwartz, supra, at 474-77; Weithorn, supra, at 798-808; Marc N. Sperber,
Comment, Short-Sheeting the Psychiatric Bed: State-Level Strategies to Curtail
the Unnecessary Hospitalization of Adolescents in For-Profit Mental Health Fa-
cilities, 18 AM. J.L. & ME. 251, 252 (1992).
131. See MxAN. STAT. § 253B.04. Legislative efforts to regulate the civil com-
mitment of minors are not unique to Minnesota. In the aftermath ofParham, a
number of jurisdictions re-examined or revised their commitment statutes for
juveniles. See, e.g., Carol K Dillon et al., In re Roger S.: The Impact of a
Child's Due Process Victory on the California Mental Health System, 70 CAL. L.
REv. 373, 404-13, 467-72 (1982); see also Lee E. Teitelbaum & James W. Ellis,
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The scope of the juvenile code revisions and the proposed
laws to regulate civil commitment of youths provoked massive
opposition from law enforcement officials, prosecutors, juvenile
court judges, court services personnel, and mental health and
chemical dependency treatment providers. 132 Despite three
years of hearings, research, and meetings, the Code Revision
Task Force failed to mobilize a coalition for juvenile court law
reform.133
The Minnesota Supreme Court appointed the Juvenile Rep-
resentation Study Committee in 1989 to examine "the right to
legal counsel in juvenile justice matters and recommend criteria
for that right to the legislature."13 4 The Study Committee found
that most juveniles in Minnesota lack access to counsel.' 3 5 It
The Liberty Interest of Children: Due Process Rights and their Application, 12
F ,e. L.Q. 153 (1978) (exploring constitutional issues surrounding "voluntary"
commitment of children by parents); Susan A. Turner, Comment, Parham v.
J.R.: Civil Psychiatric Commitment of Minors, 5 J. Comemp. H TH L. &
PoL'y 263, 269-73 (1989) (discussing various aspects of commitment procedures
for juveniles).
132. The Minnesota Senate Judiciary Committee held 34 hours of hearings,
and most of the testimony opposed various aspects of the legislation. See, e.g.,
Mike Kaszuba, Revised Juvenile Code Passed by Senate Panel, STAR TRB. (Min-
neapolis), Feb. 18, 1986, at 2B (opponents of bill offered more than 100 amend-
ments to derail legislation); Mike Kaszuba, Juvenile-Code Revision Appears in
Trouble, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Feb. 20, 1986, at 1B (legislation reflects
three years of testimony and hearings to make juvenile justice system more
accountable and to prevent improper placement of juveniles); Sam Newlund,
Juvenile Code Reform Moves in Legislature After Fine Tuning, STAR TRm. (Min-
neapolis), at 1B (jury trials opposed by many juvenile court judges and
prosecutors).
133. Its only legislative achievement was to open to the public delinquency
hearings for 16- and 17-year-old youths charged with felony offenses. See
MINN. STAT. § 260.155(1) (1986); supra text accompanying note 70. The fiuit-
less experience of the Code Revision Task Force influenced the 1993 Juvenile
Justice Task Force in preparing its policy recommendations.
134. The 1989 legislature authorized the Minnesota Supreme Court to cre-
ate a Juvenile Representation Study Committee. 1989 Minn. Laws 335, art. 3,
§ 43. On October 16, 1989, Chief Justice Peter S. Popovich appointed a 13-
member committee. Order Establishing the Juvenile Representation Study
Committee and Appointing Members, NO-89-1824 (Minn. Oct. 16, 1989).
135. [It appears that in Minnesota, like many other states, less than
half of all juveniles adjudicated delinquent receive the assistance of
counsel to which they are constitutionally entitled. In 1984, only
46.8% of juveniles were represented. In 1986, only 45.3% [of] youths
had lawyers. And in 1988, only 47.8% had attorneys at their adjudica-
tion. Professor Feld reported enormous county-by-county variations in
rates of representation within Minnesota, ranging from a high of 100%
to a low of less than 5%. A substantial minority of youths removed
from their homes (30.7%) and those confined in state juvenile correc-
tional institutions (26.5%) lacked representation at the time of their
adjudication and disposition.
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also reported geographic disparities in rates of representa-
tion.136 The Study Committee concluded that most juveniles
were unrepresented because juvenile court judges found that
they waived their right to counsel. In Minnesota, as in most
states, courts use the adult standard of "knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary" waiver under the "totality of the circum-
stances." 37 The Study Committee determined that allowing
juveniles to relinquish their right to counsel under the "totality
of the circumstances" was an undesirable policy. 138 The ques-
tionable validity of many juveniles' waiver of the right to counsel
raises collateral legal issues. 139
The Study Committee recommended mandatory, non-waiv-
able appointment of counsel for juveniles charged with felony or
gross misdemeanor offenses, and in any proceding that may
lead to out-of-home placement.140 It recommended mandatory
consultation with counsel prior to any waiver of counsel by
juveniles charged with misdemeanor offenses. 141 Finally, it rec-
ommended the creation of a juvenile appellate division within
the Office of State Public Defender. 14 2
Although the Study Committee expected its proposals to
more than double the costs of defense representation, it was un-
able to estimate either the current expenditures on defense rep-
JUVENILE REPRESENTATION STUDY Comm., REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA SuPREmE
COURT 11 (1990) [hereinafter STUDy CoMM., REPORT]; see infra notes 646-715
and accompanying text.
136. STuDY CoMM., REPORT, supra note 135, at 12 (stating that urban youths
are most likely to be represented and that the majority of rural youths charged
with felony offenses did not have access to counsel).
137. See generally Feld, supra note 15, at 169-90; infra note 665 and accom-
panying text. Prior to the 1994 amendments, the Minnesota Legislature also
believed that youngsters could make "knowing and intelligent" waiver decisions
without parental concurrence or consultation with an attorney. MINN. STAT.
§ 260.155(8) (1992) ("Waiver of any right... must be an express waiver intelli-
gently made by the child after the child has been fully and effectively informed
of the right being waived.").
138. STUDY CoMM., REPORT, supra note 135, at 15 (finding that waiver in-
creases judicial convenience and encourages juveniles to accept responsibility
for their actions).
139. Because appointment of counsel or a valid waiver is a constitutional
prerequisite to incarceration, removal from home or confinement of an unrepre-
sented juvenile may be improper; similarly, appointment of counsel or a valid
waiver may be a prerequisite to use prior convictions to enhance subsequent
sentences as a juvenile or as an adult. See infra notes 704-709 and accompany-
ing text.
140. STUDY CoMM., REPORT, supra note 135, at 19.
141. Id. at 21.
142. Id. at 22.
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resentation, or to predict their fiscal impact. 143 As a result of
Minnesota's 1991 budget deficit and fiscal austerity, the legisla-
ture did not enact any of the Study Committee's recommenda-
tions. The 1993 Juvenile Justice Task Force later adopted the
Study Committee's recommendations and the 1994 legislature
enacted its proposals. 144
The Minnesota Supreme Court's Race Bias Task Force145
examined the impact of judicial administration on racial minori-
ties between 1990 and 1993, and created a Juvenile and Family
Law Committee to investigate, among other things, race-related
differences in juvenile courts. 146 It also identified significant
disparities in the pre-trial detention and post-conviction disposi-
tion of minority youths in Minnesota's urban and non-metropoli-
tan juvenile courts. 147 It attributed the racial and geographic
143. Id. at 23. Although the Committee could not estimate current expendi-
tures, it recognized that total costs would more than double, because fewer than
50% of those juveniles entitled to representation received counsel, and because
the increased presence of defense lawyers would entail additional appearances
by county attorneys as well. The Committee recommended further study to de-
termine the costs of implementing its recommendations. Id.
144. See infra notes 689-700 and accompanying text.
145. The Minnesota Legislature and the Supreme Court created the Minne-
sota Supreme Court Task Force on Racial Bias in the Judicial System in De-
cember 1990. The 36-member Race Bias Task Force, chaired by Supreme Court
Justice Rosalie Wahl, examined whether "statutes, rules, practices or conduct
work unfairness or undue hardship on minorities in our courts" and proposed
reform measures to eliminate racial bias and evaluate their effectiveness. MIN-
NESOTA SUPREME CouRT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL BIAS IN THE JUDICIAL Sys., F-
NAL REPORT 1 (May 1993) [hereinafter RACIAL BIAS, FINAL REPORT].
146. Id. at 2. Concurrently with Minnesota's efforts, many other states cre-
ated similar task forces or commissioned research to examine racial bias and
those investigations consistently revealed racial disparities in juvenile justice
administration. See infra note 539 (discussing research and data regarding ra-
cial bias in juvenile courts).
147. RAcLAL BIAS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 145, at 108. Although most de-
linquency petitions lacked race-specific information, the Race Bias Task Force
analyzed data from Hennepin County where 80% of the cases included race
data, and from 15 non-urban counties that collected sufficient data for racial
analyses. Id. at 98. In the Hennepin County juvenile court sample, the largest
proportion of minority juveniles were African-Americans (29.4%) and Native
American (8.5%), while the largest proportions of minority youths in the out-
state sample were Native American (16.4%) and Hispanic (4.0%). Id. at 2 app.
D.
The Race Bias Task Force found significant geographic disparities in juve-
nile detention and home removal practices between Hennepin and the outstate
counties. Id. at 17. More disturbingly, the Task Force research also "uncovered
a significant association between race and detention rates in both the Hennepin
and outstate samples." Id. at 18.
For example, the Race Bias Task Force study ofjuvenile court case process-
ing data found that for
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disparities in detention and sentencing to the discretion inher-
ent in juvenile justice decision-making. 148 The 1993 Juvenile
Justice Task Force subsequently re-affirmed the Race Bias Task
Force's recommendations to reduce racial disparities at
detention.149
Spanning a decade and a half, five state study committees
and task forces examined Minnesota's juvenile courts. Regard-
less of their political affiliations or the source of their appoint-
ments, these groups identified similar problems. All recognized
the profound procedural deficiencies of juvenile courts, espe-
first-time delinquents in Hennepin County, there is, in fact, a signifi-
cant relation between race and detention.... Minority youths are de-
tained at nearly two and one-half times the rate of whites in each of
these [offense] categories. Even for repeat delinquents within the
same three offense categories a higher rate of detention existed.
Id. at 101-02.
The Race Bias Task Force findings strongly corroborated my research that
reported urban minority juveniles were disproportionately at risk for pre-trial
detention and home removal. Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile
Court: An Empirical Study of When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They
Make, 79 J. CrM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1261-74, 1311-17 (1989). Control-
ling for the seriousness of the present offense and prior record, I reported that
minority juveniles were more than twice as likely to be detained as white
juveniles. Id. at 1271-74. Holding other variables constant, black and Native
American juveniles were also more likely to be removed from their homes than
were similarly situated white youths. Id. at 1314-17.
This research analyzed the impact of counsel on juvenile justice adminis-
tration and reported that in Hennepin County, minority juveniles were more
likely to be represented than were whites. Id. at 1266-68. Unfortunately, that
research also "provides strong and consistent evidence that representation by
counsel redounds to the disadvantage of ajuvenile." Id. at 1330. The Race Bias
Task Force noted that "[t]he Courts should use great care so as not to be influ-
enced by the pre-adjudication determination in making a final disposition. This
merits further study by the Juvenile Justice Task Force of the Supreme Court."
RACIAL BIAS, FrNAL REPORT, supra note 145, at 109 (emphasis added).
The Race Bias Task Force findings also corroborated that a pattern of 'jus-
tice by geography" prevailed in which geographic locale affected juvenile courts'
detention and sentencing practices. See Feld, supra note 67, at 162.
148. The report stated:
The juvenile court system still operates, to a certain degree, under the
model of 'parens patriae'. Judges have a great deal of discretion to do
whatever they feel is in the best interest of the juvenile. There are no
rules that stipulate juveniles who are charged with similar offenses
must be treated in a like manner .... Regardless of whatever good
intentions the juvenile court system may possess, it appears that it is
in need of a serious policy evaluation at this time.
RAcLAL BIAs, FINAL REPORT, supra note 145, at 19 app. D.
149. The Juvenile Justice Task Force "strongly endorses the recommenda-
tions put forth by The Task Force on Racial Bias and recommends that the
Legislature ensure resources are available for the implementation of The Racial
Bias Task Force recommendations." TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2,
at 67.
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cially the inadequate access to defense representation. Further-
more, the 1980 Governor's Task Force and the 1985 Code
Revision Task Force recognized that juvenile courts perform the
same social control functions as criminal courts, and recom-
mended procedural parity for juveniles, including the right to a
jury trial.
The various groups also agreed that juvenile court judges'
individualized discretion, whether exercised to detain youths, to
sentence them in their "best interests," or to assess their "ame-
nability to treatment" and transfer them to criminal court, pro-
duced inconsistent and unequal results, as well as racial and
geographic disparities. Several groups recommended objective
"risk assessment" instruments or sentencing guidelines to rem-
edy the ills of individualization at detention and disposition.
These issues remained unresolved as the 1994 legislature con-
fronted the central issues of juvenile administration against a
backdrop of escalating youth violence.
B. TnE 1993 JUVENILE JusTICE TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP AND
OPERAION
The legislature named its members to the 1993 Juvenile
Justice Task Force shortly after it passed the 1992 Omnibus
Crime Bill, and Chief Justice A.M. Keith made his appointments
by mid-summer 1992.150 At its first meeting, the Task Force
elected Justice Sandra S. Gardebring to serve as chair. 151 The
Task Force formed subcommittees to address the bundles of is-
sues that the legislative charge posed. Although many Task
Force members joined one or more subcommittees, a smaller
group of more active Task Force members overlapped several
working groups, heavily influenced the subcommittee delib-
150. Due to delays in appointment by Governor Arne Carlson, however, the
supreme court did not issue its order to establish the Task Force until October
22, 1992. The first meeting of the 20-member Task Force convened on Novem-
ber 24, 1992. It was apparent at that first meeting that members from "commu-
nities of color" were underrepresented in a group dealing with crime and justice
issues that disproportionately affect minority youths. Within two months, the
Task Force added five additional members to more adequately reflect the racial
make-up of juvenile courts' clientele. When the legislature added examination
of secure juvenile facilities to the Task Force's charge in May 1993, it appointed
two additional legislative members to the Task Force.
151. Minutes of the Juvenile Justice Task Force 4 (Nov. 24, 1992) (on file
with author).
1995] 997
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
erations and discussions, and coordinated the policy
recommendations.152
Throughout 1993, the Task Force met monthly, and sub-
committees met more frequently. Before its January 15, 1993,
meeting, each subcommittee drafted a "charge" to define the pol-
icy issues that the legislative mandate posed, identify types and
sources of information necessary to inform Task Force discus-
sions, and formulate a work-plan. At subsequent meetings, ju-
venile justice practitioners, state data analysts, community
activists, and scholars provided information, research, and data
both to the subcommittees and to the Task Force. The Task
Force conducted focus group meetings,153 public hearings,
54
and site visits. 155
The Task Force gathered information about juvenile court
sentencing practices. A representative from the state of Wash-
ington described that state's juvenile guidelines, which impose
152. The Task Force's core "working group" consisted of: Justice Sandra
Gardebring, executive committee members Barry Feld, John Stuart, Judge
Philip Bush, Judge Larry Jorgenson, James Hayes, and Richard Quick, and
Task Force members Roxanne Bartsh, Freddie Davis, Judge Leslie Metzen, and
Karel Moersfelder. Although the legislature appointed six legislative members,
only Sen. Jane Ranum and Rep. Bill Macklin actively participated in the
process.
153. Members of the Task Force held focus group meetings with representa-
tives of the following groups: prosecutors, corrections personnel, juvenile de-
fense attorneys, members of the Supreme Court's Racial Bias Task Force, the
Family and Juvenile Law Committee, law enforcement professionals, treatment
providers and health care workers, education leaders, guardians ad litem and
social service agency personnel, parents of juvenile offenders, and victims of
juvenile crime. See Advisory Task Force on the Juvenile Justice System, Sum-
mary Report on Focus Group Meetings: February 2, 1993 to March 4, 1993, at
1-2 (unpublished report, on file with author).
154. In 1993 the Task Force held public hearings at eight locations around
Minnesota. The testimony at public hearings moved Task Force members, as
victims of juvenile crime and those whose children the juvenile justice process
victimized described their experiences. See, e.g., Kevin Diaz, Juvenile Justice
System Takes Verbal Beating, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis), Mar. 26, 1993, at 1B
(describing testimony by relatives of victims and juvenile delinquents). One re-
curring theme was the juvenile courts' failure to respond to "children of color"
adequately and justly. Minutes of the Juvenile Justice Task Force 8 (Apr. 23,
1993) (on file with author).
155. In spring and early summer 1993, Task Force members made site visits
to a number ofjuvenile detention and correctional facilities in Minnesota. Task
force members toured facilities and held focus group meetings with incarcer-
ated juveniles. In addition, several Task Force members met with a group of
juvenile court judges in Madison, Wisconsin, on August 25 and 26, to assess
Wisconsin's experience with providing jury trials for juveniles. See infra notes
642-643 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of jury trial on juvenile
courts).
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determinate and proportional sentences based on a youth's age,
the seriousness of the offense, and prior record. 156 Representa-
tives from the Dodge-Fillmore-Olmsted ("DFO") Department of
156. WASH. Rnv. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010 (West 1993). The state of Washing-
ton's "just deserts" sentencing principles represent a dramatic departure from
traditional juvenile court sentencing practices. See generally Jeffrey K Day,
Comment, Juvenile Justice in Washington: A Punitive System in Need of Reha-
bilitation, 16 U. PuGEr SOUND L. REv. 399 (1992) (criticizing Washington!s sys-
tem); Feld, supra note 9 (analyzing the trend toward punishment); Richard G.
Patrick & Timothy TA. Jensen, Changes in Rights and Procedures in Juvenile
Offense Proceedings, 14 GoNz. L. REv. 313 (1979); Syposium, Juvenile Law, 14
GONz. L. REv. 285 (1979) (symposium on the revised Washington juvenile code);
Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L.
REv. 503 (1984); Report by Anne Schneider & Donna Schram, A Comparison of
Intake and Sentencing Decisi6n-Making Under Rehabilitation and Justice
Models of the Juvenile System (Mar. 1983) (unpublished report, on file with
author) [hereinafter Schneider & Schram, Intake and Sentencing Decision-
Making]; Report by Anne Schneider & Donna Schram, A Justice Philosophy for
the Juvenile Court (Mar. 1983) (unpublished report, on file with author) [here-
inafter Schneider & Schram, Justice Philosophy].
Under the Washington guidelines, presumptive sentences for juveniles are
determinate and proportional to the age of the offender, the seriousness of the
offense, and the juvenile's prior record. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 13.40.010(2)(d). See generally Patrick & Jensen, supra, at 313 ("The juvenile
will no longer be treated as a delinquent possessing a misguided perception of
society; rather, he will be classified as an offender of society who must be dealt
with in a like manner."); Bruce Fisher et al., Institutional Commitment and
Release Decision-Making for Juvenile Delinquents: An Assessment of Determi-
nate and Indeterminate Approaches, Washington State-A Case Study 1-15(1985) (unpublished study, on file with author). The Washington juvenile code
creates three categories of offenders-serious, middle, and minor-with pre-
sumptive sentences and standard ranges for each. WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 13.40.020 (West Supp. 1995). A sentencing guidelines commission developed
dispositional and presumptive length-of-stay guidelines that are proportional
to the seriousness of the present offense, age, and prior record. Id.
§ 13.40.030(1)(a). The sentencing judge may either impose a sentence within
the standard prescribed range for that offense record, or deviate from the pre-
sumptive sentence by finding with "clear and convincing evidence" that follow-
ing the dispositional guidelines would produce a "manifest injustice." Id.
§ 14.40.160(1).
Evaluations of the revised Washington code concluded that it improved ju-
venile sentencing practices: "Sentences in the post-reform era were considera-
bly more uniform, more consistent, and more proportionate to the seriousness of
the offense and the prior criminal record of the youth than were sentences in
the rehabilitation system which existed before 1978." Schneider & Schram, In-
take and Sentencing Decision-Making, supra, at 76.
Despite increased uniformity, certainty, and proportionality at sentencing,
however, some professional commentators criticize Washington's juvenile sen-
tencing provisions. Although institutional commitments declined in the first
years following the new code's adoption, the number of incarcerated youths in-
creased as more youths acquired extensive prior records. Allen F. Breed & Rob-
ert L. Smith, Reforming Juvenile Justice: A Model or an Ideology 25-27 (n.d.)
(on file with author). The average length of stay has dropped to keep pace with
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Community Corrections described the juvenile dispositional
guidelines that juvenile courts used in those counties. 157 A rep-
resentative from Oregon described its "restorative justice" or
"balanced approach" to sentencing juveniles which gives equal
weight to community protection, accountability, and individual
competency development. 158
The Task Force also received information about waived ju-
venile offenders sentenced for felonies in adult court.159 Profes-
the increase in commitments. Id.; see also Schneider & Schram, Intake and
Sentencing Decision-Making, supra, at 24-30.
Despite the legislation's effort to assure equality and uniformity, another
recent evaluation reveals that significant racial sentencing disparities remain.
At every stage ofjuvenile justice administration-referral, charging, detention,
adjudication, conviction, sentencing, and confinement-minority youths, espe-
cially African-American juveniles, receive disproportionately harsher conse-
quences than do white youths. See George S. Bridges, Racial Disproportionality
in the Juvenile Justice System: Final Report 77-79 (1993) (unpublished report,
on file with author)
157. Minutes of the Juvenile Justice Task Force 3-5 (Feb. 26, 1993) (on file
with author); see Juvenile Dispositional Guidelines Project Comm., Juvenile
Dispositional Guidelines (Nov. 1986) (on file with author). The DFO juvenile
dispositional guidelines are similar to Minnesota's adult sentencing guidelines.
"[Diecisions relating to the basic grid, factors used for mitigating and aggravat-
ing to justify departure, general philosophical statements as well as the format
have been taken from the adult guidelines." Id. at 2. Significantly, however,
the juvenile dispositional guidelines attempt to develop a "dual component" sys-
tem in which the seriousness of a youth's offense and delinquency history estab-
lish a "sanction level" and which allow a "treatment decision to be made within
the sanction level." Id. at 1. The DFO juvenile guidelines calculate sentences
in "units," and a judge may impose alternative dispositions within equivalent
units to accomplish treatment objectives. Id. at 13. "[S]even alternatives are
regularly used and can be equated ... as follows; community work service
hours, fines, counseling hours, street oriented supervision, restricted probation,
regular probation and placement out of the home." Id. at 13. For example,
under the guidelines, a typical first-time misdemeanor shoplifter could receive a
disposition of either 20 hours of community service, a $70 fine, 10 hours of coun-
seling, or 60 days of regular probation. Id. at 24.
An evaluation of the juvenile dispositional guidelines found that they
"seem to be doing what they were intended to do-provide consistent and uni-
form dispositions while addressing the specific needs of the juvenile offender."
Evaluation Program, DFO Community Corrections Sys., Juvenile Dispositional
Guidelines: A Look at Five and One-Half Years 1986 to June 1991, at 2 (1992)
(unpublished report, on file with author).
158. See Minutes of a Special Meeting of the Juvenile Justice Task Force 2-4
& attachment I (May. 14, 1993) (on file with author). For a description of this
approach see infra note 566 and accompanying text.
159. See MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, SENTENCING PRAC-
TICES: JUVENILE OFFENDERS SENTENCED FOR FELONIES IN ADULT COURT (1993).
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission collects data on waived
juveniles convicted of felony offenses in adult criminal courts. Id. at 1. The
number ofjuveniles sentenced as adults rose from 85.in 1981 to 107 in 1991, an
increase of 26%. Id. Although the majority of juveniles sentenced as adults
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sor Richard Frase analyzed the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines' success in reducing disparity and increasing uni-
formity in adult sentencing, while preserving flexibility. He cau-
tioned, however, that a failure to implement guidelines carefully
could increase severity and correctional overcrowding.160
The Task Force examined juvenile rehabilitative programs.
Experts reviewed the evaluation literature, reporting little em-
pirical evidence of treatment effectiveness, 161 but emphasizing
that much evaluation research lacks methodological rigor.' 62
were property offenders (62% in 1991), by virtue of prosecutorial and judicial
selection the relatively few waived juveniles typically have been convicted of
more serious offenses than average adult felons. For example, in 1991, 35% of
juveniles as compared with 25% of adult offenders were convicted of crimes
against the person. Id. at 2. Reflecting the trends in youth violence, "[bletween
1981 and 1991, the number of juveniles sentenced in adult court for person of-
fenses increased by 37%; the increase for property offenders was 18%." Id. The
proportion of juveniles sentenced for homicide and sex offenses reflected the
largest proportion of the increases. Id. Because the juveniles sentenced as
adults were convicted of higher severity level offenses, they received longer
sentences than did adults. Juveniles received an average of 53.4 months com-
pared with 45.1 months for adults (18% longer). Id. at 4.
Despite public fears of youth violence, most juveniles certified to stand trial
as adults in 1992 were charged with property offenses rather than crimes
against the person. Sharon A. Krmpotich, Graphic Summary of Reference
Hearings in Juvenile Court (Apr. 23, 1993) (on file with author). In 1992, 101
juveniles were certified for trial as adults. Id. Of those transferred youths,
more than half (52%) were charged with property crimes, about one-third (35%)
were charged with crimes against the person, and the remainder (13%) were
charged with miscellaneous offenses ranging from weapons violations to dis-
turbing the peace to traffic violations. Id. Because the majority of juveniles
convicted as adults did not commit crimes against the person and had a lower
criminal history score than adult defendants,
the imprisonment rate for juveniles was slightly lower than for
adults.... Of the cases sentenced in 1991 for which the guidelines
recommended prison, the court departed and placed the offender on
probation in 58% of the cases involving juveniles and in 34% of the
cases involving adults.... [Tihe reasons cited by the courts for depart-
ing from recommended prison sentences for juveniles included: the age
of the offender, the offender's amenability to treatment, and the recom-
mendation or agreement of the prosecution.
MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, supra, at 3.
160. Minutes of the Juvenile Justice Task Force 7 (Feb. 26, 1993) (on file
with author); see Richard S. Frase, The Uncertain Future of Sentencing Guide-
lines, 12 LAW & INEQ. J. 1, 40 (1993) (summarizing the three achievements of
Minnesota's Sentencing Guidelines). See generally Richard S. Frase, The Roles
of the Legislature, the Sentencing Commission, and Other Officials Under the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 345 (1993) (evaluat-
ing success of the Guidelines, through 1989, in achieving the Commission's
stated or apparent goals).
161. See infra note 483 (citing studies on the effectiveness of treatment).
162. Dr. David Ward emphasized that in the absence of strong evidence of
effectiveness, all treatment programs should be considered experimental and
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Echoing the findings of earlier Task Forces, some witnesses
strongly cautioned the Task Force against perpetuating the indi-
vidualized treatment model, and instead urged offense-based,
"just deserts" sentencing for juveniles. 163
The Task Force also pondered strategies to reduce racial
disparities in juvenile justice administration. 164 The Minnesota
Supreme Court's Race Bias Task Force documented that urban
and non-metropolitan juvenile courts detained and sentenced
minority youths differently than white youths with similar of-
fenses and prior records. 165 The likely disproportionate impact
on minority youths of changes in waiver policies deeply dis-
turbed Task Force members.
Another Task Force meeting focused on the delivery of legal
services in juvenile courts. 166 Although state law and court
rules provide that juveniles have a right to counsel, 167 rates of
representation continue to vary substantially around the
state.' 68 In 1992, for example, fewer than half of all delinquents
received the assistance of counsel, and in five of Minnesota's ten
judicial districts, lawyers accompanied fewer than forty percent
ofjuveniles. 169 Differences in methods of delivering and funding
legal services, judicial advisories of the right to counsel, and ju-
dicial policies regarding juveniles' waiver of counsel account for
most of the variation in rates of representation.'70
subject to rigorous evaluation by people other than those conducting the pro-
grams, and that all program funding should include a component for program
evaluation. Minutes of the Juvenile Justice Task Force 5 (July 23, 1993) (on file
with author).
163. Id. at 5. See generally INSTITUTE oF JuDictLL ADMIN., ABA, JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY AND SANCIoNs 34 (1980) (discussing determinate and propor-
tional sentences based on offense); Feld, supra note 9 (discussing shift in juve-
nile justice practice from a rehabilitation-treatment model to a punishment
model).
164. Minutes of the Juvenile Justice Task Force 2-5 (Mar. 26, 1993) (on file
with author).
165. See supra notes 146-148 and accompanying text.
166. Minutes of the Juvenile Justice Task Force 4-7 (Apr. 23, 1993) (on fle
with author).
167. See MINN. STAT. § 260.155(2); MINN. R. Juv. P. 4, in MINNESOTA RuLES
oF CouRT (West 1995) [hereinafter'MINNEsoTA RULES].
168. See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
169. Sharon A. Krmpotich, 1991-92 Attorney Representation Rates: Juve-
nile Delinquency Cases at Adjudication 1 (n.d.) (on file with author).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 137-138 (discussing waiver of coun-
sel injuvenile proceedings). The Task Force surveyed county court administra-
tors and obtained copies of the rights advisories that juveniles received with
their summons and petition. The information contained in those advisories va-
ried considerably. The legal language often was difficult for a typical juvenile to
understand. Cf Karen Saywitz et al., Children's Knowledge ofLegal Terminol-
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The Task Force also examined the need for secure juvenile
facilities for both pre- and post-adjudicated juveniles. 17 1 The
Department of Corrections identified the need for more secure
pre- and post-adjudication facilities, primarily in Hennepin
County, where the detention facility experiences chronic over-
crowding.172 Experts analyzed secure facility policy options.
They generally opposed large, physically-secure facilities, and
instead endorsed small, staff-secure facilities that use rigorous
risk-assessment criteria to screen placements and innovative
programs for those few juveniles who require security.173
The Task Force held two two-day retreats in the fall of 1993
to formulate its legislative recommendations. The retreats pro-
vided Task Force members their first opportunity as a group to
discuss substantive juvenile justice policy, vote for particular
policies, and coordinate subcommittee recommendations.
Although Task Force members initially held widely divergent
policy views, they developed considerable mutual respect and
tolerance of different perspectives as a result of the months of
working together in subcommittees, at Task Force meetings,
and at public hearings and site visits. Task Force members
ogy, 14 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 523, 531-34 (1990) (examining age-related differ-
ences in children's understanding of legal constructs and concluding that
children's abilities to define legal terms develop gradually with age); Trudie F.
Smith, Law Talk: Juveniles' Understanding of Legal Language, 13 J. CRm.
JusT. 339, 350 (1985) (concluding that juveniles' understanding of legal lan-
guage is moderate and confined to procedural terms, and that they do not un-
derstand technical terms or specialized vocabulary of legal profession).
Parents' financial ability to pay may actually discourage representation,
because recoupment provisions authorize a court to appoint counsel for a child
at public expense, and then seek reimbursement for attorney's fees expended on
behalf of the child. MINN. STAT. § 260.251(4) ("[T]he court may inquire into the
ability of the parents to pay for such counsel's services and, after giving the
parents a reasonable opportunity to be heard, may order the parents to pay
attorney's fees."); see In re Welfare of M.S.M., 387 N.W.2d 194, 199-200 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986) (ordering parents to reimburse state $3191).
171. See 1993 Minn. Laws 146, art. 2, § 4, subd. 1 (requesting that the Task
Force assess the state's need for juvenile correctional facilities, including secure
facilities).
172. Minutes of the Juvenile Justice Task Force 5-7 (June 25, 1993) (on file
with author); Report by the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative Commit-
tee, to the Hennepin County Board of Commissioners and the Fourth Judicial
District 1 (Feb. 1994) (unpublished report, on file with author) (noting that
Heunepin detention center housed as many as 110 juveniles in a facility with a
licensed capacity of 87 beds, and that in 1993 the facility was overcrowded 75%
of the time).
173. Minutes of the Juvenile Justice Task Force 3-4 (Aug. 27, 1993) (advo-
cating rigorous risk assessment to assure that only juveniles who pose long
term public safety risks are placed in physically secure facility) (on file with
author).
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were able to disagree in a remarkably civil fashion, and ulti-
mately achieved a surprisingly high degree of consensus. Chair
Justice Gardebring exercised strong leadership to foster una-
nimity and enable the Task Force to speak to the legislature
from a unified position. Throughout the legislative process,
Task Force members emphasized that its recommendations
were a "package deal," and that if legislators attempted to pass
"get tough" sentencing provisions without enacting and funding
corresponding procedural reforms, for example, the proposal's
balance and coherence would unravel.
The Task Force held its final substantive meeting on No-
vember 19, 1993. It adopted recommendations to create several
small, regional secure facilities, and to change legislative and
judicial policies affecting data privacy, juvenile court statistics,
pre-trial diversion, and racial disparities in juvenile justice.174
The Task Force approved the draft outline of the Final Report.
It identified various interest groups whom the proposed legisla-
tion would affect and developed a strategy to enlist their support
for the Task Force's legislative recommendations.1 75
The Task Force released its Final Report at a press confer-
ence timed to coincide with its presentation of recommendations
to the legislature.176 Task Force members met with editorial
174. See TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 61, 67-68.
175. The Executive Committee identified more than 60 interest groups and
individuals whose support would be crucial to the successful adoption of the
legislation. The Committee then assigned Task Force members to meet with
and brief those groups and individuals on the proposals and elicit their support.
See Memorandum of Sandra Gardebring, Chart of Task Force Contacts (Dec. 3,
1993) (on file with author). Task Force members met with representatives of
various juvenile justice constituencies, including those involved with juvenile
prosecution and defense, members of the judiciary, law enforcement agencies,
divisions of state and local goveinment, probation and corrections associations,
communities of color such as the Urban League and Urban Coalition, and a
variety of civic organizations, and with the legislative leadership and committee
chairs in the Minnesota House and Senate. Id.
Task Force members began to consult and coordinate legislative strategies
with many of these groups as Task Force policy recommendations began to
emerge in October 1993. See, e.g., Attorney General et al., 1994 DFL Legisla-
tive Proposals, Protection, Punishment, Prevention (on file with author) (outlin-
ing legislative policies proposed by the Minnesota Attorney General and
Democratic members of the Minnesota House and Senate calling for presump-
tive certification, and the creation of a serious youth offender sentencing cate-
gory, as recommended by the Task Force); Dane Smith, DFLers Target Crime
Committed by Juveniles in New Crime Package, STAR TAIs. (Minneapolis), Dec.
1, 1993, at 1B (outlining DFL proposals).
176. Jack B. Coffman, Panel Proposes More Juvenile Lockups, ST. PAUL PiO-
NEER PREss, Jan. 19, 1994, at IC, 14C (discussing Task Force recommenda-
tions); Kevin Diaz, Tougher Role Seen for Juvenile Courts, STAR Tm.
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boards of the major Twin Cities newspapers and garnered edito-
rial endorsement of the proposals.1 77 Members of the Task
Force, especially Justice Gardebring and Hennepin County Ju-
venile Court Judge Philip Bush, met regularly with the House,
Senate, and Conference committees throughout the legislative
session. Both the Senate and House held hearings at which
members of the Task Force and the public testified. After the
respective houses approved their versions of the bill, a confer-
ence committee met over several days to resolve policy differ-
ences between the two bills. Senator Jane Ranum and
Representative William Macklin, both active members of the
Task Force, ably presented Task Force policy positions in their
respective chambers and in conference.
IlI. THE TASK FORCE PROPOSES AND THE
LEGISLATURE DISPOSES
The legislature charged the Task Force to recommend poli-
cies regarding waiver of juveniles to criminal courts, juvenile
court sentencing practices, the use of juvenile records to sen-
tence young adult criminal offenders, the need for secure facili-
ties, and procedural safeguards in juvenile courts. 178 The most
significant substantive legislative changes affect the sentencing
of youths as adults and as juveniles. They reflect an age and
offense-based continuum of controls from ordinary juvenile de-
linquency through extended juvenile court jurisdiction to adult
prosecution.
This Section provides some legal context and analyzes the
Task Force's recommendations and ensuing legislation. Part A
examines the substantive criteria and processes used to certify
some youths for adult criminal prosecution. Part B analyzes the
extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecutions that expand the sen-
tencing powers of juvenile courts. Part C appraises the exclu-
sion of first degree murder from juvenile court jurisdiction. Part
(Minneapolis), Jan. 19, 1994, at 1B ("Mask force is recommending that the
Legislature make it easier to prosecute serious juvenile offenders as adults, and
at the same time grant them more rights.").
177. See Fighting Crime: How to Capture an Aspiring Crook, STAR Tam.
(Minneapolis), Feb. 8, 1994, at 10A (Task Force's recommendations "could go
far to heighten accountability for young lawbreakers ... [and] fulfill a societal
need to control viciousness and protect the innocent"); In Reforming System,
Maintain Balance, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Jan. 21, 1994, at 8A (Task Force
adhered to balanced strategy between punishing and preventing crime, by do-
ing both vigorously).
178. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (quoting Task Force's
statutory charge).
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D considers the use of juvenile delinquency and EJJ convictions
to enhance the sentences of young adult offenders. Part E criti-
ques juvenile court sentencing of ordinary delinquent offenders.
Finally, Section F probes the procedural implications of the sub-
stantive sentencing policy changes. Where the 1994 legislature
simply enacted a Task Force recommendation without signifi-
cant change, I will simply cite the corresponding statutory provi-
sion. Where the legislation deviates from Task Force
recommendations, I will analyze the policy differences more
extensively.
A. CERTIFYING JUVENILES FOR ADULT CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
Whether to waive a juvenile to criminal court for prosecu-
tion as an adult is the single most important sentencing decision
that juvenile court judges make. In Kent v. United States, the
United States Supreme Court held that due process requires
some procedural protections for juveniles in judicial waiver
hearings. 179 Subsequently, in Breed v. Jones the Court applied
the Constitution's Double Jeopardy provisions to the adjudica-
tion of juvenile offenses and required states to decide whether to
persecute a youth as a juvenile or adult before trial on the mer-
its of the charge. 8 0
Although Kent and Breed provide the procedural framework
for judicial waiver-sentencing decisions, the substantive bases of
waiver pose the principal difficulty. Most jurisdictions allow ju-
venile court judges to waive based on a discretionary assessment
of a youth's "amenability to treatment" or "dangerousness." The
179. 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966). The Court concluded that the loss of the spe-
cial protections of the juvenile court-private proceedings, confidential records,
and protection from the stigma of a criminal conviction-was a "critically im-
portant" decision that required a hearing, assistance of counsel, access to social
investigations and other records, and written findings and conclusions capable
of review by a higher court. Id. at 554-57; see Monrad G. Paulsen, Kent v.
United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 SUP. CT.
REv. 167, 182-83 (criticizing Kent's requirements as intrusive upon a juvenile
court's exercise of discretion).
180. 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975). Breed posed the issue of whether the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibited adult criminal re-prosecu-
tion of a youth after a prior conviction in juvenile court. Id. at 541. The Court
resolved the question by establishing a functional equivalence between an adult
criminal trial and a delinquency proceeding. Id. at 531. The Court described
the virtually identical interests implicated in a delinquency hearing and a
traditional criminal prosecution, "'anxiety and insecurity,'" a "heavy personal
strain,'" and the increased burdens as the juvenile system became more proce-
durally formalized. Id. at 530-31 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184, 187 (1955); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1979)).
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judge appraises a juvenile's age, treatment prognosis as re-
flected in clinical evaluations, and threat to others as reflected
in the seriousness of the present offense and prior record to de-
cide whether to order transfer.1 8  Legislatures specify waiver
factors with varying degrees of precision, and frequently adopt
the substantive criteria appended to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Kent..8 2
The determination of whether a youth is "amenable to treat-
ment" or "dangerous" implicates some of the most fundamental
and difficult issues of penal policy and juvenile jurisprudence.183
Legislation mandating such an inquiry assumes that effective
treatment programs exist for serious or chronic young offenders,
that classification systems exist to differentiate some youths'
treatment potentials or dangerousness, and that clinicians or ju-
venile court judges possess valid and reliable diagnostic tools
181. Feld, supra note 98, at 526. Under prior Minnesota law a juvenile
court judge could transfer a youth to criminal court for prosecution as an adult
on findings of probable cause and if the prosecutor demonstrated by clear and
convincing evidence that the child was not suitable to treatment or that the
public safety would not be served by the use of the juvenile courts. MINN. STAT.
§ 260.125(2)(d) (1992) (amended 1994).
182. Although the Supreme Court decided Kent on procedural grounds, see
supra note 179 and accompanying text, in an appendix to the opinion, it listed
substantive factors that a juvenile court might consider in waiving jurisdiction:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense ....
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, vio-
lent, premeditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against prop-
erty ....
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint ....
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one
court when the juveniles associates ... are adults ....
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by
consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude
and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile ....
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likeli-
hood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile ....
Kent, 383 U.S. app. at 566-67.
183. Typical "amenability-dangerousness" judicial waiver statutes are
highly problematic. No valid or reliable clinical tools exist with which to assess
amenability to treatment or to predict dangerousness. The judicial discretion to
make that assessment fosters a variety of abuses and inequalities. In addition,
the subjective and idiosyncratic criteria that juvenile court judges use to iden-
tify "serious" offenders are not the same criteria that criminal court judges use
to sentence adult offenders. The lack of integration in sentencing practices
often results in a "punishment gap." Moreover, the failure to coordinate and
integrate sentencing practices on both sides of the juvenile-adult line is crimi-
nologically significant because when chronic young offenders make the transi-
tion to the adult system, they are at the peak of their criminal careers.
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with which to determine the appropriate disposition for a partic-
ular youth.'8 4 Similarly, legislation allowing juvenile court
judges to waive jurisdiction because a youth poses a threat to
public safety assumes that a judge can predict a youth's danger-
ousness. Compelling evidence, however, contradicts the premise
that either courts or clinicians can validly or reliably predict a
youth's future criminal behavior. 185
Couching judicial waiver decisions in terms of amenability
to treatment or dangerousness effectively grants juvenile court
judges broad, standardless discretion. Such waiver provisions
are the juvenile equivalent of the discretionary capital punish-
ment statutes that the Supreme Court condemned Furman v.
Georgia.18 6 The addition of long lists of substantive factors,
such as those to which the Court adverted in Kent, does not pro-
vide objective guidance to structure discretion. "[T]he substan-
tive standards are highly subjective, and the large number of
factors that may be taken into consideration provides ample op-
portunity for selection and emphasis in discretionary decisions
that shape the outcome of individual cases."' 87 Indeed, lists of
amorphous and contradictory factors reinforce juvenile court
judges' discretion and allow them selectively to emphasize one
element or another to justify any decision.' 88
184. See Feld, supra note 98, at 529-46; Barry C. Feld, Juvenile Court Legis-
lative Reform and the Serioui Young Offender: Dismantling the 'Rehabilitative
Ideal" , 65 MINN. L. REv. 167, 198 (1980).
185. NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 62 (1974); see also
Feld, supra note 98, at 535-46; Amicus Curiae Brief, Am. Psychiatric Assoc.,
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080) (noting that psychiatrists
distort the factfinding process in capital cases because predictions of future vio-
lence do not derive from psychiatrists' specialized knowledge), cited in Norval
Morris & Marc Miller, Predictions of Dangerousness, in 6 CRIME AND JUSTICE:
AN ANNUAL REviEw OF RESEARCH 1, 32 n.32 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris
eds., 1985).
186. 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that discretionary
state capital punishment statutes constitute cruel and unusual punishment
within the meaning of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). Professor
Frank Zimring describes the waiver of serious juvenile offenders as "the capital
punishment of juvenile justice." Franklin E. Zimring, Notes Toward a Juris-
prudence of Waiver, in MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE INFORMATION AND
TRAINING: READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY 193, 193 (John C. Hall et al. eds., 1981).
Zimring notes that "[clapital punishment in criminal justice and waiver injuve-
nile justice share four related characteristics: (1) low incidence, (2)
prosecutorial and judicial discretion, (3) ultimacy, and (4) inconsistency with
the premises that underlie the system's other interventions." Id.
187. Zimring, supra note 186, at 195.
188. "Collectively, 'ists' of this length rarely serve to limit discretion or reg-
ularize procedure. By giving emphasis to one or two of the guidelines, a judge
can usually justify a decision either way." TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, TASK
1008
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The inherent subjectivity in waiver criteria permits a vari-
ety of inequalities and disparities to occur without any effective
check. Judges cannot administer these discretionary statutes
consistently or even-handedly.' 89 Within a single jurisdiction,
judges interpret and apply waiver statutes inconsistently from
county to county and court to court.190 Empirical analyses pro-
vide compelling evidence that judges apply waiver statutes in an
arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory manner.19 ' In many
jurisdictions, including Minnesota, waiver practices vary by geo-
graphic locale.' 9 2 In some research, juveniles' race also may in-
FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TowARD YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING
YOUTH CRIME 56 (1978).
189. See infra note 198 and accompanying text (analyzing empirical data on
transfer decisions).
190. See, e.g., DONNA HAMPARIAN ET AL., MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE
INFORMATION AND TRAINING: YOUTH IN ADULT COURTS: BnwEEN Two WORLDS
150-98 (1982) (wide county-by-county disparity in waiver applications in a 10-
state case study); JAMS P. HEUSER, JUVENILES ARRESTED FOR SERIOUS FELONY
CRIMES IN OREGON AND "REMANDED" TO ADULT CRIMINAL COURTS: A STATISTI-
CAL STUDY 30 (1985) (noting that, in examining Oregon's 36 counties, "it ap-
pears that some counties may be over- or under-represented in terms of the
proportion of cases per unit of risk population); JUVENILE JUSTICE STUDY
COmM'N, supra note 97, at 61-78 (waiver is used for three different purposes in
different parts of the state); Leonard Edwards, The Case for Abolishing Fitness
Hearings in Juvenile Court, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 595, 611-12 (1977) (county-
by-county disparity); Feld, supra note 72, at 25-46 (empirical analysis in Min-
nesota reveals uneven exercise ofjudicial discretion disproportionately and ad-
versely impacts upon rural juvenile offenders).
191. See, e.g., HAMPARIAN Er AL., supra note 190, at 101-07. Jeffrey Fagan
and Elizabeth Deschenes analyzed.waiver decisions involving a sample of vio-
lent youths in four different jurisdictions and concluded that no uniform criteria
exist to guide the transfer decision. Jeffrey Fagan & Elizabeth P. Deschenes,
Determinants of Judicial Waiver Decisions for Violent Juvenile Offenders, 81 J.
CraM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 314 (1990). Their article states:
What we found was a rash of inconsistent judicial waiver decisions,
both within and across sites. Inconsistent and standardless decisions
for youths retained in juvenile court are not surprising in a judicial
context which cherishes individualized justice .... But for youth who
may be tried and convicted in criminal court and subjected to years of
imprisonment in a secure institution, such subjective decision-making
is no longer justified.
Id. at 347. Fagan and Deschenes controlled for both offense and offender vari-
ables and concluded that "[n]either multivariate analysis nor simple explora-
tions identified strong' or consistent determinants of the judicial transfer
decision. Except for a relationship between extensive prior offense history and
the transfer decision, none of the identified variables could significantly de-
scribe differences between youths who were or were not transferred." Id. at
345.
192. See JUVENILE JUSTICE STUDY COMM!N, supra note 97, at 61-78.
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fluence waiver decisions. 193 The location of a waiver hearing,
differences in judicial philosophies, or juvenile court organiza-
tional politics explain as much about transfer decisions as does a
youth's offense or personal characteristics. 194 Courts interpret
and appy waiver statutes inconsistently because of the subjec-
tivity of the substantive issues, the lack of effective guidelines to
structure the decision, and the latent as well as manifest func-
tions that waiver serves.
Ultimately, waiver involves the appropriate dispositions of
serious offenders who happen to be chronological juveniles.
"Treatment" as a juvenile or "punishment" as an adult is based
on an arbitrary legislative line which often results in inconsis-
tent sentencing policies between juvenile and criminal courts.
These jurisprudential antinomies may frustrate attempts to ra-
tionalize social control of serious young offenders. By classifying
into binary categories, legislatures fail to recognize that young
people mature constantly. Adolescence is a developmental con-
tinuum, and young people are not irresponsible children one day
and responsible adults the next. There is also a strong correla-
tion between age and progression of criminal careers with the
rates of criminality peaking in mid- to late-adolescence. 195
193. A study of violent youths found substantial disparities between the
transfer rates of minority and white offenders. Although there was no direct
evidence of sentencing discrimination, "it appears that the effects of race are
indirect, but visible nonetheless." Jeffrey Fagan et al., Racial Determinants of
the Judicial Transfer Decision: Prosecuting Violent Youth in Criminal Court,
33 CRImE & DEuNQ. 259, 276 (1987); Joel P. Eigen, The Determinants and Im-
pact of Jurisdictional Transfer in Philadelphia, in MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVENILE
JUSTICE INFORMATION AND TRAINING: READINGS IN PUBLIC PouCY, supra note
186, at 333, 339-40 (discussing the interracial effect in transfers, and observing
that black youths who murder white victims are significantly more at risk for
waiver).
194. Professor M. Bortner contends that:
[P]olitical and organizational factors, rather than concern for public
safety, account for the increasing rate of remand. In evidencing a will-
ingness to relinquish jurisdiction over a small percentage of its clien-
tele, and by portraying these juveniles as the most intractable and the
greatest threat to public safety, the juvenile justice system not only
creates an effective symbolic gesture regarding protection of the public
but it also advances its territorial interest in maintaining jurisdiction
over the vast majority of juveniles and deflecting more encompassing
criticisms of the entire system.
M.A. Bortner, Traditional Rhetoric, Organizational Realities: Remand of
Juveniles to Adult Court, 32 CRIM & DELINQ. 53, 69-70 (1986); see also
HPARIAN ET AL., supra note 190, at 101-07 (noting that variations in waiver
rates among jurisdictions generally reflect those jurisdictions' different philoso-
phies on waiver).
195. See 1 ALFRED BLUMSTEN ET AL., CRIMINAL CAREERS AND "CAREER
CRIMINALS" 23 (1986); Joan Petersilia, Criminal Career Research: A Review of
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Chronic offenders typically begin their criminal careers in their
early to mid-teens, achieve their peak rates of criminal activity
in their late teens to early-twenties, and then gradually reduce
their criminal involvement.196 Rational sentencing policy re-
quires integrated and coordinated responses to young chronic of-
fenders on both sides of the juvenile-adult line.
Despite the research on criminal careers, however, juvenile
and criminal courts often may work at cross-purposes. Criminal
courts frequently impose longer sentences on older offenders
whose rate of criminal activity is declining, but do not sentence
as severely younger offenders when their rate of criminal activ-
ity is increasing or at its peak, and who pose the greater risk to
public safety.197 Juvenile property offenders, in particular, typi-
cally receive lenient sentences when they appear in adult crimi-
nal court as first-time adult offenders. 198
Recent Evidence, in 2 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH
321, 358 (Norval Morris & Michael Tonry eds., 1980); see also supra notes 31-33
(noting the decreasing percentage of crimes committed by youths aged 10-17
from 1980 to 1990).
196. 1 BLUMSTEIN ET AL., supra note 195, at 23 fig. 1-2, Petersilia, supra note
195, at 358.
197. See generally PETER W. GREENWOOD ET AL., AGE, CRIME AND SANCTIONS:
THE TRANsITION FROM JUVENILE TO ADULT COURT (1980); Barbara Boland,
Fighting Crime: The Problem of Adolescents, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 94
(1980); Barbara Boland & James Q. Wilson, Age, Crime, and Punishment, 51
Pun. INTEREsT 22 (1978).
The currently fashionable "Three Strikes and You're Out" sentencing policy
is an example of such misguided emphasis. By the time typical adult offenders
accumulate the prior record necessary to qualify for such enhancements, they
are often on the down-cycle of criminal activity. Non-discriminate incarceration
of all such offenders likely will result in geriatric prisons housing older offend-
ers with low probabilities of recidivism.
198. Peter Greenwood, Allan Abrahamse, and Frank Zimring examined
sentences of youths tried as adults in several jurisdictions and found substan-
tial variations. PETER W. GREENWOOD ET AL., FACTORS AFFECTING SENTENCE
SEVERITY FOR YOUNG ADULT OFFENDERS 12-14 (1984). In New York City and in
Franklin County-the county that includes Columbus-Ohio, they found that
youthful offenders faced a substantially lower chance of incarceration than did
older offenders; that youthful violent offenders received lighter sentences than
older violent offenders; and that, for approximately two years after becoming
adults, youths benefitted from informal lenient sentencing policies in adult
courts. Id. at 12-14. Similarly, although the seriousness of a youth's offense is
the primary determinant of the severity of the adult sentence imposed in Wash-
ington, D.C., "youth, at least through the first two years of criminal court juris-
diction, is a perceptible mitigating factor." TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra
note 188, at 63; see also HAI1PARAN ET AL., supra note 190, at 106-09 (reporting
that a majority of juveniles transferred to adult court in 1978 received subse-
quent fines or probation, and among those confined, 25% received maximum
sentences of one year or less); Bortner, supra note 194, at 54-57 (noting that in
one western metropolitan county fewer than one-third of the transferred
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The justice systems' failure to sentence chronic and active
young offenders when they are at the peak of their criminal ca-
reers may produce a "punishment gap." Qualitative differences
between juveniles' and adults' offenses, a lack of integration be-
tween juvenile and adult criminal records, and differences be-
tween juvenile court waiver criteria and criminal court
sentencing practices contribute to this anomalous gap in social
control. In many jurisdictions, criminal courts rely primarily on
the seriousness of a young adult's present offense and prior
adult criminal history when imposing sentences. The juvenile
component of offenders' criminal history often is not available
because of the confidentiality of juvenile court records, the func-
tional and physical separation of juvenile and criminal court
staffs who must compile and combine these records, and sheer
bureaucratic ineptitude.199 One study of the effect of juvenile
offense histories on criminal court sentences reported that "local
sentencing policies have much more of an impact on how young
adults are treated, than any modest variations in the availabil-
ity of juvenile records."200 Although Minnesota's Sentencing
Guidelines include some older juveniles' felony convictions in
their adult criminal history score, they restrict their applicabil-
ity and thus limit their usefulness to identify and sanction
chronic young adult offenders.20 1
juveniles convicted in adult proceedings were sentenced to prison); L. Kay Gil-
lespie & Michael D. Norman, Does Certification Mean Prison: Some Prelimi-
nary Findings from Utah, 35 Juv. & FAm. CT. J. 23, 30-32 (1984) (reporting that
between 1967 and 1980 Utah prosecutors did not charge a majority of trans-
ferred juveniles with violent offenses, and the majority ofjuveniles convicted as
adults received no prison sentence); HausER, supra note 190, at 26 (reporting
that only 55% of the youths convicted of felonies were incarcerated, and nearly
two-thirds of those received jail terms of one year or less and served an average
of about eight months).
In analyzing the relationships between the offense for which jurisdiction
was waived and the eventual disposition, Hamparian concluded that "[t]here
seems to be a direct correlation between low percentage of personal offenses
waived and high proportion of community dispositions (as opposed to incarcera-
tion)." HAmpAurAN Er AL., supra note 190, at 112.
199. See Peter W. Greenwood, Differences in Criminal Behavior and Court
Responses Among Juvenile and Young Adult Defendants, in 7 CRmmE AND Jus-
TreE, supra note 31, at 173; Joan Petersilia, Juvenile Record Use in Adult Court
Proceedings: A Survey of Prosecutors, 72 J. CRn. L. & CRIMINOLoGY 1746,
1756-59 (1981); see infra note 406 and accompanying text (noting that many
states integrate juvenile and criminal court records).
200. GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 198, at 36.
201. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II.B.4 cmts. II.B.401-05 (as-
signing to an adult offender one point for every two prosecuted juvenile of-
fenses, subject to specific limitations); infra notes 440-445 and accompanying
text.
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Rather than relying on judicial discretion, the legislature
should propound more objective waiver criteria to integrate ju-
venile and criminal court sentencing practices, and to reduce the
gap in intervention when youths make the transition between
the two systems. It is fundamentally contradictory for juvenile
court judges to send youths to adult court because they require
longer sentences, and then have those criminal court judges sen-
tence those same youths to probation.20 2 For example, the Juve-
nile Justice Task Force found that "[t]he majority [fifty-two
percent] of juveniles certified to adult court are property offend-
ers," and only twenty-three percent of juveniles sentenced as
adults were convicted of presumptive-commitment-to-prison of-
fenses.20 3 Moreover, a larger proportion of juveniles received
downward departures from the Guidelines' recommended sen-
tence than did adult defendants.20 4 Task Force recommenda-
tions to link waiver criteria closely with the adult sentencing
guidelines and to emphasize offense seriousness and criminal
history, rather than amorphous clinical considerations, signifi-
cantly rationalize transfer decision and criminal court responses
to chronic young offenders.
1. Certification in Minnesota
Minnesota's judicial waiver practices pose two inter-related
problems: the highly discretionary, idiosyncratic nature of indi-
vidualized sentencing decisions, and the disjunction between the
criteria for transfers from juvenile court and those for sentences
in adult criminal courts. Judicial discretion underlies both
problems. 20 5 Juvenile court judges attempt to make clinical de-
terminations of a youth's "dangerousness" or "amenability to
treatment" despite scant evidence of either effective intervention
202. See supra note 159.
203. TASK FORCE, FnAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 25.
204. Id. The Task Force noted that in 1991, 23% of the juveniles sentenced
in adult court were convicted of Severity Level VII-X presumptive-commitment-
to-prison offenses, 22% of Severity Level V-VI offenses, and 54% of Severity
Level IV or below offenses such as non-residential burglary, theft, and forgery.
Id.
205. Appellate courts repeatedly have emphasized the broad discretion that
trial judges enjoy in making this type of sentencing decision. See, e.g., In re
K.P.H., 289 N.W.2d 722, 724 (Minn. 1980) ("The juvenile court is vested with
broad discretion in determining whether either of the statutory criteria exists
upon which to base its reference decision... ."); In re K.J.K., 357 N.W.2d 117,
119 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) ("The court has broad discretion in determining
whether a juvenile is suitable for treatment in the juvenile system, and its deci-
sion will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous.").
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strategies for serious young offenders or valid clinical indicators
that identify those who might respond to intervention. They ap-
ply indeterminate waiver statutes that are rife with potential for
abuse and disparity. Organizational or political pressures to
waive less serious offenders further aggravate the "lack of fit"
between juvenile and adult criminal sentencing practices.
Several previous Task Forces and researchers have ex-
amined Minnesota waiver practices in recent decades.206 The
Minnesota Supreme Court's Study Committee reported that ru-
ral judges certified juveniles with less serious offenses or prior
records more frequently than their urban counterparts. 20
7
Shortly after the Minnesota legislature adopted "prima facie" of-
fense criteria to create a rebuttable presumption to transfer,
waiver decisions remained highly discretionary and idiosyn-
cratic.208 In 1986, judges waived more youths for property of-
fenses than for crimes against the person, and geographic
disparities continued.20 9 Data presented to the Task Force
again revealed that the majority of youths waived by juvenile
courts committed property crimes rather than violent crimes,
and many youths sentenced as adults received shorter sentences
than they might have received as juveniles. 210
Another study, completed after the Task Force issued its Fi-
nal Report, analyzed waiver practices in Hennepin County be-
tween 1986 and 1992.211 Unlike previous statewide studies, this
research analyzed waiver decisions in an urban setting marked
by more serious youth crime.212 Although prosecutors filed most
reference motions for presumptive-commitment-to-prison of-
206. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme
Court Juvenile Justice Study Commission's study of juvenile courts).
207. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
208. See Osbun & Rode, supra note 111, at 195 (noting that only about one-
third of youths referred for adult prosecution met prima facia offense criteria).
209. Feld, supra note 72, at 31.
210. See Krmpotich, supra note 159 (graph showing the lower imprisonment
rate for juveniles, as compared to adults, in 1992).
211. Marcy A. Podkopacz, Juvenile Reference Study (Aug. 25, 1994) (unpub-
lished study, on file with author). The study collected data from the Hennepin
County Attorney's Office, the Juvenile Court, and the Department of Commu-
nity Corrections on 330 juveniles against whom the county filed reference mo-
tions between 1986 and 1992. Id. at 3. The study examined the offenses for
which reference motions were filed, the backgrounds of the youths, the
processes by which some juveniles were referred to adult court and others re-
tained in juvenile court, and the ultimate dispositions they received in both sys-
tems. Id.
212. Podkopacz reported that prosecutors filed reference motions against a
majority (55%) ofjuveniles charged with presumptive-commitment-to-prison of-
fenses and that most had multiple felony charges. Id. at 29-30.
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fenses, the largest proportion of juveniles charged with serious
crimes did not have extensive prior records. The juvenile court
transferred youths with extensive delinquency histories but who
were charged with less serious current offenses more reaily than
it did juveniles charged with more serious crimes.213 The prior
record, rather than the seriousness of the present offense alone,
combined with the youth's age and time remaining in juvenile
court jurisdiction most strongly influenced judicial waiver deci-
sions.214 Significantly, however, prosecutors charged minority
juveniles with violent crimes and presumptive-commitment-to-
prison offenses much more frequently than white juveniles. 215
These racial differences will likely affect the racial composition
of youths presumptively certified and those sentenced as EJJs
after the passage of the 1994 Juvenile Crime Act.
Juvenile court judges encounter their greatest quandry
when they attempt to apply the transfer statute to apparently
"normal" juveniles who suddenly commit a violent murder with-
out seeming explanation. For nearly two decades, Minnesota's
appellate courts have struggled unsuccessfully to develop a
waiver jurisprudence for youths with no prior records of delin-
quency or treatment who unexpectedly commit a very serious
offense.216 In In re Dahl, the Minnesota Supreme Court ana-
lyzed some of the procedural and substantive problems that
Over half (55%) of the juveniles who faced the possibility of transfer to
adult court were charged with offenses that would result in prison com-
mitments if they were convicted in criminal court (i.e., presumptive-
commit offenses). Nearly a quarter of these juveniles (22%) came to
court with only one presumptive charge, the remaining 33% were
charged with two or more presumptive charges ....
Id. at 29.
Although about 25% of all the youths in the sample were charged with
property felonies such as burglary, Hennepin County Attorney Michael Free-
man decided to focus on youths charged with serious person offenses. Id. at 17.
He filed reference motions against property felony offenders in only eight per-
cent of reference motions in 1991 and 11% in 1992. Id. at 33. Although the
number of prior felony adjudications and age at the time of the reference motion
increased a youth's probability of waiver, the seriousness of the present offense
alone was not a significant determinant of transfer. Id. at 40-43.
213. Id. at 46-48.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 35-36. Person-felony offenses were included in reference motion
charges filed against 75% of African-Americans, as contrasted with 43% of
whites. For the most serious crimes, prosecutors charged 66% of African-Amer-
ican juveniles with presumptive-commitment-to-prison offenses, as compared
with only 31% of white juveniles. Id. at 35.
216. See Feld, supra note 184 (analyzing legislative response to In re Dahl);
Feld, supra note 72 (analyzing of judicial opinions in In re D.F.B.).
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these uncharacteristically serious offenders pose. 21 7 The juve-
nile court judge certified Dahl, an otherwise exemplary youth
charged with first degree murder, to stand trial as an adult on
the grounds that he was both unamenable to treatment and a
threat to the public safety because of his age and the seriousness
of his alleged offense, and the limited time remaining under ju-
venile court jurisdiction.218 The question presented to the Min-
nesota Supreme Court was whether a trial court properly could
certify a youth as nonamenable to treatment and dangerousness
based solely on the seriousness of the offense and the juvenile's
age.
The Dahl court criticized the judicial waiver statute,219 and
held that "the existing statutory framework does not authorize
referral based on the specific crime charged .... [Tlhis court did
not intend the . . . referral of a juvenile solely because of the
alleged offense."220 The Dahl court held that a proper record for
217. 278 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1979). Dahl, 17 years old at the time of the
alleged offense and 18 years old at the time of the certification proceedings,
murdered another youth with several shotgun blasts after taking him to a re-
mote area of northern Minnesota. Id. at 317. Dahl, a high school senior, main-
tained a B average, participated in interscholastic sports, planned to attend a
nearby college, and held various part-time jobs. Id. The court commented, "[1it
is clearly apparent that [Dahl] is not the typical delinquent seen by the Juve-
nile Court. This offense [first degree murder] ... appears to be an isolated
delinquent act. ... Id. at 317-18.
218. The court record in support of the certification motion contained
neither psychological or psychiatric information nor negative information re-
garding the juveniles background apart from the alleged homicide. Id. at 318.
At that time Dahl could receive only three years of treatment as a juvenile, i.e.,
until age 21. See MIns. STAT. § 260.181(4) (1978). Subsequent amendments to
that statute reduced the maximum age ofjuvenile court jurisdiction over youths
from 21 to 19 years of age. See MmIN. STAT. § 260.181 (4) (1988); see infra notes
352-353 and accompanying text.
219. Dahl, 278 N.W.2d at 318.
220. Id. at 321. In In re J.B.M., 263 N.W.2d 74 (Minn. 1978), the last certifi-
cation case considered by the Minnesota Supreme Court prior to Dahl, the
waiving judge construed the seriousness of the offense to mandate reference "if
the offense is of a sufficiently dangerous nature." Id. at 75. The supreme court
rejected that construction, observing that "[alithough the nature of the offense
is certainly a factor to be considered in this determination and may serve as a
basis for statutory reference . . . this court has not held that reference is
mandatory when a serious crime is involved." Id. at 76.
The Dahl court went on to state that the offense charged was obviously
"among the relevant factors to be considered," 278 N.W.2d at 321 (citing State
v. Hogan, 212 N.W.2d 664 (1973)), but that "[tihe record must contain direct
evidence that the juvenile endangers the public safety." Id. (emphasis added).
The court thus remanded the case to the trial court. In order to certify the
youth, the record required direct evidence, apart from the offense charged, that
the juvenile was not suitable for treatment or presented a threat to the public
safety. Id.
1016 [Vol. 79:965
JUVENILE JUSTICE
a waiver decision required direct evidence of "unamenability" or
"dangerousness" in addition to the seriousness of the crime.221
The court questioned whether the transfer statute provided trial
judges with sufficient guidance for these uniquely difficult
waiver decisions,222 and suggested to the legislature that a "re-
evaluation of the existing certification process may be in
order."223
In 1980, the Minnesota legislature responded to the Dahl
decision, revised the juvenile code, and amended the certifica-
tion process.224 The legislature modified the purpose clause's
exclusively benevolent and rehabilitative objectives, and added
to it the goals of maintaining the integrity of the substantive
criminal law and developing individual responsibility.2 25 The
purpose clause amendments signalled a fundamental philosoph-
ical departure from the previous emphasis on rehabilitation, and
recognized that juvenile courts also punish and exercise penal
social control.
The amended legislation also included procedural changes.
It mandated a probable cause hearing to support the certifica-
221. 278 N.W.2d at 320-21.
222. Id. at 318.
223. Id. at 319. The Dahl court observed that "the standards for referral
adopted by present legislation are not very effective in making this important
determination." Id. at 318. The court went on to note that "[due to these diffi-
culties in making the waiver decision, many juvenile court judges have tended
to be overcautious, resulting in the referral of delinquent children for criminal
prosecution on the erroneous, albeit good faith, belief that the juveniles pose a
danger to the public." Id. at 319.
224. See generally Feld, supra note 184, at 192-239 (analyzing legislative
changes).
225. The previous purpose of the law was to secure "for each minor... the
care and guidance, preferably in his own home, as will serve the... welfare of
the minor and the best interests of the state." Juvenile Court Act, ch. 685, § 1,
1959 Min. Laws 1275 (repealed 1980). Under the new legislation, the exclu-
sively benevolent and rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile court remains only
for children "alleged or adjudicated neglected or dependent." MuNN. STAT.
§ 260.011(2)(a) (effective Aug. 1, 1980). For those charged with delinquency,
however,
[tjhe purpose of the laws relating to children alleged or adjudicated to
be delinquent is to promote the public safety and reduce juvenile delin-
quency by maintaining the integrity of the substantive law prohibiting
certain behavior and by developing individual responsibility for lawful
behavior. This purpose should be pursued through means that are fair
and just, that recognize the unique characteristics and needs of chil-
dren, and that give children access to opportunities for personal and
social growth.
Id. § 260.011(2)(c). The significance of the change in purpose clause is dis-
cussed infra notes 465-465 and accompanying text.
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tion motion.226 The legislature retained, without change, the
basic waiver criteria of nonamenability to treatment or danger-
ousness. 227 It also placed the burden of proof on the prosecution
to establish by "clear and convincing evidence" that the juvenile
court should waive jurisdiction.228
The legislature attempted to guide juvenile court judges'
discretion by adding a third subdivision to the certification stat-
ute.229 This subdivision enabled prosecutors to establish a
"prima facie" case for certification by proving various combina-
tions of a youth's present offense and prior record.230 Thus, a
prosecutor could establish a prima facie case for certification by
charging a sixteen-year-old, who possesses a specified prior rec-
ord, with certain types of serious offenses. 231 Although the legis-
lature retained the basic "nonamenability" and "dangerousness"
criteria, the amendments provided prosecutors with an indirect
method to prove those ultimate facts.232
226. MINN. STAT. § 260.125(2)(d) (1988); Feld, supra note 184, at 203-05.
227. MI-N. STAT. § 260.125(1)(d).
228. Id. § 260.125(2)(d); see also Feld, supra note 184, at 205-07.
229. In response to Dahl, the legislature adopted a modified version of a
matrix that establishes a prima facie case for certification under the
amenability and dangerousness provisions when various combinations
of a youth's present offense and/or prior record are present. Under the
new statute, the prosecution can establish a prima facie case of both
nonamenability and dangerousness simply by proving that the juvenile
is at least sixteen years of age, that the present crime charged is a
serious offense, and that the combination of the present crime charged
and the prior record brings the case within one of the subdivision's
clauses.
Feld, supra note 184, at 194 (footnotes omitted). The 1994 legislation repeals
the applicable subdivision. 1994 Minn- Laws 576, § 13.
230. MINN. STAT. § 260.125(3) (1988); see Feld, supra note 184, at 207-14.
231. The legislation read:
A prima facie case for certification is established if the juvenile was at
least 16 years of age at the time of the offense, and is alleged to have
committed:
1) First degree murder, or
2) an aggravated felony against a person involving particular cruelty,
a high degree of sophistication or planing [sic], or use of a firearm,
or
3) one of several other felonies listed in the statute, combined with a
particular type of prior offense history specified in the statute.
The presence of any of these circumstances creates a presumption that
the public safety is not served or that the juvenile is unamenable to
treatment within the juvenile court system.
M NN. STAT. § 260.125(3) (1988).
232. The adoption of offense criteria to structure judicial sentencing discre-
tion is one example of recent legislative changes in waiver statutes throughout
the nation. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the
Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 471, 504-11 (1987).
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The 1980 legislation that used age and offense to create a
rebuttable presumption for certification based on age and of-
fense was probably the least satisfactory of the several policy
options available to the legislature.233 The legislature could
simply have excluded youths charged with certain combinations
of present offenses and prior record from juvenile court jurisdic-
tion.234 Or, it could have placed the burdens of production and
persuasion on juveniles charged with serious offenses, rather
than burdening the prosecution only.23 5 Although the 1980 leg-
islature considered both of these alternatives, it rejected them
233. The 1980 "prima facie" case amendments of the waiver statutes pri-
marily affected the allocation of burdens of production and persuasion. Feld,
supra note 184, at 207-14. In an earlier article, I argued that creating a rebut-
table presumption for waiver would do little to reduce judicial discretion. Id. at
209-10. Several subsequent Minnesota court decisions endorsed that analysis.
See, e.g., In re J.F.K, 316 N.W.2d 563, 564 CMinn. 1982) (holding that when a
state establishes a prima facie case that defense rebuts with substantial evi-
dence, the court must decide the waiver issue on the basis of the entire record,
not simply by reference to the prima facie case); In re Givens, 307 N.W.2d 489,
490 (Minn. 1981) (holding that an unrebutted prima facie case authorizes refer-
ence on both grounds of nonamenability and dangerousness); In re K.J.K, 357
N.W.2d 117, 119 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that where the state fails to
establish a prima facie case not established, court must consider totality of
circumstances).
I also suggested that under the discretionary provisions proof of a serious
offense alone would not warrant waiver. Feld, supra note 184, at 212. Again,
appellate opinions confirm that analysis and conclude that once a juvenile re-
buts the prima facie case with "significant evidence," the prosecution bears the
burden of proof under the "totality of the circumstances." For example, the
court in In re S.R.L. concluded that "[iUn evaluating evidence under the clear
and convincing standard, the court must consider the totality of the circum-
stances." 400 N.W.2d. 382, 384 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); accord J.F.K., 316
N.W.2d at 564 (citing Feld, supra note 184).
Finally, I argued that the legislative prima facie case for certification based
on age and seriousness of the offense would not effectively overrule the holding
of Dahl. Feld, supra note 184, at 214. Whether the legislature effectively over-
ruled Dahl remains a source of judicial controversy. Compare S.R.L., 400
N.W.2d at 384 (holding that the amendments and supreme court's reasoning in
J.F.K implicitly overrule Dahl) with In re J.L.B., 435 N.W.2d 595, 601-04
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (Crippen, J., dissenting) (arguing for the continuing vital-
ity of Dahl).
234. Legislative waiver results in automatic certification of certain youths to
adult criminal court based on the offenses alleged. See Feld, supra note 98, at
573-78, 617-18. This option is nondiscretionary; there is simply no occasion for
a judicial waiver hearing. The virtues of legislative waiver include objectivity,
consistency, economy, equality, and ease of administration. Id. at 588-601; see
also Feld, supra note 9, at 494-99; infra notes 373-391 and accompanying text.
235. I have suggested that the juvenile should bear the burden of persuasion
to prove amenability and non-dangerousness to "emphasize the policies of social
defense and public safety in light of the uncertainty of the issues being deter-
mined." Feld, supra note 184, at 215; see also Feld, supra note 72, at 95-96.
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and adopted the "rebuttable presumption," or prima facie case,
strategy. 23 6 Because the legislature neither resolved the funda-
mental sentencing contradictions inherent in the waiver statute
nor provided clear guidance to trial judges who confront serious
but isolated offenders, the problems identified in Dahl inevitably
recurred.
In 1988, the case of In re D.F.B. 2 37 illustrated the failure of
the 1980 legislative amendments to resolve the tension between
sentences based on the rehabilitative potential of the offender
and the seriousness of the offense.238 Sixteen-year-old David
Brom had no prior history of illegal or aggressive behavior, other
than the four brutal axe-murders charged in the petition.239
Judge Gerard Ring recognized that, despite Dahl and the 1980
amendments, a reference proceeding still must assess on a juve-
nile's treatability or threat to the public. Judge Ring ruled that
the prosecution failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
either that Brom could not be treated or that he threatened pub-
lic safety.240 The reference hearing record included the testi-
mony of two clinicians and amply supported Judge Ring's
conclusions.241 The outcome in D.F.B. turned on who bore the
236. Elsewhere I have thoroughly traced the history of the legislation's
evolution from automatic exclusion, to burden on the juvenile, to rebuttable
presumption. Feld, supra note 184, at 192-97, 205-22.
237. .In re D.F.B., No. 884-0955 (Minm. Dist. Ct. Apr. 21), rev'd, 430 N.W.2d
475 (Minm. Ct. App.), rev'd, 433 N.W.2d 79, 82 (Minm. 1988).
238. See Feld, supra note 72 (analyzing the application of Minnesota waiver
legislation in In re D.F.B.).
239. The trial court's undisputed finding of fact was that "[tihe child has no
history of illegal behavior, drug abuse, or aggressive behavior except for the
incident alleged in this petition." D.F.B., No. 884-0955, mem. op. at 1. On the
basis of the expert testimony and psychological report, Judge Ring found that
"[t]he child has been diagnosed as having a major depressive disorder and it has
not been shown that he cannot be successfully treated by his 19th birthday."
Id. at 2.
240. As Judge Ring observed,
[tihis is one place where the burden of proof becomes significant. I do
not believe the child could prove suitability for treatment if the burden
were placed on him. However, the prosecution has been unable to
prove the contrary. Each of the experts when asked said that it is pos-
sible to complete the treatment in the time available; certainly no one
said he could not. Since the evidence cannot be said to be clear and
convincing proof that he cannot be treated, the petitioner has failed to
carry the burden of proof on this issue.
Id. at 17.
241. Previous decisions emphasized the need for psychological data to sup-
port a finding that a juvenile is or is not suitable for treatment. In re Dahl, 278
N.W.2d 316, 319 (Minn. 1979); In re R.D.W., 407 N.W.2d 113, 117 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987) (holding that a finding that a juvenile is unsuitable for treatment
"must be based on psychological data or a history of misconduct as well as the
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burden of proof on subjective, clinical issues of amenability and
dangerousness.242 Although the legislature amended the waiver
statute in response to Dahl, Judge Ring found that those amend-
ments actually increased, rather than decreased, the difficulty of
transferring atypical serious offenders, such as Brom.243 Be-
cause uncontradicted direct, clinical evidence supported Judge
Ring's decision, the appellate courts could not characterize his
findings of fact as clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion.2"
The Minnesota Court of Appeals overturned Judge Ring's
decision in In re D.F.B.,245 and concluded as a matter of law that
juvenile's age, level of maturity, and the seriousness of the offense"); In re D.M.,
373 N.W.2d 845, 850 (Minm. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that psychological data
must support the juvenile court's conclusion); see Feld, supra note 72, at 54-59
(analyzing record of evidence introduced at reference hearing).
242. Under the statute as written and previously interpreted, the logic
of Judge Ring's decision was impeccable. The prosecution's proof of a
prima facie case created a rebuttable presumption for transfer. Once
that presumption is rebutted or where it does not arise, the issues of
amenability and dangerousness must be decided on the 'totality of cir-
cumstances" based upon the whole record and not just by reference to
the offense criteria or the rebuttable presumption.
Feld, supra note 184, at 62-63 (footnote omitted). Brom introduced contro-
verting evidence and, by so doing, "did rebut the prima facie case." D.F.B., No.
88-J-0955, mem. op. at 9. "Having done so, the burden of proof remained with
the prosecution to prove the elements necessary for referral to the adult court
and pursuant to the 1980 amendments that burden requires clear and convinc-
ing evidence." Id.
Throughout the proceedings, the burden of proof by "clear and convinc-
ing evidence" remains with the prosecution to demonstrate either that
the juvenile is not amenable to treatment or constitutes a threat to
public safety.... A decision to refer or to retain a juvenile may not be
overturned on appeal unless it is "clearly erroneous" so as to constitute
an abuse of discretion.
Feld, supra note 184, at 62-63 (footnotes omitted).
243. D.F.B., No. 88-J-0955, mem. op. at 9-11 ("[M]n my judgment the 1980
amendments did not change the burden of proof, they only raised the degree of
proof required. Instead of making it easier and more likely that children would
be referred to adult court, the statute has had the opposite effect."). See gener-
ally Feld, supra note 184.
244. Indeed, neither the decision of the court of appeals nor of the Minne-
sota Supreme Court characterized Judge Ring's findings of fact as "clearly erro-
neous" or an "abuse of discretion," the only permissible criteria for overturning
trial court factual determinations. D.F.B., 430 N.W.2d at 480-82 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988) ("We nonetheless accept as not clearly erroneous the trial court's
determination that the prima facie case was rebutted."); D.F.B., 433 N.W.2d at
82 (Minn. 1988).
245. The court concluded that "the burden of persuasion remains at all
times upon the state." D.F.B., 430 N.W.2d at 479. Because neither the lan-
guage of the statute nor the rules of procedure evidenced an intention to shift
the burden of persuasion to a juvenile, "[a]bsent specific indication from the
legislature, we must conclude that it is only the burden of producing evidence
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Brom should be tried as an adult.246 Although the court of ap-
peals agreed with Judge Ring's analysis of the statute and previ-
ous interpretations, it asserted that "broader consideration of
the 1980 amendments to Chapter 260 is not only warranted but
is required," and that such "broader consideration" inevitably
led to the result that Brom should be tried as an adult.247
The Minnesota Supreme Court accepted Brom's appeal for
review "for the limited purpose of substituting our opinion...
for that of the court of appeals."248 The supreme court offered a
factual rationale for its decision to try Brom as an adult, rather
than accept the court of appeals's legal analysis. 249 As did the
court of appeals's analysis, the supreme court's analysis began
with the post-Dahl 1980 legislative amendments. 250 However,
which shifts." Id. The court accepted Judge Ring's finding that Brom had re-
butted the prosecutor's prima facie case. Id. at 480-81.
246. Id. at 483. "Such consideration irrevocably leads us, as we are certain
it would have led the trial court, to a determination that D.F.B. must be re-
ferred to stand trial as an adult." Id.
247. Id. Judge Huspeni noted that in addition to amending the waiver pro-
visions, the legislature had also modified the purpose clause of the Minnesota
Juvenile Code. Id.; see MmN. STAT. § 260.011(2); see also supra note 225 and
accompanying text (discussing purpose clause). The amended purpose clause
provided the court with a means to "gloss" the specific language of the waiver
statute. See infra notes 463-465 and accompanying text (explaining the
changes in the purpose clause).
According to the court of appeals, "[i]f the words 'maintaining the integrity
of the substantive law prohibiting certain behavior' are to have any meaning,"
then trial judges must look beyond the characteristics of the child in analyzing
the "totality of the circumstances," even though that alone is the legislative
mandate. D.F.B., 430 N.W.2d at 483. The court was
persuaded by the language of section 260.011 that the trial court, upon
rebuttal of the prima facie case, must not be hobbled by the statutorily
weakened analysis of Dahl and of Rule 32.05, subd. 2, especially subd.
2(h) (the record and previous history of the child), as the trial court
here so clearly believed itself to be.
Id. In short, the seriousness of Brom's crime outweighs any consideration of his
amenability to treatment or lack of threat to the public; the offense takes prece-
dence over the offender.
248. In re D.F.B., 433 N.W.2d at 80.
249. Id. at 80-82.
250. Chief Justice Douglas K Amdahl opined that Dahl (discussed supra
notes 217-223 and accompanying text) decided that the purpose of a waiver
hearing is to consider "all of the relevant factors-not just age or seriousness of
the offense-to determine if the statutory test of reference has been met." 433
N.W.2d at 80 (citing In re Dahl, 278 N.W.2d 316, 321 (Minn. 1979)). The court
also reviewed the 1980 amendments of the purpose clause and the waiver stat-
ute, noting that Brom, a 16-year-old charged with first degree murder, fit the
prima facie case criteria. Id. at 81. The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with
Judge Ring that once the juvenile had rebutted the prima facie case,
then the role for the juvenile court is to decide on the basis of the entire
record, without reference to the prima facie case, whether the state has
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unlike the court of appeals, which used the purpose clause to
gloss the waiver statute, the supreme court rejected the findings
of the trial judge and substituted its version of the facts.251 In
short, the court decided that Brom should be tried as an adult as
a question of fact not as a matter of law.252
met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that thejuvenile is unamenable to treatment in the juvenile court system con-
sistent with the public safety.
Id. (emphasis added). The court agreed with Judge Ring that the evidence that
Brom introduced, bearing both on amenability to treatment and the threat to
public safety, rebutted the prima facie case. The sole issue in the case, then,
was whether the state had met its burden of proving by "clear and convincing"
evidence, on the basis of the entire record, that Brom was either not amenable
to treatment or not a threat to public safety. Id.
251. The court stated:
Employing the multi-factor analysis in this case-which is what the
trial court in Dahl was directed to do on remand-would justify a ref-
erence decision in this case even if the legislature's 1980 amendment of
the purpose section was without significance. While we agree with the
court of appeals' conclusion that the amendment of the purpose section
makes it easier to conclude that reference is justified in this case, we do
not agree with the implication that reference is justified any time ajuvenile commits a heinous offense. Rather, reference in this case isjustified because-bearing in mind the legislature's revised statement
of purpose and looking at all the factors listed in R. 32.05, including
the offense with which D.F.B. is charged, the manner in which he com-
mitted the offense, the interests of society in the outcome of this case,
the testimony of Dr. Malmquist suggesting that treatment of D.F.B.
might be unsuccessful, and the weakness of Dr. Gilbertson's testi-
mony-the state met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evi-
dence that D.F.B. is unamenable to treatment in the juvenile court
system consistent with the public safety.
433 N.W.2d at 81-82 (emphasis added).
252. The Minnesota Supreme Court's entire analysis of the facts simply ad-
verts to the general substantive factors listed in the rules and then concludes
that "the state met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that
D.F.B. is unamenable to treatment in the juvenile court system." Id. at 82; see
Feld, supra note 72, at 84-86.
Appellate courts normally must defer to fact-finding by trial courts. See,
e.g., Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 223 (1988) (stating that the "clearly-errone-
ous standard of review is a deferential one"); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
443 U.S. 526, 534 n.8 (1979) (finding "great value" of appellate deference).
Court rules provide that "[findings of fact, whether based on oral or documen-
tary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses." MwN. R. Crv. P. 52.01; see also FEr. R. CIrv. P. 52(a). See generally
Hon. John F. Nangle, The Ever Widening Scope of Fact Review in Federal Ap-
pellate Courts-Is the "Clearly Erroneous Rule" Being Avoided?, 59 WASH. U.
L.Q. 409 (1981) (decrying appellate courts' failure to accord trial courts' findings
of fact the respect and deference envisioned by the clearly erroneous rule);
Charles A. Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L.
REV. 751, 770 (1957) (same).
In In re D.F.B., the Minnesota Supreme Court never found that Judge
Ring's factual findings were "clearly erroneous" or an "abuse of discretion."
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The dilemmas that serious but isolated offenders such as
Dahl and Brom present, the geographic disparities in waiver,
the inconsistent outcomes for similarly situated offenders, and
the lack of fit between juvenile and criminal court sentencing
policies dramatically highlight the conceptual inadequacy of ju-
dicial determinations of amenability or dangerousness. Couch-
ing sentencing policy issues in discretionary, clinical terms, such
as "amenability" or "dangerousness," disserves their rational
resolution. Moreover, when the policy choices are fundamental
and irreconcilable, such as whether to base sentences on charac-
teristics of the offender or the offense, the legislature has pri-
mary responsibility to decide.
2. The Task Force Recommendations and Legislative
Changes: Presumptive Certification and Serious
Youthful Offenders
The Task Force identified several problems with the ex-
isting transfer law: the need for a stronger and more consistent
response to serious, violent juvenile offenders, the need for
clearer guidelines within an individualized sentencing process,
the ineffectiveness of the prima facie case criteria to structure
judicial discretion, and the lack of fit between judicial waiver de-
cisions and criminal court sentencing practices.253 In addition,
because the age nineteen jurisdictional limit severly restrict ju-
venile court sanctions, judges sometimes certified older juveniles
who did not necessarily require adult incarceration.
254
In June 1993, the Certification Committee began to formu-
late the Task Force's recommendations to create a presumption
to certify older serious offenders.255 This presumption would
shift to juveniles the burden of proving that they should be re-
tained as juveniles.2 56 It would also downplay the clinical in-
quiry about "amenability" and "dangerousness," emphasize
"public safety," and create an expanded intermediate sentencing
category for serious youthful offenders.257
Rather, it simply disregarded its appellate function and used a different strat-
egy than that employed by the court of appeals to reach the politically "correct"
result. 433 N.W.2d at 81-82.
253. TASK FORCE, FiNAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 22-30.
254. Id. at 32-33.
255. See Minutes of the Advisory Task Force 8 (June 25, 1993) (on file with
author).
256. Memorandum from Jim Hayes to the Juvenile Justice Task Force Cer-
tification Committee, Food for Thought 2 (June 11, 1993) (on file with author).
257. Minutes of the Juvenile Certification Committee 3 (June 4, 1993) (on
file with author). See generally Memorandum from Jim Hayes, supra note 256
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The Task Force recommended a simplified certification pro-
cedure that linked the definition of serious juvenile offenders to
the definition of serious offenses in the adult sentencing guide-
lines. It also recommended using the Guidelines' definition of
serious offenses to create an intermediate category of young of-
fenders who could receive extended sentences in juvenile court.
Under this proposal, juvenile courts would try uncertified seri-
ous youthful offenders with all the adult criminal procedural
safeguards, including the right to a jury trial, impose a stayed
adult criminal sentence and juvenile probationary status to re-
tain access to juvenile treatment resources, and extend juvenile
court jurisdiction to age twenty-three. 258
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, which apply to adult de-
fendants, conviction for certain violent crimes creates a pre-
(outlining proposal). The idea to create an intermediate, blended juvenile-crim-
inal jurisdiction over "intermediate" offenders originated with Judge Philip
Bush. Minutes of the Juvenile Certification Committee, supra, at 1. The Hen-
nepin County juvenile court bench experimented unsuccessfully with stayed
certification or "dual" jurisdiction strategies in an effort to expand the sanction-
ing powers of juvenile courts without relinquishing the option of an adult sen-
tence. Id. at 2-3.
In earlier articles, I anticipated many of the policies eventually recom-
mended by the Certification Committee. In Feld, supra note 72, I suggested
that
it appears that either of two alternatives [is] preferable to continuing
the present practice. Both strategies use offense criteria-seriousness
and persistence-to structure the waiver determination. One ap-
proach-presumption/burden shifting-uses offense criteria to create
a presumption for waiver and shifts the burden of proof to the juvenile
to affirmatively demonstrate why he or she should be retained as a
juvenile, i.e., is amenable to treatment and poses no threat to the pub-
lic .... In the face of the inherent uncertainty of clinical evaluations,
placing the burden of production and the risk of nonpersuasion on
youths charged with serious offenses is preferable to placing those bur-
dens on the state.
Id. at 95; see also Feld, supra note 184, at 215 (stating that because a court
cannot reliably determine amenability or dangerousness, placing the burden of
persuasion on the juvenile rather than on the state shifts the risk of
uncertainty).
The Certification Committee and Task Force discussed and rejected exclud-
ing certain offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction. Minutes of the Juvenile
Certification Committee, supra, at 4. The Committee also discussed and re-
jected another strategy of placing youths charged with serious crimes directly
in adult court with "reverse certification," i.e., returning to juvenile court those
youths who proved they posed no threat to public safety and were "amenable to
treatment." Id. at 2-3; see, e.g., Simon I. Singer, Automatic Waiver of Juveniles
and Substantive Justice, 39 CRIME & DELINQ. 253, 258 (1993) (analyzing New
York's offense-exclusion waiver-back strategy and concluding that it "seems to
have duplicated the discretionary decisions of juvenile justice officials").
258. TASK FORCE, FNAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 26-37.
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sumption that the offender should be committed to prison.259
The Task Force used the Sentencing Guidelines to structure ju-
venile court waiver and sentencing decisions. It proposed that
older juveniles charged with presumptive-incarceration offenses
be presumptively certified. If juvenile court judges retained
youths charged with those presumptive offenses, the youths
would be subject to enhanced sanctions within juvenile courts.
Thus, the Task Force used the Sentencing Guidelines' definition
of serious offenses to make certification easier and more consis-
tent, to integrate juvenile and criminal court sentencing prac-
tices, to emphasize public safety over treatment considerations,
and to enhance the sentencing authority of juvenile courts.260
The Task Force proposed, and the new legislation provides,
that a prosecutor may file a motion to transfer only against
juveniles charged with felony-level offenses. 26 ' The new statute
retains a revised version of the waiver process. For juveniles
aged fourteen to seventeen and charged with any felony offense,
the prosecutor must prove by "clear and convincing evidence"
that protection of "public safety" requires the juvenile's transfer
to criminal court.262
259. MWN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § V (Offense Severity Reference Table)
(including in Severity Level VII-X offenses such crimes as: second and third
degree murder, first degree assault, first degree criminal sexual conduct, and
aggravated robbery).
260. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 27.
261. Id. Under prior law, juveniles charged with any offense could be trans-
ferred. Feld, supra note 72, at 30; see id. at 42 (22.9% of certified juveniles were
charged with misdemeanors as were 42.9% of juveniles certified in rural coun-
ties). The new statute provides that "[wihen a child is alleged to have commit-
ted, after becoming 14 years of age, an offense that would be a felony if
committed by an adult, the juvenile court may enter an order certifying the
proceeding to the district court for action under the criminal laws." MINN. STAT.
§ 260.125(1) (emphasis added to note new statutory language).
262. MINN. STAT. § 260.125(2). "he burden of proof, under current law, is
always on the prosecution. The Legislature should provide that under the new
certification process the burden of proof will remain on the prosecution for regu-
lar certifications and will be shifted to the defense for presumptive certifica-
tions." TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 30.
A juvenile court may order a certification to district court only if-
(2) a motion for certification has been filed by the prosecuting
authority;
(5) the court finds that there is probable cause ... ; and
(6) the court finds either:
(i) that the presumption of certification created by subdivision
2a applies and the child has not rebutted the presumption by
clear and convincing evidence demonstrating that retaining
the proceeding in the juvenile court serves public safety; or
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For youths aged sixteen or seventeen at the time of offense
who are charged with a crime requiring presumptive commit-
ment to prison under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, the
Task Force recommended a presumption of transfer to criminal
court.2 63 The new legislation incorporated the Task Force's rec-
ommendations. 264 While a prosecutor bears the burden of proof
in an "ordinary" certification proceeding, the presumption shifts
the burden of proof to older juveniles charged with serious of-
fenses to show by "clear and convincing" evidence that retaining
their case in juvenile court serves "public safety."265 The prima
(ii) that the presumption of certification does not apply and the
prosecuting authority has demonstrated by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that retaining the proceeding in the juvenile
court does not serve public safety. If the court finds that the
prosecutor has not demonstrated by clear and convincing evi-
dence that retaining the proceeding in juvenile court does not
serve public safety, the court shall retain the proceeding injuvenile court.
MINN. STAT. § 260.125(2) (emphasis added).
263. TAsK FORCE, F NAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 27.
264. The statute states:
It is presumed that a proceeding involving an offense committed by a
child will be certified to district court ifi
(1) the child was 16 or 17 years old at the time of the offense; and
(2) the delinquency petition alleges that the child committed an of-
fense that would result in a presumptive commitment to prison
under the sentencing guidelines and applicable statutes, or that
the child committed any felony offense while using, whether by
brandishing, displaying, threatening with, or otherwise employing
a firearm.
If the court determines that probable cause exists to believe the child
committed the alleged offense, the burden is on the child to rebut this
presumption by demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that
retaining the proceeding in the juvenile court serves public safety. If the
court finds that the child has not rebutted the presumption by clear
and convincing evidence, the court shall certify the child to district
court.
MIN. STAT. § 260.125(2)(a) (emphasis added).
265. Professor Francis McCarthy notes that the allocation of burdens of
proof and the type of waiver scheme used reflect ways of minimizing and con-
trolling specific types of errors. Thus, if a mistake is to be made, under a judi-
cial waiver statute, "the preferred error... is to keep a juvenile in the juvenile
court if there is doubt concerning which court is appropriate," whereas when a
legislature excludes offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction, "[t~he favored er-
ror ... is to keep a juvenile charged with such an offense in the criminal court."
McCarthy, supra note 37, at 659.
Similarly, I have argued that even within the context of a judicial waiver
proceeding, it is possible to use the burden of proof to strike the balance differ-
ently and choose a process that favors criminal prosecution in certain cases:
Placing the burden of persuasion on a youth... would emphasize the
policies of social defense and public safety in light of the uncertainty of
the issues being determined. In many cases, a court cannot reliably
determine whether a youth is amenable or dangerous. In these ambig-
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facie case approach created only a rebuttable presumption that
shifted the burden of production but left the ultimate burden of
proof on the prosecutor.266 Under the new legislation, however,
older juveniles charged with serious offenses bear the risk of
non-persuasion.267 If a youth fails to meet that burden, waiver
is non-discretionary.
Although the Task Force explicitly linked presumptive cer-
tification to the adult sentencing guidelines, the legislature ex-
panded somewhat the catalogue of offenses supporting the
presumption, adding cases involving juveniles who employ fire-
arms in committing felony offenses. 268 The Minnesota Criminal
Code and Sentencing Guidelines impose a three-year mandatory
minimum sentence for conviction of certain offenses while using
a firearm.269 Most of the firearms offenses to which the
mandatory minimum provisions apply are already presumptive-
commitment-to-prison offenses that carry terms longer than the
mandatory minimum.270 But presumptive certification may not
uous cases the decision whether or not to waive is determined by which
party bears the burden of persuasion. The legislative policies that jus-
tify creating a rebuttable presumption also justify placing the burden
of persuasion on the juvenile rather than the state.
Feld, supra note 184, at 215.
266. See supra notes 229-231 and accompanying text. The Final Report of
the Task Force explains that
[u]nike the prima facie case, a presentation by the defense of rebuttal
evidence will not shift the burden of proof back to the prosecution.
Under the presumptive certification system, the defense will always
have the burden of proving the juvenile should be retained in the juve-
nile system.
TASK FORCE, FiNAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 27.
267. In close cases, the allocation of the burden of proof may determine the
outcome of the waiver proceeding. See supra notes 236-251 and accompanying
text (discussing In re D.F.B.).
268. MiNN. STAT. § 260.125(2)(a)(2) (quoted supra note 264).
269. Id. § 609.11(5).
270. The crimes for which mandatory minimum sentences shall be
served as provided in this section are: murder in the first, second, or
third degree; assault in the first, second, or third degree; burglary; kid-
napping; false imprisonment; manslaughter in the first or second de-
gree; aggravated robbery; simple robbery; criminal sexual conduct... ;
escape from custody; arson in the first, second, or third degree; drive-
by shooting... ; a felony violation of chapter 152 [drug offenses]; or
any attempt to commit any of these offenses.
Id. § 609.11(9).
Some of the Severity Level VI or other less serious offenses when commit-
ted with a firearm arguably are appropriate for presumptive certification and
adult incarceration, for example, aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon
or kidnapping without great bodily harm. See id. §§ 609.222(1), 609.25(2)(1).
With the addition of a presumptive commitment mandatory-minimum firearms
charge, judges may imprison those offenders under the sentencing guidelines
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be appropriate for every type of firearm felony, for example, neg-
ligent manslaughter in a hunting accident.271 Although a
youngsters use of a firearm is obviously an "aggravating" factor
for politicians, these may be appropriate cases for judicial
discretion.
Basing a presumption for waiver on an allegation of a seri-
ous crime and placing the burden upon the youth to prove why
remaining in juvenile court serves public safety should signifi-
cantly increase the number of youths certified to criminal
court.272 To further expedite transfer to criminal court, the
Task Force recommended a change in waiver criteria to give pri-
macy to "public safety."273 Rather than asking unanswerable
without finding additional aggravating factors to justify an upward departure.
See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES cmt. 3I.E.01. "However some cases carry a
mandatory prison sentence under state law but fall above the dispositional line
on the Sentencing Guidelines Grid, e.g., Assault in the Second Degree. When
that occurs, imprisonment of the offender is the presumptive disposition. The
presumptive duration is the mandatory minimum sentence." Id. cmt. H.E.02.
"The fact that a firearm was involved in the offense triggered the application of
the mandatory minimum term...." State v. Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13, 15 (Mim.
1982) (holding that presumptive disposition is the mandatory minimum).
271. See MwN. STAT. § 609.205(2)-(4) (manslaughter second degree-hunt-
ing accident, Severity Level V).
272. California pioneered the presumption-burden-shifting strategy in 1976
when it amended its waiver statute. If the prosecution has alleged certain enu-
merated offenses, transfer is presumed unless the youth affirmatively estab-
lishes his or her amenability within the juvenile court. See CAL. WELT. & INST.
CODE § 707(b) (West 1984 & Supp. 1995). Subsequent amendments have
greatly expanded the catalogue of offenses which create the presumption of
adulthood. See infra note 385 and accompanying text (discussing California's
legislative amendments).
Evaluations of the California legislative changes indicate that using offense
criteria to shift the burden of proof dramatically increased the number of
youths tried, convicted, and sentenced as adults after being charged with one of
the enumerated offenses. "Los Angeles County experienced a 318% increase in
certification hearings and a 234% increase in certifications" between 1976 and
1977. Katherine S. Teilmann & Malcolm W. Klein, Summary of Interim Find-
ings of the Assessment of the Impact of California's 1977 Juvenile Justice Leg-
islation 30 (nd., unpublished report, on file with author). Moreover, thejuveniles who were certified to stand trial as adults were as likely to be con-
victed as youths tried in juvenile court, and following their convictions, they
were more likely to be incarcerated than their juvenile counterparts. Id. at 32.
273. TASK FORCE, FiNAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 27. The shift in emphasis
did not emerge until relatively late in the Task Force process. At a meeting of
the certification committee on September 14, 1993, I proposed alternatives to
the current factors. Minutes of the Juvenile Certification Committee 3-4 (Sept.
14, 1993) (on file with author) (proposing length of prior record, seriousness of
prior record, prior exposure to treatment, age of onset of delinquency). At the
Task Force retreat on September 29-30, 1993, the Certification Subcommittee
still recommended retention of "amenability to treatment" and "dangerousness"
as waiver criteria and the factors listed in MINN. R. Juv. P. 32(a)-(k), in MnqN-
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questions about a youth's "amenability to treatment" or "danger-
ousness," the Task Force proposed using more objective offense
criteria to define "public safety."27 4 Quite apart from criminal
liability, I urged the Task Force to include an offender's culpabil-
ity as a principal or accessory as a component of the waiver deci-
sion.275 Because juveniles are highly susceptible to peer group
influences and more likely than adults to commit their crimes in
SOTA RULES, supra note 167, as factors. Minutes of the Juvenile Certification
Committee 3 (Oct. 12, 1993) (on file with author). Ms. Karel Moersfelder, a
Hennepin County prosecuting attorney, and I expressed the strongest objection
to continued reliance on "clinical" considerations. At my urging, the Task Force
adopted objective offense, culpability, and "public safety" criteria to structure
waiver decisions. Minutes of Juvenile Justice Task Force 9 (Oct. 16, 1993) (on
fie with author).
274. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 27 (recommending in-
creased use of offense criteria, e.g., seriousness of the present offense, culpabil-
ity of the juvenile and prior record of delinquency, in order to emphasize public
safety, increase objectivity, and simplify the process). I had long advocated that
Minnesota use objective offense criteria to structure waiver decisions, e.g., Feld,
supra note 98, and others supported such a policy as well. A Minnesota House
of Representatives legislative analyst wrote a policy brief supporting similar
criteria. See EMILY SHmimo, MIN. HOUSE RESEARCH, POLICY BRIEF: REFER-
ENCE OF JUVENILES TO ADULT COURT 2 (1989). The analyst stated:
A reference process that relies primarily on objective criteria, such as
the nature of the crime, the age of the juvenile, and the extent of prior,
adjudicated delinquent conduct, is more likely to result in consistent
and principled results than one that relies primarily on the exercise of
unstructured discretion by the juvenile court judge.
Id. (emphasis added).
275. See Feld, supra note 232, at 523. I previously stated:
Assessments of seriousness, however, also include the quality of the
actor's choice to engage in the conduct that produced the harm. "The
other major component of seriousness is the degree of the offender's
culpability: that is, the degree to which he may justly be held to blame
for the consequences or risks of his act."
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 80 (1976)).
In In re KC. the court of appeals analyzed the juvenile's role in the offense
and rejected the claim that waiver required more than "passive" complicity:
The statutory requirement that a juvenile must be alleged "to have
committed" a certain type of felony does not imply a higher standard of
criminal liability than that established in the Minnesota criminal code.
The [prima facie case] statute relies on the seriousness of the felony,
not the juvenile's degree of participation, to target those offenses par-
ticularly meriting reference. Just as an adult defendant may be
charged as an accomplice under Minn. Stat. § 609.05 (1992), a juvenile
may be referred for adult prosecution based on that degree of participa-
tion. The court is, of course, free to consider the juvenile's degree of
participation in determining whether the county's burden of proof has
been met ....
513 N.W.2d 18, 21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
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groups,276 I felt that some mechanism was necessary to distin-
guish between active participants and passive accomplices.
The Task Force's emphasis on "public safety" reflects the
political reality that the public's fear of serious youth crime,
rather than a child's responsiveness to treatment, is the real
reason for waiver.277 I have repeatedly urged the legislature to
define "public safety" itself rather than to delegate that question
to the subjective, discretionary assessment of each member of
the judiciary.278
The legislative definition of "public safety" closely parallels
the Task Force's recommendations and further links the defini-
tion of serious juvenile offenses to the adult sentencing
guidelines:
In determining whether the public safety is served by certifying a child
to district court, the court shall consider the following factors:
(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of community pro-
tection, including the existence of any aggravating factors recog-
nized by the sentencing guidelines, the use of a firearm, and the
impact on any victim;
(2) the culpability of the child in committing the alleged offense, in-
cluding the level of the child's participation in planning and carry-
ing out the offense and the existence of any mitigating factors
recognized by the sentencing guidelines;
(3) the child's prior record of delinquency;
(4) the child's programming history, including the child's past willing-
ness to participate meaningfully in available programming;
276. Zimring, supra note 42, at 873-75 (arguing that juveniles' group partic-
ipation in criminal activity overstates their age contribution to overall crime
rates). Juveniles are routinely adjudicated delinquent or waived to criminal
court on the basis of accomplice liability. See In re T.L.C., 435 N.W.2d 581, 583
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting argument that misconduct ofjuvenile's accom-
plices had to be attributable to him in reference proceeding); In re D.K.KL, 410
N.W.2d 76, 77 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (juvenile adjudicated delinquent based on
evidence she aided and abetted theft); MnaN. SENTENCING GUMELNES
§ H.D.2.a.(2) (mitigating factor that "offender played a minor or passive role" in
crime).
277. The issue of waiver arises primarily in the context of a concern for
public safety. Therefore, legislatures may address the questions of an
offender's record of recidivism or the seriousness of the current offense
directly, rather than circuitously, through a judicial inquiry into ame-
nability to treatment or dangerousness. The value judgment about
whether public safety justifies waiver reflects a tension between retri-
bution and utilitarian prevention.
Feld, supra note 232, at 498.
278. See, e.g., id. at 499 ("These issues of public policy and safety should be
debated and decided in the open political arena by democratically elected legis-
lators rather than behind closed doors on an idiosyncratic basis by individual
judges."). In the Task Force deliberations, I stood behind my argument that
"[tihe most reliable and relevant criteria on which to base these [public safety]
judgments are the present offense and the prior record." Id. at 497.
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(5) the adequacy of the punishment or programming available in the
juvenile justice system; and
(6) the dispositional options available for the child.
In considering these factors, the court shall give greater weight to the
seriousness of the alleged offense and the child's prior record of delin-
quency than to the other factors listed in this subdivision.2 79
The statutory addition of the "punishment or programming" lan-
guage to the Task Force's recommended list of "public safety"
factors reflects a compromise between House and Senate confer-
ees.28 0 The legislation assigns controlling importance to the
present offense and prior record, and represent a significant ra-
tionalizing of the decision.28 1
The Task Force also recommended and the statute includes
"prior program history" and juvenile court "dispositional op-
tions" among the "public safety" factors. In the past, juvenile
courts certified many youths who received no prior exposure to
intensive treatment programs. 28 2 Inclusion of juveniles' pro-
gramming history, and the adequacy of juvenile court programs
and dispositional options, may reinstate sub rosa more subjec-
tive clinical considerations into waiver decisions.
Legislatively linking presumptive certification with the
Sentencing Guidelines also implicates many court decisions in-
terpreting the Guidelines' policy and jurisprudence. For exam-
ple, adult defendants may rebut the Sentencing Guidelines'
presumption of commitment to prison by showing that they are
"amenable to probation."28 3 In State v. Wright the defendant
279. MINN. STAT. § 260.125(2b) (emphasis added).
280. In the April 20, 1994, conference committee, Sen. Allan Spear objected
that "punishment" too narrowly defined juvenile court dispositions and argued
that 'programming is a broader term that includes both the punitive and the
therapeutic aspects." Minutes of the Juvenile Justice Task Force 4 (Apr. 20,
1994) (on file with author). Rep. Phil Carruthers insisted that the law should
retain "punishment" language: "Sometimes, kids deserve to be punished. If
they do something serious... let's not beat around the bush. They [sic] are
times when they deserve to be punished." Id. The conferees agreed to include
both terms in the statute.
281. See MmN. STAT. § 260.125(2b). I have criticized Minnesota and other
states for failing to rank-order or assign relative weights to the various factors
that courts consider when making waiver decisions. See Feld, supra note 98, at
527-29 (arguing that without rank-ordering or assigning controlling weight to
the factors they are to use, legislatures give judges wide discretion). Legislative
"lists" rarely serve to limit discretion, as a judge can emphasize one or two fac-
tors to justify almost any decision. Feld, supra note 15, at 271-72; see also
supra notes 182-188 and accompanying text.
282. See Feld, supra note 72, at 35 (fewer than half of certified youths re-
ceived previous home removal or institutional dispositions).
283. See generally Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Reform in Minnesota, Ten
Years After: Reflections on Dale G. Parent's structuring Criminal Sentences:
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faced a presumptive prison term of twenty-four months, but the
trial court stayed the term, made a mitigated dispositional de-
parture, and ordered probation with six months in jail and treat-
ment.28 4 The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the departure
because the defendant was "particularly unamenable to incar-
ceration" and he was "particularly amenable to individualized
treatment in a probation-setting."28 5 Subsequently, in State v.
Tracy, the court upheld a mitigated downward departure based
solely on a finding that the defendant was "amenable to
probation."28 6
Thus, to the extent that the Sentencing Guidelines' rebutta-
ble presumption jurisprudence shapes interpretation of the
analogous presumptive-certification provisions, trial judges in
certification hearings must still determine whether a youth is
amenable to an EJJ probationary disposition.28 7 Despite the
legislature's emphasis on "public safety" and "proportional sen-
tencing," a substantial degree of individualized sentencing dis-
cretion remains inherent in presumptive certification. Professor
Frase's criticism of the vagueness of "amenability to probation"
departures echoes my critiques of judicial waiver discretion
based on assessments of "amenability to treatment."288
The Evolution of Minnesota's Sentencing Guidelines, 75 MNN. L. REv. 727, 740
(1991) (discussing the operation of Minnesota's sentencing guidelines).
284. 310 N.W.2d 461, 461 (Minn. 1981).
285. Id. at 462-63. The court found that because of his immaturity, Wright
would be easily victimized in prison or misled into criminal activity by other
inmates. The court also found that he needed psychiatric treatment that would
not be available in an institutional setting and that he would not endanger pub-
lic safety if he received appropriate treatment on an out-patient basis. Id. at
462.
286. 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982).
287. See Frase, supra note 283, at 740-48. Both the presumption of feasibil-
ity and infeasibility of community-based treatment may be overcome in excep-
tional circumstances. Id. at 746. Professor Frase contends that the Guidelines'
mixed retributive-utilitarian approach makes sentencing policy sense. For
those for whom probation will likely be unsuccessful, "[p]romptly giving such
defendants their full just deserts' incapacitates high-risk offenders and sends
appropriate deterrent messages to the public." Id. at 747. At the same time,
allowing amenability departures helps to counterbalance the prison crowding
impact of upward departures based on findings of nonamenbility to probation,
and avoids other less visible charging or plea bargaining strategies that prose-
cutors or courts might resort to in order to achieve the same results. Id. at 745-
46.
288. Compare id. at 747 (arguing that amenability departures are vague,
and as a result, popular with criminal justice officials who are likely to overuse
them, and that the Guidelines Commission should have "sought to develop
more precise definitions of 'amenability' and 'unamenbility,' including objective
1995] 1033
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
In the final analysis, a juvenile court judge who decides to
certify a youth in the interest of "public safety" effectively must
decide whether the youth's offense severity, criminal history,
and "unamenability to probation" warrant adult imprisonment.
In 1989 about thirty percent of all adult defendants convicted of
presumptive-commitment-to-prison offenses received mitigated
downward departures, and courts formally justified about half of
those departures (fifteen percent) with findings of amenability to
probation.28 9 Unless prosecutors are more selective in filing cer-
tification motions than they are in charging adult criminal de-
fendants, similar rates of non-certification should occur.
The new legislation still requires a juvenile court judge to
conduct a waiver hearing whether the prosecutor charges a
youth with a presumptive-certification offense or seeks certifica-
tion on "public safety" grounds.290 A prosecutor initiates a certi-
fication proceeding by filing a motion, and the court must
conduct a hearing within thirty days.291 Because the charges
fied determine whether the presumption for certification ap-
plies, and thus which party bears the burden of proof, the court
must make a threshold determination of probable cause.29 2
In State v. Florence, the Minnesota Supreme Court defined
the type of probable cause required by the rules of criminal pro-
cedure.29 3 Probable cause may be "based upon the entire record
including reliable hearsay in whole or in part" rather than liti-
gated in an adversarial hearing.2 94 In authorizing non-adver-
sarial probable cause procedures, the Florence court relied on
criteria for making these findings") with Feld, supra note 98, at 529 n.49 (judi-
cial determinations of amenability to treatment are inherently vague.)
289. Richard S. Frase, Implementing Commission-Based Sentencing Guide-
lines: The Lessons of the First Ten Years in Minnesota, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
PoL'y 279, 320-26 (1993).
290. MIN. STAT. § 260.125(2).
291. Id. MiNN. R. Juv. P. 32.04(1)(B), in MINNESOTA RuLEs, supra note 167.
The 30-day time period for the hearing may be extended for an additional 60
days for "good cause." MINN. STAT. § 260.125(2)(4); Mn-NN. R. Juv. P. 32.04.1(B),
in MINNESOTA RULES, supra note 167.
292. MINN. STAT. § 260.125(2)(d); see also MIN. R. CRIM. P. 11.03 ("A find-
ing by the court of probable cause shall be based upon the entire record includ-
ing reliable hearsay in whole or in part."); MINN. R. Juv. P. 32.04(3)(B), in
MINNESOTA RULES, supra note 167 (probable cause determination made pursu-
ant to Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure 11).
293. 239 N.W.2d 892, 899 (1976).
294. Id. The court concluded that "ufin most instances, the information
available to the judge presiding at an omnibus hearing will form an adequate
basis for determining probable cause, thus making unnecessary the production
and cross-examination of witnesses in court." Id. at 900.
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Gerstein v. Pugh,2 9 5 where the Supreme Court upheld ex parte
judicial determinations of probable cause.296 In the vast major-
ity of criminal cases, probable cause is based on the complaint
supported by police reports and statements by witnesses. 297 An
adversarial probable cause determination occurs only in those
relatively rare instances in which a defendant produces wit-
nesses whose testimony, if believed, would negate a finding of
probable cause.298 Thus, in practice, probable cause determina-
tions in certification hearings entail only judicial review of the
documentary record.
Even though certification hearings focus primarily on "pub-
lic safety" considerations, rather than "amenability to treat-
ment," some clinical issues remain formally in the guise of
"dispositional options" and "adequacy of... programming," and,
practically, as findings of "amenability to probation."299 Conse-
quently, a court may require a social or psychological study of a
child in a certification proceeding.300 Such evaluations raise
constitutional issues similar to those posed by a determination
of a criminal defendant's competency to stand trial or sanity at
the time of the offense. In In re S.R.J., the Minnesota Supreme
Court analyzed how to obtain psychiatric evaluations and
clinical evidence for certification hearings without violating the
Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimina-
tion.30 ' The S.R.J. court attempted to resolve the dilemma by
295. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
296. Florence, 239 N.W.2d at 901.
297. Id. at 902. The Florence court noted that
[a] carefully drawn and sufficiently detailed complaint made by an in-
vestigating officer and incorporating reliable hearsay could in some
limited situations be adequate support for a finding of probable cause,
at least where the essential truth of the facts averred in the complaint
is not contested. In the more usual situation, the complaint will and
should be buttressed by the police report, including verified statements
of witnesses whose observations form the basis for the complaint and,
in addition, the results of disclosure and discovery procedures required
by the rules.
Id. (footnote omitted).
298. Id. at 902-03.
299. MwN. STAT. § 260.125(2b)(5), (6).
300. Id. § 260.151(1) (1994) ("The court may order any minor coming within
its jurisdiction to be examined by a duly qualified physician, psychiatrist or psy-
chologist appointed by the court."); MINN. R. Juv. P. 32.03, in MINNESOTA
RULEs, supra note 167 (court may order social, psychiatric, or psychological
studies).
301. 293 N.W.2d 32 (Minn 1980). The Supreme Court extended the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to juvenile court proceedings
in 1967. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text (discussing In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1 (1967)). Shortly after the Minnesota court decided S.R.J., I argued
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providing a form of limited use-immunity to compel the inter-
view but restrict its use.3 0 2 The Minnesota Supreme Court,
however, decided S.R.J. prior to Estelle v. Smith, which held
that the privilege against self-incrimination applied to a court-
ordered psychiatric examination conducted for purposes of a
subsequent sentencing hearing and restricted psychiatrists' per-
missible disclosures.30 3
Since the court decided Smith, several state courts have
held that any court-ordered psychological evaluation of a youth
to determine "amenability" either violates the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination30 4 or requires a youth's at-
torney to be present at the interview. 305 If instead of disclosure
in a court-ordered psychological evaluation, a juvenile testifies
at a certification hearing about the alleged offense, may a prose-
cutor introduce that testimony as evidence at a subsequent de-
linquency, EJJ, or criminal trial on the merits,30 6 and, if a
that the court's resolution of the Fifth Amendment claim was inconsistent with
its treatment of similar claims by adult defendants who raised an insanity de-
fense. See Feld, supra note 184, at 213-14 n.183. At least the Minnesota court
recognized the existence of the Fifth Amendment issue, however. Recently, one
court rejected the argument that constitutional rights even apply in waiver
hearings. People v. Hana, 504 N.W.2d 166, 177 (Mich. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1074 (1994).
302. "Any matters disclosed by the juvenile to the doctor in the course of the
examination may not be evidence or the source of evidence in any subsequent
adjudicatory procedure against the accused." S.R.J., 293 N.W.2d at 36. It can
be difficult to conduct evaluations where confidentiality of communications can-
not be assured. Ajuvenile may deny committing the alleged offense because of
genuine non-participation, a strategic calculation of the affects of admitting it at
trial, an avoidance or inability to acknowledge negative behavior, or repression,
a dissociative reaction against the memory of the offense. Richard Barnum,
Self-Incrimination and Denial in the Juvenile Transfer Evaluation, 18 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCH. L. 413, 419 (1990).
Other jurisdictions may bar a juvenile from introducing expert testimony
on the question of amenability if the youth does not submit to an examination
by an expert for the state. See, e.g., Wayne W. v. Commonwealth, 606 N.E.2d
1323, 1330 (Mass. 1993) ("[A] defendant who speaks on his own behalf thereby
gives up his privilege of silence and may be compelled to respond to questions
posed by the State on matters reasonably related to the subject matter of his
own testimony.").
303. 451 U.S. 454, 462-69 (1981). "'[Ihe availability of the [Fifth Amend-
ment] privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protec-
tion is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission and the
exposure which it invites.'" Id. at 462 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49
(1967) (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion)).
304. E.g., R.H. v. State, 777 P.2d 204 (Ala. Ct. App. 1989).
305. Christopher P. v. State, 816 P.2d 485, 489 (N.M. 1991).
306. MIN. R. Juv. P. 32.04(4), in MINNESOTA RULES, supra note 167. The
rules of procedure do not provide an explicit use immunity for the youth's testi-
mony at the certification hearing. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377,
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youth's attorney obtains a clinical evaluation to aid the defense
in a waiver hearing, may the prosecution call the psychiatrist as
a witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution?30 7 Because a
certification hearing is a type of sentencing proceeding, the new
statute also provides parity between juveniles and adult crimi-
nal defendants with respect to the confidentiality of psychologi-
cal evidence.308
394 (1968) (holding that a defendant's testimony in support of a motion to sup-
press evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds can not be used against him at
trial); State v. Christenson, 371 N.W.2d 228, 332 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (same).
In Ramona R. v. Superior Court the California Supreme Court held that
any statements a juvenile gives in a certification hearing must receive use im-
munity, meaning that such statements can not be used in a subsequent delin-
quency or criminal trial. 693 P.2d 789, 793-95 (Cal. 1985). The court in
Ramona R. analogized to the self-incrimination dangers posed for probationers
in revocation hearings and reasoned that without a grant of use-immunity, ajuvenile would be dissuaded from contesting a certification motion. Id. at 794-
95. Analogizing to the dangers of self-incrimination posed for a probationer in a
revocation hearing, the court recognized that a juvenile at a certification hear-
ing faced the cruel-trilemma of contempt, self-incrimination, or perjury:
He might ... seriously incriminate himself if he exercises his right to
be heard, particularly where his testimony would consist of a truthful
explanation of mitigating circumstances.... If he remains silent he
not only loses his opportunity to present a conceivably convincing case
against... [waiver] but also incurs the risk that notwithstanding the
ideals of the Fifth Amendment... his silence will be taken as an indi-
cation that there are no valid reasons why ... [he should not be tried
as an adult]. To avoid the adverse effects of the foregoing alternatives,
the ... [juvenile] may be tempted to testify falsely in a manner which
will not damage his defense at a subsequent criminal trial.
Id. at 794.
307. In State v. Rhomberg, defense counsel employed a psychiatrist to ob-
tain evidence for the juvenile's waiver hearing. 516 N.W.2d 803, 807 (Iowa
1994). Although the psychiatrist did not testify on the juvenile's behalf, the
state called him as a rebuttal witness at the youth's subsequent criminal prose-
cution. Id. The court ruled that "the physician-patient privilege does not pre-
clude the State from calling a psychiatrist . . . as a witness against [the]
defendant" because the psychiatrist was retained not to aid in treatment but for
litigation purposes. Id. at 808.
308. Compare MINN. STAT. § 260.155(1)(c) ("[Tihe court may exclude the
public from portions of a certification hearing to discuss psychological material
or other evidence that would not be accessible to the public in an adult proceed-
ing.") with MIN. R. JUV. P. 32.04(1), in MumEsoTA RULEs, supra note 167(same).
Prior to the amendment, all delinquency and reference hearings were open
to the public if a youth was 16 years of age or older and charged with a felony.
MINN. STAT. § 260.155(1) (1992). Many commentators analyzed the conflicting
policies between media access to court proceedings and the confidential nature
of juvenile court hearings to protect youths from stigma and public labelling.
Richard D. Hendrickson, Media Access to Juvenile Courts: An Update, 4 Juv. &
Fm. CT. J., No. 3, 1993, at 27; David Katz, The Grim Reality of Open Juvenile
Delinquency Hearings, 28 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 101 (1983); Stephen Jonas, Press
1995] 1037
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
B. EXTENDED JURISDICTION JUVENILE PROSECUTIONS
The Task Force recognized that one fundamental deficiency
of all waiver legislation is its binary quality, either juvenile or
adult, even though adolescence is a developmental continuum
requiring a continuum of controls.30 9 To avoid re-creating a
false dichotomy, the Task Force recommended
a more graduated juvenile justice system that establishes a new transi-
tional component between the juvenile and adult systems.... [Tlhis
new [Serious Youthful Offender] category will create viable new dispo-
sitional options for juvenile court judges facing juveniles who have
committed serious or repeat offenses. It will give the juvenile one last
chance at success in the juvenile system, with the threat of adult sanc-
tions as an incentive not to re-offend. The juvenile court, for a Serious
Youthful Offender, will be very similar to adult court, with the excep-
tion that juvenile treatment would be available.3 10
In recommending the creation of a category for serious youthful
offenders, the Task Force proposed a substantial departure from
prior juvenile court legislation. The new, intermediate category
envisioned that courts would try youths in juvenile court with
all adult procedural safeguards, and then impose both a juvenile
court sentence and a stayed adult criminal sentence.
3 11
Access to the Juvenile Courtroom: Juvenile Anonymity and the First Amend-
ment, 17 COLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 287 (1982); Note, The Public Right of Ac-
cess to Juvenile Delinquency Hearings, 81 MICH. L. R.v. 1540 (1983); see Note,
Juvenile Court Records: Confidentiality vs. the Public's Right to Know, 23 AM.
Camn. L. R.v. 379, 399-401 (1986) (table summarizing statutory access
provisions).
In a certification proceeding, however, either side could present psychologi-
cal evidence that would be confidential if offered at the sentencing of an adult
criminal defendant. MINN. R. Calm. P. 27.03(C) (disclosure of "non confidential
portion of the presentence investigation report" only). When a juvenile court
judge restricted press access to the "psychological phase of a waiver hearing in
the highly visible Jason Williams murder case, the court of appeals reversed
and granted admission. Star Tribune v. Bush, 20 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2293
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993). The court of appeals dismissed the trial court's concern
about the "'significant danger' that psychological information related to the ju-
venile's amenability to treatment would be 'available to the public.' The legisla-
ture has weighed the balance between the juvenile's rights and public access,
and has concluded that public access is appropriate in certain serious cases."
Id. at 2294. As a result of the court of appeals's decision to grant press access to
the reference hearing, Williams waived his right to a waiver hearing in order to
avoid the public disclosure of psychological information that his attorney feared
would be prejudicial. Kevin Diaz, Boy Waives Rights and Will Stand Trial as
Adult in Slayings, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Feb. 24, 1993, at 2B.
309. TASK FORCE, Fni. REPORT, supra note 2, at 32-33.
310. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
311. Elsewhere I have proposed the idea of an intermediate, blended juve-
nile-adult sentence. Feld, supra note 98, at 583-84 (proposing a sentencing cat-
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Although a few jurisdictions provide some mixed or blended
juvenile-adult intermediate categories for sentencing serious
young offenders,31 2 they typically either use inadequate juvenile
court procedures or impose standard adult sentences. In Texas,
for example, juveniles may be indicted for certain serious
crimes, tried in juvenile court with all adult criminal procedural
safeguards, including the right to a jury trial, and sentenced to
up to forty years of confinement with their term beginning in
juvenile facilities and, if not released from the Youth Commis-
sion, continuing in an adult correctional facility.313 By contrast,
young offenders are committed to the California Youth Author-
ity ("CYA7) either as juveniles or as young adults. The CYA
exercises jurisdiction over them until age twenty-five. 314
Juveniles tried in juvenile courts do not have a right to a jury
trial, and they may receive longer CYA sentences than young
egory for chronological juveniles sentenced as adults to encourage courts to
incarcerate young offenders with considerable juvenile histories).
312. New Mexico recently created a "youthful offender" status for juveniles
charged with serious crimes, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-3(I) (Michie 1993).
Juveniles in New Mexico enjoy the right to a jury trial. Id. § 32A-2-16. The
statute authorizes either an adult criminal sentence, or a juvenile disposition
with extended jurisdiction until age 21 with a waiver hearing to decide whether
to sentence the juvenile as an adult or youthful offender. Id. § 32A-2-20.
313. TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. §§ 53.045, 54.04, 54.11 (West 1986 & Supp.
1995). The Texas determinate sentencing law subjects children 10 to 16 years
of age to sentences of up to 40 years in prison if they are indicted for one of six
designated felonies. Id. § 54.04(d)(3). Juveniles receive the same procedural
guarantees as do adult criminal defendants. Id. § 53.045(a). Juveniles begin
their sentences in juvenile facilities, and at age 18 a court conducts a hearing to
decide if they will be retained within the juvenile correctional system for the
duration of their minority (until age 21), or complete their determinate sen-
tence in the Texas Department of Corrections. Id. §§ 54.04(d)(3), 54.11. Chal-
lenges to the law have been unsuccessful. See, e.g., In re D.S., 833 S.W.2d 250,
253 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (equal protection claim).
The Texas legislation greatly increases the sanctioning power of juvenile
courts to respond to youths below 15 years old, the minimum age to transferjuveniles to criminal courts, and provides prosecutors with a powerful alterna-
tive to adult prosecution. See Robert 0. Dawson, The Third Justice System:
The New Juvenile-Criminal System of Determinate Sentencing for the Youthful
Violent Offender in Texas, 19 ST. MARy'S L.J. 943, 946 (1989) [hereinafter Daw-
son, Third Justice System] (explaining that the primary focus of the determi-
nate sentencing system is on violent offenses committed by 13- and 14-year-olds
as well as on providing prosecutors with alternative to discretionary transfer
for older violent juveniles); Robert 0. Dawson, The Violent Juvenile Offender:
An Empirical Study of Juvenile Determinate Sentencing Proceedings as an Al-
ternative to Criminal Prosecution, 21 TExAs TECH L. REv. 1897, 1921-24 (1990)(examining the age distribution of the juveniles handled under the Texas deter-
minate sentencing statute).
314. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1731.5 (West 1992); see Feld, supra note 9,
at 877-78 & nn.286-89 (discussing California legislation).
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adult offenders convicted for the same offense in criminal
court.31 5 Thus, the Minnesota Juvenile Justice Task Force at-
tempted to wend its way between using adult criminal proce-
dures and sentences in juvenile court on the one hand, and using
the deficient procedures of juvenile courts to enhance sanction-
ing powers, on the other hand.
Currently, most waived juveniles are sixteen or seventeen
years old. 31 6 Prior to the 1994 amendments, juvenile courts' dis-
positional authority ended when individuals reached age
nineteen.3 17 A juvenile's time remaining within the jurisdiction
of juvenile courts often provides the impetus to waive older
youths.318 Thus, increasing juvenile courts' dispositional juris-
diction from age nineteen to age twenty-one or twenty-three
could reduce the pressure to certify some youths.31 9 Due to con-
cerns that a longer jurisdictional period might unduly prolong
some youth's exposure to probation revocations or discourage
judges from certifying them, some Task Force members favored
extending jurisdiction only until age twenty-one.3 20
315. The California Supreme Court in People v. Olivas limited the maxi-
mum sentence that could be imposed upon an adult misdemeanant committed
to the CYA to the maximum length that could be imposed on an adult sentenced
for the same offense. 551 P.2d 375, 389 (Cal. 1976). By contrast, inIn re Eric J.
the court refused to apply the Olivas adult sentence limits to juveniles sen-
tenced to the CYA. 601 P.2d 549, 552-54 (Cal. 1979). Juvenile courts may im-
pose a longer term on a juvenile than could be imposed on an adult sentenced
for the same offense because "[j]uvenile commitment proceedings are designed
for the purposes of rehabilitation and treatment, not punishment." Id. at 554.
See generally Robert V. Vallandigham Jr., People v. Olivas: The Concept of
"Personal Liberty" as a Fundamental Interest in Equal Protection Analysis, 4
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 757 (1977) (discussing the potential impact of Olivas);
Comment, Equality of Sentencing Between Juveniles and Adults: A Logical Ex-
tension of People v. Olivas, 10 PAC. L.J. 161 (1978) (arguing against any dispar-
ity between juvenile and adult sentencing schemes); People v. Olivas:
Equalizing the Sentencing of Youthful Offenders with Adult Maximums, 4 PEPP.
L. REV. 389 (1977) (same).
316. McCarthy, supra note 37, at 651 (noting that the vast majority of trans-
fer cases involve 16- and 17-year-old males); see also Podkopacz, supra note
211, at 45 (data from Hennepin County, Minnesota).
317. MINN. STAT. § 260.181 (1992). The 1982 amendment of § 260.181
shortened the period of juvenile court jurisdiction from age 21 to age 19. 1982
Minn. Laws 615, § 4.
318. See, e.g., Fagan & Deschenes, supra note 191, at 341 (youth's age at the
time of offense was the most consistent factor in waiver decisions, with older
youths transferred more often).
319. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 33. Even if this is the
case, use of the new category would still result in stronger consequences for
serious and repeat offenders. Id.
320. Id. at 33, 36. A minority of the members of the Task Force recom-
mended that SYO extended jurisdiction terminate at age 21:
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For older juveniles charged with presumptive-certification
offenses, the Task Force recommended that, at the conclusion of
a waiver hearing, the only sentencing options available to a ju-
venile court judge would be either to certify the youth to adult
court or designate the juvenile as a Serious Youthful Of-
fender.321 The legislature renamed that category Extended Ju-
risdiction Juvenile Prosecution ("EJJ") because it sounded more
bureaucratic and less attractive to young toughs.322 For non-
presumptive-certification juveniles against whom the state filed
a certification motion but who were not certified, the Task Force
proposed that juvenile court judges retain broader discretion
either to designate the youth as an EJJ or to impose an ordinary
juvenile court disposition.3 23
Some Task Force members characterized EJJ status as "one
last chance" for juvenile rehabilitation. Others described EJJ as
enhancing juvenile court sanctioning powers, a juvenile court
"on steroids," or one with "a longer handle and a stronger leash."
Effectively, EJJ status reflects both descriptions because
Concern was expressed that extending the jurisdiction to age 23 cre-
ated too lengthy an exposure for juveniles in which they could reoffend.
Concern was also expressed that the adult criminal system may be
overwhelmed if large numbers of juveniles reoffend and have their
adult sentences executed.
Id. at 33. Commissioner of Corrections Frank Wood expressed concern that
many juveniles whom judges had already deemed inappropriate for adult incar-
ceration by declining to certify them would enter adult prisons as a result of
probation violations.
321. Id. at 28, 32-35.
322. The legislature changed the name from "serious youthful offender" to
extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecutions to make the label less attractive to
delinquent "wannabees." "We were told that we might somehow be encourag-
ing youths to be tough, so we settled on something less, uh, glamorous,' said
Sen. Jane Ranum, DFL-Minneapolis, the Senate bill's sponsor." Patricia L. Ba-
den, Senate Oks Juvenile Crime Bill; Violent Youths Could Get Adult Penalties,
STAR TRm. (Minneapolis), Apr. 30, 1994, at 1B, 5B. For simplicity, this Article
uses the Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile Prosecution (EJJ) label rather than
the serious youthful offender (SYO) label.
323. Some juveniles would not meet the presumptive certification criteria
because either they were younger than 16 years of age, or their offenses were
less serious. The Task Force recommended that in these cases judges have
somewhat broader sentencing discretion:
The Legislature should provide that at the end of the [ordinary] certifi-
cation hearing the court will have three options:
a. deny the motion and keep the juvenile in juvenile court,
b. deny the motion, designate the juvenile as a Serious Youthful Of-
fender and keep the Serious Youthful Offender in juvenile court, or
c. grant the motion and refer the certified adult to adult court for
trial.
TAsK FORCE, FiNAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 30.
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juveniles designated as EJJs will be tried in juvenile court, but
will be given all adult criminal procedural safeguards, including
the right to a jury trial.3 24 Because juvenile courts use adult
procedures to try EJJs, judges could impose adult criminal
sentences as well as juvenile dispositions. 325 If a youth violated
the conditions of the juvenile sentence, the stayed adult criminal
sentence could be executed.3 26
Certification Committee and Task Force members debated
thoroughly the extent to which probation revocation should be
automatic or non-discretionary. Unable to define the circum-
stances requiring mandatory revocation, the Task Force ulti-
mately proposed that courts treat EJJ revocations in the same
way as adult probation violations.327 Because EJJs receive
adult criminal procedural safeguards, the Task Force recom-
mended including their EJJ convictions in their criminal
history.3 28
Whether to allow prosecutors to designate "presumptive-
certification" juveniles as EJJs without filing a certification mo-
tion divided Task Force members. Many had misgivings about
prosecutorial overcharging and the potential for abuse.329 As a
324. The Task Force recognized that "[ilmplementing a significantly more
severe juvenile justice system response, including the potential of an adult
sanction, will require extending a mandatory right to counsel and the option of
a jury trial to juveniles designated as Serious Youthful Offenders." Id. at 34.
Accordingly, the Task Force made such recommendations. Id. at 36; see infra
notes 596-709 and accompanying text (analyzing more extensively the provision
of jury trials and counsel in juvenile court).
325. TASK FORCE, FiNAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 33.
Serious Youthful Offenders would receive an adult sentence for their
offense, which would initially be stayed, and a juvenile disposition
would be ordered. This category would give the public the best of both
systems. The juvenile court would retain access to juvenile program-
ming, and would have the availability of adult sanctions if the program
is not successful.
Id. at 33-34.
326. Id. at 34, 37.
327. Id.
328. The Task Force recommended that "Serious Youthful Offender convic-
tions carry the same weight as similar adult convictions should the offender be
sentenced for an adult crime in the future. Unlike the current system, Serious
Youthful Offender convictions will become a part of the Serious Youthful Of-
fender's adult criminal record." Id. at 34; see infra notes 403-449 and accompa-
nying text (discussing use of juvenile records in the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines).
329. Cf. McCarthy, supra note 37, at 657-58 (noting that most prosecutors
are officials elected locally, who may prosecute a juvenile criminally in a well-
publicized case to appease local public pressure). See generally Donna M.
Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: A Case
Study and Analysis of Prosecutorial Waiver, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETmcs & PUB.
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concession to prosecutors, the Task Force endorsed prosecutorial
classification of presumptive-certification juveniles as EJJs
without judicial review. 330 Some Task Force members feared
that allowing prosecutors to designate EJJs without judicial re-
view could result in adult confinement of inappropriate youths if
courts revoked their EJJ probation status. They concluded,
however, that restricting EJJ eligibility to older, presumptive-
certification juveniles, requiring prosecutors to use adult crimi-
nal procedures to try EJJ cases, and removing the EJJ designa-
tion from youths convicted of lesser, non-presumptive offenses,
would foster realism in charging and provide adequate checks on
prosecutorial designation of EJJ cases.331
The legislature followed the Task Force's recommendations,
and created the intermediate EJJ status. 332 When a prosecutor
initially files a delinquency petition alleging a felony offense, the
petition must indicate whether the prosecutor seeks an EJJ
designation.333 The new statute provides several methods for
Poi'y 281 (1991) (philosophy and practice of prosecutorial waiver in Florida);
Donna M. Bishop et al., Prosecutorial Waiver: Case Study of a Questionable
Reform, 35 CRmm & DELINQ. 179 (1989) (same); Wallace J. Mlyniec, Juvenile
Delinquent or Adult Convict-The Prosecutor's Choice, 14 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 29,
36-46 (1976) (examining the validity and desirability of prosecutorial
discretion).
330. The Task Force recommended:
The second option would allow the prosecutor to designate the juvenile
as a Serious Youthful Offender on the charging petition. This designa-
tion could apply to juveniles 16 or 17 years of age at the time of the
offense, who are charged with a felony offense that, if they were an
adult, would be a presumptive commitment of prison offense under the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. If it is later determined that the of-
fense at plea or conviction is less serious than originally charged, the
designation would be removed and the offender returned to regular ju-
venile status for disposition.
TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 34 (emphasis added). The itali-
cized language and the Task Force's recommendation to allow juveniles con-
victed of lesser-included, non-presumptive certification offenses to resume their
regular juvenile status became known as the "bounce back" provision.
As a former prosecutor, I recognize the potentials for abuse of prosecutorial
overcharging. In the analogous context of prosecutorial over-charging under
excluded offense waiver legislation, I argued that "[tlhe provision for 'rejuve-
nating' young offenders not convicted of excluded offenses by basing disposi-
tional jurisdiction on convictions rather than on initial charges provides an
important additional check on the prosecutor's charging discretion." Feld,
supra note 98, at 582.
331. TASK FORCE, FNAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 36.
332. MINN. STAT. § 260.126(1); see supra note 322 (describing the name
change from SYO to EJJ).
333. See MNN. STAT. § 260.131(4).
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subjecting a youth to an EJJ prosecution.38 4 One gateway is an
unsuccessful attempt to certify a youth. In an ordinary certifica-
tion hearing involving a youth fourteen to seventeen years of age
and charged with any felony, if a court does not certify the
youth, the judge may designate the subsequent proceeding as
either an EJJ proceeding or an ordinary delinquency proceed-
ing.385 Although the certification statute does not cross-refer-
ence the EJJ provision, presumably a judge will use the EJJ
"public safety" criteria to make the EJJ or delinquency
determination.
In a presumptive-certification proceeding involving a six-
teen- or seventeen-year-old youth charged with a firearms felony
or other offense for which the Sentencing Guidelines presume
commitment to prison, if a court does not certify the youth, it
must designate the subsequent juvenile proceeding as an EJJ
prosecution.33 6 Assuming that the "worst of the worst" will be
certified, the mandatory EJJ provisions subject the "less bad of
the worst" to more stringent controls than those ordinarily avail-
able in juvenile courts. Effectively, a decision not to certify a
presumptive-certification youth entails a determination that the
youth is "amenable to probation" under the juvenile court's
strengthened EJJ provisions.
A second gateway to EJJ status arises when a prosecutor
charges a youth sixteen or seventeen years of age with a pre-
sumptive-certification offense, and designates the case as an
EJJ prosecution without any further judicial review.337 Because
the only alternative disposition available to a judge following a
presumptive-certification hearing is to designate the case as an
EJJ proceeding,338 allowing the prosecutor to designate the case
as an EJJ proceeding provides an efficient alternative. Thus,
prosecutors need not file pro forma certification motions when
334. See id. § 260.126(1).
335. Id. § 260.126(1)(1). The rules of procedure for the juvenile court pro-
vide that "[ilf the court does not order certification in a case in which certifica-
tion is not presumed, the court may consider designating the proceeding an
extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution." To do so, the prosecution must
prove that "public safety" requires such designation. MmN. R. Juv. P.
32.05(5)(B), in MINNESOTA RULEs, supra note 167.
336. MI-N. STAT. § 260.126(1)(2); MmN. R. Juv. P. 32.05(5)(A), in MINNE-
SOTA RULEs, supra note 167.
337. See MINN. STAT. § 260.126(1)(2) (providing for this procedure).
338. See id. § 260.125(5) ("If the juvenile court decides not to order certifica-
tion in a case in which the presumption described in subdivision 2a applies, the
court shall designate the proceeding an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecu-
tion .... ") (emphasis added).
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they do not desire adult status, and they obtain greater plea bar-
gaining leverage in the most serious juvenile cases.3 39
Finally, the legislature followed the Task Force's rationale
and provided a third gateway to EJJ prosecution for other seri-
ous offenders. Instead of filing a certification motion against a
non-presumptive-certification youth, a prosecutor may request
that the court designate the youth an EJJ.340 A judge may deny
a motion to certify and designate a fourteen- to seventeen-year-
old charged with any felony as an EJJ when public safety re-
quires;341 a judicial hearing on a prosecutor's request for EJJ
designation provides for the same result.342 At the EJJ hearing,
the prosecution must prove by "clear and convincing evidence"
that public safety warrants designating the proceeding as an
EJJ prosecution, using the same criteria specified in the certifi-
cation legislation.3 43
Regardless of the mechanism by which an EJJ prosecution
commences, a youth receives greater procedural protections
than those currently available in juvenile court, including the
right to a jury trial.3 " The right to a trial by jury is an essential
component of this new quasi-adult status, because a court im-
poses both a juvenile sentence and an adult sentence which is
stayed pending compliance with the juvenile probation.3 45 The
legislation also includes all EJJ convictions in the Sentencing
339. TAsK FORCE, FwnAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 34-35. "The prosecutor
designation option will make it possible for older juveniles who commit violent
person offenses to be designated as Serious Youthful Offenders [EJJ] in an ex-
pedient manner" without the administrative burdens of filing a certification mo-
tion. Id.
340. Msi. STAT. § 260.126(1)(3).
341. See supra note 335 and accompanying text.
342. See MINN. STAT. § 260.126(2) (requiring prosecutor to show by clear and
convincing evidence that an EJJ prosecution serves public safety); MINN. R.
Juv. P. 32A.01(4), in MINNESOTA RULES, supra note 167.
343. MINN. STAT. § 260.126(2); see MINN. R. Juv. P. 32A-05, in MmNESOTA
RuLEs, supra note 167 (setting forth factors to be considered in determining
whether an EJJ prosecution serves public safety); see also supra notes 277-292
and accompanying text (analyzing how "public safety" is determined under the
new legislation).
344. MnN. STAT. § 260.126(3) (child prosecuted as an EJJ has the right to
jury trial and effective assistance of counsel); id. § 260.155(1)(a) (child prose-
cuted as an EJJ has the right to jury trial on the issue of guilt).
345. See id. § 260.126(4) (allowing court to impose both a juvenile and an
adult sentence); MINN. R. Juv. P. 32A.08, in MINNESOTA RuLEs, supra note 167
(same). Adult criminal procedural safeguards may be a constitutional prerequi-
site to imposing a valid adult sentence. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note
2, at 34 ("Implementing a significantly more severe juvenile justice system re-
sponse, including the potential of an adult sanction, will require extending a
mandatory right to counsel and the option of a jury trial .... ").
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Guidelines' criminal history score the same as for adult of-
fences. 346 It requires juvenile courts to retain EJJ records for as
long as they would retain those of adult offenders.3 47 Using ju-
venile convictions to enhance subsequent adult criminal
sentences arguably requires providing to juveniles all adult
criminal procedural safeguards. 348
To restrict prosecutorial over-charging of juveniles as pre-
sumptive-certification EJJs, the Task Force recommended that
the courts remove EJJ designations from youths who plead or
are convicted of non-presumptive-commitment offenses and sen-
tence those youths as delinquents. 349 The EJJ statute, however,
distinguishes between findings of guilt on a lesser-included, non-
presumptive-commitment offense after trial and after a guilty
plea.3 50 If, after trial, a youth is convicted of a non-presumptive-
commitment offense, the youth may only be sentenced as a de-
linquent because the prosecutor incorrectly assessed the serious-
ness of the underlying offense in designating the juvenile as an
EJJ. To expedite plea bargaining, however, a youth may enter a
guilty plea to a non-presumptive-commitment offense and still
consent to an EJJ disposition. This provision allows juveniles to
plea-bargain for non-presumptive-commitment adult offenses to
avoid incarceration and to protect their criminal history scores.
It also allows prosecutors to avoid judicial hearings at which
they would have to prove that public safety requires an EJJ
346. See MINN. STAT. § 260.211(1)(a). This, in turn, requires amendment of
the juvenile court record keeping and reporting provisions, id. § 260.166(1)(a)
(record of adjudication), and of the Sentencing Guidelines. 1994 Minn. Laws
576, § 60 ("The sentencing guidelines commission shall modify the guidelines to
take effect January 1, 1995, to provide that an extended jurisdiction juvenile
conviction is treated under the guidelines in the same manner as a felony con-
viction of an adult."); see infra notes 439-442 and accompanying text (discussing
use of juvenile records in sentencing adult offenders).
347. MINN. STAT. § 260.161(1).
348. See infra notes 434-438 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 330-331 and accompanying text.
350. MINN. STAT § 260.126(4)(b).
If a child prosecuted as an extended jurisdiction juvenile after designa-
tion by the prosecutor in the delinquency petition is convicted of an
offense after trial that is not an offense described in subdivision 1,
clause (2) [presumptive commitment], the court shall adjudicate the
child delinquent and order a disposition under section 260.185. If the
extended jurisdiction juvenile proceeding results in a guilty plea for an
offense not described in subdivision 1, clause (2), the court may impose
a[n EJJ] disposition under paragraph (a) if the child consents.
Id. (emphasis added).
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designation for a youth charged with a non-presumptive-com-
mitment felony.3 51
Although the Task Force recommended that jurisdiction
over serious young offenders continue until age twenty-three, 352
the statute lowered the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdic-
tion over EJJs to twenty-one. 353 This provision reflects a com-
promise between the original House bill, which extended
juvenile court jurisdiction for all delinquent and serious young
offenders to age twenty-three, 354 and the Senate version, which
only extended jurisdiction over serious young offenders to age
twenty-one.3 55 The Senate supported the lower age jurisdiction
to limit youths' prolonged exposure to probation revocations,
and to avoid the wide mix of ages that could occur in EJJ facili-
ties if probation failures did not occur quickly. Although the
House wanted to maximize control over all young offenders until
age twenty-three, it agreed to the Senate position on jurisdiction
in exchange for agreement on automatic certification.356 More-
over, some legislators feared that the longer jurisdiction might
actually discourage some judges from certifying youths.
The Task Force regarded an EJJ prosecution as "one last
chance at success in the juvenile system,"3 57 and discussed how
to prevent "one last chance" from becoming two or three, or four
more chances. Although some Task Force members wanted ju-
venile probation violations or any new offenses to result in auto-
matic execution of the adult sentence, others feared that
mandatory revocation for technical violations or trivial offenses
could be excessively rigid. Unable to fashion specific criteria to
trigger an automatic revocation, the Task Force ultimately rec-
ommended that courts treat EJJ probation violations in the
351. See id. § 260.126(3).
352. See supra note 319 and accompanying text (discussing ramifications of
extending juvenile court's jurisdiction).
353. MINN. STAT. § 260.181(4)(b); TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2,
at 33. The amendment to reduce the age to 21 was added to S.F. No. 1845 on
March 14, 1994. MmN. S.F. 1845, 78thLeg. § 21 (1994). "Commissioner of Cor-
rections Frank Wood testified that the number of offenders in a secure facility
aged 21 to 23 was small, because the offenders were either proceeding toward
community re-entry, or had re-committed offenses and were placed in adult fa-
cilities." Juvenile Justice Bill Approved, BRmFLY: MINN. SENATE WY. IN REv.
(Senate Pubs., St. Paul, Minn.), Mar. 18, 1994, at 3.
354. MhmN. H.F. 2074, 78th Leg. § 26 (1994).
355. MmN. S.F. 1845, 78th Leg. § 21 (1994).
356. See infra note 392 and accompanying text (discussing legislative "pack-
age deal").
357. TASK FORCE, FiNAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 33.
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same manner as they would treat subsequent offenses or proba-
tion violations by adults.358
Because revocation of probation entails a loss of liberty, the
Constitution requires minimum procedural safeguards.
359
Although probation revocation is a summary procedure in Min-
nesota, a probationer has the right to counsel360 and a contested
hearing,3 61 and the opportunity to "present mitigating circum-
stances or other reasons why the violation, if proved, should not
result in revocation."3 62 Even if the prosecution proves a proba-
tion violation, a court retains discretion either to continue the
stay or sentence, or to execute the previously imposed
sentence.36
3
The legislature generally followed the Task Force's recom-
mendation. If an EJJ allegedly violates the conditions of the
stayed sentence or committed a new offense,
the court may, without notice, revoke the stay and probation and direct
that the offender be taken into immediate custody. The court shall no-
tify the offender in writing of the reasons alleged to exist for revocation
of the stay of execution of the adult sentence. If the offender challenges
the reasons, the court shall hold a summary hearing on the issue at
which the offender is entitled to be heard and represented by
counsel.
3 6 4
The provisions for written notice, appointment of counsel, and a
summary hearing correspond to the adult probation revocation
procedures. 365
Significantly, even if a court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that an offender violated the conditions of probation or
committed a new offense, it need not execute a previously stayed
358. Id. at 34. The Task Force stated:
[MIf a Serious Youthful Offender commits a new offense or a probation
violation, the court will treat the Serious Youthful Offender in the
same manner as adults are treated on subsequent offenses or proba-
tion violations, including being subject to the execution of the stayed
adult sentence. Juveniles will know there is a certainty of punish-
ment, combined with an opportunity to be successful in the juvenile
system.
Id.
359. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 785-89 (1973); see also Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (according procedural due process in parole
revocation).
360. MwN. R. CRIM. P. 27.04(2)(1)(a).
361. Id. at 27.04(2)(1)(b).
362. Id. at 27.04(2)(1)(d).
363. Id. at 27.04(3).
364. MANN. STAT. § 260.126(5).
365. Compare MINN. R. Juv. P. 32A.09, in MINNESOTA RuLEs, supra note
167 (regarding juvenile probations revocation) with MInN. R. C0uM. P. 27.04 (re-
garding adult probation revocation).
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sentence and may continue the stay and place the offender on
probation.366 To avoid stretching "one last chance" into several
chances and thereby diminishing the significance of an EJJ
designation, however, the legislature strengthened probation
revocation procedures for presumptive certification or prosecu-
tor-designated EJJs. If an EJJ youth convicted of a presump-
tive-commitment-to-prison or firearms offense3 67 commits a new
offense, or violates the conditions of the stayed sentence, "the
court must order execution of the previously imposed sentence un-
less the court makes written findings regarding the mitigating
factors that justify continuing the stay."368 For these youths,
the court must execute the stayed sentence unless it finds miti-
gating circumstances, presumably circumstances that would
justify a downward departure under the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines. 369 Because the Guidelines require courts to provide
"substantial and compelling" reasons to justify downward depar-
tures from presumptive sentences3 70 courts should provide justi-
fications at least as strong to depart from the even stronger
presumption in the EJJ revocation provision.
366. MINN. R. CRIm. P. 27.04(3)(3)(b).
367. Id.; MINN. STAT. § 260.126(1)(2) (defining extended jurisdiction juvenile
proceeding). The statutory cross-reference creates some ambiguity whether
"automatic" revocation applies simply to prosecutorially designated EJJs, only
to presumptive certification youths, i.e., those 16 and 17 years old and convicted
of presumptive-commitment-to-prison offenses, or to youths of any age who are
convicted of presumptive-certification offenses. Id.
368. MINN. STAT. § 260.126(5); see also MINN. R. Juv. P. 32A.09(3)(C)(2), in
MINNESOTA RULES, supra note 167 ("IT]he court shall order the execution of the
sentence or make written findings indicating the mitigating factors that justify
continuing the stay.") (emphasis added).
369. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II.D.2.a (non-exclusive list of mit-
igating factor that may be used as reasons for departure from presumptive sen-
tence). The House members of the conference committee strongly advocated for
a compulsory revocation provision:
[T]his serious youthful offender category should be taken that way. We
should assume that the court will be imposing the adult sentence un-
less there's a mitigating factor.... [We didn't want it to be automatic,
we didn't want it to be mandatory.... We're not saying it always
absolutely has to be, but if they violate the order of their sentence,
they're going to go to prison.
Hearings on H.F. 2074 Before the Judiciary Conference Committee, 78th Leg.
(Apr. 20, 1994) [hereinafter Hearings] (transcribed by and on file with author)
(statement of Rep. Skoglund); see also MINN. R. Juv. P. 32A.09(3)(C)(2), in MIN.
NESOTA RULEs, supra note 167 (providing that if EJJ conviction was for a pre-
sumptive-commitment-to-prison offense, then "the court shall order the
execution of the sentence or make written findings indicating the mitigating
factors that justify continuing the stay").
370. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES cmt. II.D.03.
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Although provisions to revoke probation and execute the
adult sentences are essential elements of the EJJ status, some
Task Force members feared that many youths might enter adult
facilities through this procedural back door. An EJJ youth is
one whom a judge or a prosecutor already determined can be
retained in juvenile court consistently with public safety. And
yet, even if a new probation violation is not a presumptive-com-
mitment-to-prison offense, he or she will likely be incarcerated
as an adult offender. While there must be limits to "one last
chance," some juveniles' "adult" status may now be decided in
the context of summary probation revocation hearings rather
than certification hearings. Although the Task Force, legisla-
ture, and Sentencing Guidelines Commission recognized that
the EJJ provisions had the largest potential bed-impact on adult
facilities, they could not estimate the precise effect of these
changes. There was no basis to determine the rate at which EJJ
courts would revoke probation and execute their adult prison
sentences. 37 1
At least a few youths sentenced as EJJs may have their pro-
bation revoked, serve an adult sentence, and still return to the
community as chronological juveniles. If they re-offend, they
would still be under juvenile court jurisdiction. Although certi-
fied youths who manage to re-offend before their eighteenth
birthday are prosecuted as adults,3 72 no official has determined
that public safety requires the former EJJ to be prosecuted as an
371. See MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, BED-SPACE IMPACT
ANALYSIS: JUVENILE JUSTICE BILL 2 (1994). The Minnesota Sentencing Guide-
lines Commission candidly noted that "because this bill includes new policies
which are substantially different than the existing system, it is difficult to pre-
cisely estimate the impact. Estimating the impact of the legislation is further
complicated by the difficulty in predicting prosecutorial and judicial practices
for these cases." Id. With respect to EJJ probation revocations, the Guidelines
Commission cautioned: "The impact of this [EJJ] provision on the adult prison
system will depend on the frequency with which the juveniles violate their con-
ditions or commit new offenses. It is estimated that the impact could range
from 130 beds (if 10% are revoked) to 326 (if 25% are revoked)." Id. at 4.
The 1994 Minnesota Legislature requested the Legislative Audit Commis-
sion to evaluate recidivism rates for youthful offenders released from state juve-
nile correctional facilities. While recidivism rates varied somewhat for different
facilities, the Legislative Auditor found very high rates of re-offending by
juveniles and certified adults, and cautioned that even the higher EJJ bed-
space impact may under-estimate the likely rates of probation violations and
adult confinement. See OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, STATE OF MINN.,
RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS 62-75 (1995).
372. MIN. STAT. § 260.125(3)(a) ("[T]he court shall order a certification in
any felony case if the prosecutor shows that the child has been previously prose-
cuted on a felony charge by an order of certification.") (emphasis added).
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adult for all subsequent purposes. Presumably only a certifica-
tion proceeding can settle definitively a juvenile's "adult" status.
C. THE LEGISLATURE EXCLUDES FIRST DEGREE MURDER FROM
JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION
In my first articles about transferring serious young offend-
ers to criminal court, I naively extolled the virtues of eliminating
judicial discretion and legislatively excluding certain categories
of offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction.373 Although Profes-
sor Franklin Zimring "applaud[ed my] efforts to create a rule of
law for such a critical decision,"374 he questioned whether a leg-
islature can remove discretion from waiver decisions without
substantially increasing the number of juveniles transferred to
criminal court.375 Moreover, Zimring doubted that states would
enact waiver criteria as restrictive as those I originally pro-
posed. 376 Finally, Zimring questioned whether a narrowly
drawn list of excluded offenses could resist the tendency to ex-
373. For example, in 1978 1 argued:
Using a legislative waiver system, it is possible to exclude from the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court those relatively few juveniles who are
exceptionally sophisticated on a rational and legally defensible basis-
their present offense and prior record. By focusing on the seriousness
and persistence of a youth's delinquent career, a legislature can differ-
entiate between the hardcore offenders and the vast majority of
juveniles who are unlikely to repeat and who are therefore appropri-
ately handled by the juvenile court. By stressing the more objective
records rather than subjective, impressionistic clinical factors,
juveniles can be separated on a basis that avoids many of the dangers
of abuse of discretion and discrimination inherent in judicial sorting.
Feld, supra note 98, at 613; see also Feld, supra note 184, at 198 (discussing
assumptions required in classifying youth offenders); Barry C. Feld, Legislative
Policies Toward the Serious Juvenile Offender: On the Virtues of Automatic
Adulthood, 27 CRImE & DELINQ. 497, 508 (1981) (discussing legislative waiver
systems).
374. Franklin E. Zimring, The Treatment of Hard Cases in American Juve-
nile Justice: In Defense of Discretionary Waiver, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
Pun. PoL'Y 267, 273 (1991).
375. Id. at 274 (stating that legislative waiver approach is necessarily over-
broad to encompass the worst cases within any particular offense category).
"Discretion can be removed only at the price of a rigidity that increases the
punitive bite of legal policy toward youth crime." Id. at 275.
376. See Zimring, supra note 186, at 199 (responding to Feld, supra note 98).
There, he noted that
it may be impossible to define in advance all those elements that
should be weighed in the decision to waive; and it is certainly unrealis-
tic to expect a legislature to approve (or long maintain) criteria as re-
strictive as those recommended by the [Juvenile Justice] Standards or
in the proposed Minnesota legislation appended to Professor Feld's
article.
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pand to encompass larger categories of crimes in response to the
inexorable political pressures on legislators to "get tough" and
forcefully condemn every "worst case" crime in their district.3 77
Nevertheless, long before the Task Force's recommenda-
tions reached the legislature, there was political support to ex-
clude some serious offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction.378
At the beginning of the Task Force process, Attorney General
Hubert H. Humphrey advocated automatic exclusion of all
juveniles sixteen years of age or older charged with presump-
tive-commitment-to-prison offenses.3 79 Although the Task
Force's bill introduced in the .Senate did not exclude any offenses
from juvenile court jurisdiction,38 0 the House version of the bill
proposed to exclude youths sixteen or older charged with first
degree murder, intentional murder in the second degree, and
criminal sexual conduct in the first degree.38' Other House bills
would have placed additional offenses directly in adult criminal
court.
3 8 2
Id. Professor Zimring also noted that "[olnce such [excluded offense] legislation
is passed, the most typical form of amendment is the addition of new crimes to
the list of those incurring waiver." Id.
With "automatic adulthood," there are additional questions whether prose-
cutors, judges, and juries actually would convict and send young offenders to
adult prisons, even for very serious conduct, and where the adult corrections
system would confine them if they did. See, e.g., Dawson, Third Justice System,
supra note 313, at 953-54 (analyzing the policy implications of transferring ex-
tremely young offenders to adult correctional facilities).
377. Zimring, supra note 186, at 200.
378. See, e.g., Statement of Attorney General Hubert H. Humphrey regard-
ing the 1993 Criminal Justice Initiatives: Gang Violence and Juvenile Justice
Proposals 3 (Jan. 13, 1993) (on file with author) (recommending that state auto-
matically try as adults juveniles 16 or older charged with Sentencing Guide-
lines Severity Level VII-X offenses).
379. Id. (stating that proposal treats all juveniles who are charged with cer-
tain violent crimes consistently, and may deter some youths from committing
offenses with a firearm).
380. MnN S.F. 1845, 78th Leg. § 11 (1994). Another Senate bill, however,
MI-N. S.F. 2164, 78th Leg. § 4 (1994), included offense exclusion provisions
comparable to those contained in the House bill. See infra note 382 (discussing
the House bill).
381. MINN. H.F. 2074, 78th Leg. § 10 (Feb. 24, 1994). The House bill pro-
vided that "[t]he term delinquent child does not include a child alleged to have
committed murder in the first degree or criminal sexual conduct in the first
degree after becoming 16 years of age." Id. The House bill was amended March
14, 1994, and the list of excluded offenses was expanded also to include inten-
tional murder in the second degree.
382. See, e.g., MINN. H.F. 2449, 78th Leg. § 5 (1994) (excluding any juvenile
14 years of age or older charged with a presumptive-commitment-to-prison of-
fense who used a firearm while committing the offense); MINN. H.F. 610, 78th
Leg. § 1 (1993) (excluding any child 15 years of age or older and charged with
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The Task Force, by contrast, shared Zimring's concerns and
rejected excluded-offense legislation for several reasons.3 3 It
recognized that even within the most serious offense categories,
statutory classifications are too broad and imprecise to make re-
fined culpability differentiations. Moreover, excluded-offense
statutes cannot adequately distinguish between principals and
accessories, because all are equally liable under aiding and abet-
ting provisions.38 4 Finally, the Task Force feared that legisla-
tive lists would expand from a narrow exception to juvenile court
jurisdiction into a wholesale catalogue of exclusions. There is
ample evidence that once lists of offenses enter the legislative
hopper, they tend to expand well beyond their initial rationale,
creating a legislative crime-du-jour. 385
House members of the Conference Committee offered sev-
eral rationales to exclude certain offenses. Juvenile court judges
already certified virtually all sixteen- or seventeen-year-old of-
fenders charged with the most serious crimes. If they failed to
do so, they were reversed on appeal, as in the case of David
murder or attempted murder in the first, second, or third degree; assault in the
first degree; or criminal sexual conduct in the first degree).
When the Minnesota House approved H.F. No. 2074 and sent it to the Con-
ference Committee, it excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction youths 16 years
or older charged with murder in the first degree, intentional murder in the sec-
ond degree, or criminal sexual conduct in the first degree. MINN. H.F. 2074,
78th Leg. § 10.
383. See supra note 257 and accompanying text (discussing Task Force's
decisions).
384. See MmN. STAT. § 609.05; supra note 275 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing components of"seriousness"). In some instances, an accomplice may be
liable simply for passive presence, and in others, an accessory hires a principal
to commit the offense. Legislative language cannot practically distinguish the
two situations.
385. The California Legislature amended its judicial waiver statute in 1976
and placed the burden of proving fitness for juvenile court treatment on the
youth if the prosecutor alleged 11 enumerated serious offenses such as murder,
rape, or armed robbery. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(b) (West 1976). The
legislature amended the "narrow list" of serious offenses creating a presump-
tion for waiver seven different times between 1977 and 1993. Id. § 707(b)(16)
(West 1977); id. § 707(b)(5)-(8) (West 1979); id. § 707(b)(17)-(20) (West 1982);
id. § 707(b)(21) (West 1989); id. § 707(b)(22) (West 1990); id. § 707(b)(23)-(24)
(West 1991); id. § 707(b)(25) (West 1993). The extended list of "horribles" now
includes drug crimes, caijacking, and escape from a juvenile correctional facil-
ity. Id. § 707(b)(26)-(29) (West Supp. 1995).
In little more than a decade, the list of offenses in Minnesota's "prima facie"
case for reference doubled. In its initial version the legislature emphasized a
combination of aggravated felonies and prior records in five paragraphs. MI-N.
STAT. § 260.125(3) (1980). Since then the legislature has added "burglary of a
dwelling," "escape from confinement," and "gang" and "drug" related offenses.
Id. § 260.125(3).
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Brom.3 8 6 The committee did not regard the serious crimes by
sixteen- or seventeen-year-old offenders as qualitatively differ-
ent from those of eighteen-year-old adults.38 7 Some committee
members advanced principled retributivist arguments that seri-
ous crimes deserve severe consequences.38 8 Others advanced
deterrent arguments that the certainty of adult criminal prose-
cution for serious crimes would reduce youth violence.38 9 Some
feared that judges might use the EJJ sentencing option as an
inappropriate alternative to certifying the most serious
386. See supra notes 237-252 and accompanying text (discussing the Brom
case).
387. Hearings, supra note 369 (statement of Rep. Carruthers). According to
Rep. Phil Carruthers:
You've got somebody committing first degree murder, premeditated
murder, to me what's the difference where you're talking about a six-
teen year old or a seventeen year old versus an eighteen year old?
What's the difference in terms of, why should the eighteen year old get
so much tougher treatment than the sixteen year old?... I don't un-
derstand the magic difference. You're talking about the most serious
crime in our society and the fact someone is sixteen or seventeen, hey.
Id.
388. See Hearings on H.F. 2074 Before the Judiciary Conference Comm.,
78th Leg. (Apr. 21, 1994) [hereinafter Hearings] (transcribed by and on file with
author). Phil Carruthers argued that:
I think the frustration that the House felt was that these are the most
serious offenses and the juvenile system, even with the SYO system,
just does not give the kind of tools or the adequate punishment to ac-
knowledge the gravity of the crime.... [Gliven the gravity of the
crime, the current jurisdictional limit does not adequately acknowl-
edge it.
Id. (statement of Rep. Carruthers).
389. But see Eric L. Jensen & Linda KL Metsger, A Test of the Deterrent Ef-
fect of Legislative Waiver on Violent Juvenile Crime, 40 CRIM & DELINQ. 96,
100-02 (1994) (finding no deterrent effect of legislative waiver on rates ofjuve-
nile violent crime); Simon I. Singer & David McDowall, Criminalizing Delin-
quency: The Deterrent Effects of the New York Juvenile Offender Law, 22 LAw &
Soc'Y REv. 521, 532 (1988) (finding no measurable deterrent effect of New
York's excluded offense legislation).
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juveniles.3 90 And, frankly, there was strong political pressure in
the House to "get tough" with automatic certification. 3 9 1
The House and Senate agreed to exclude only youths six-
teen years or older and charged with first degree murder. This
legislative "package deal" also reduced EJJ jurisdiction to age
twenty-one, restricted prosecutorial designation of EJJs to the
presumptive-certification category, and allowed prosecutors to
obtain judicial designation of EJJs as an alternative to filing a
certification motion against youths fourteen to seventeen years
of age and charged with any felony. 3 92 The House's acquies-
cence reflected another political reality: automatically placing
larger numbers of youths in criminal court would have a more
substantial fiscal and bed-space impact on adult prisons.
3 93
Finally, automatic certification of first degree murder is con-
sistent with Minnesota sentencing policy. The Sentencing
Guidelines do not apply to first degree murder, which is the only
390. [T]here was a concern that some courts or some judges might look
at that extended jurisdiction and say, "Well we've got a sixteen year
old, but we've got five years under the Senate bill or seven years under
the House bill to deal with them and there is a greater likelihood that
we will be able to correct their behavior and use treatment procedures
that are typically available for juveniles." I think that that was a con-
cern that there might be less ... certifications, that maybe because of
that extended jurisdiction, they'd be less likely that there would be cer-
tification in those cases.... [Tihe House was of a mind that for these
very, very serious violent crimes that we wanted to make sure that
those sixteen and seventeen year olds that they were dealt with in the
adult court system.
Hearings, supra note 369 (statement of Rep. Macklin).
391. Hearings, supra note 388 (statement of Rep. Carruthers) ("I think we'd
have a problem if we didn't come back with some automatic certification provi-
sions. I think we'd have a major problem trying to come back to the House on
that.").
392. Mnw. STAT. §§ 260.126(2), 260.181(4)(b); see supra notes 354-356 and
accompanying text (discussing competing House and Senate bills). Senator
Patrick McGowan, a conservative Minneapolis police detective, cautioned
House conferees who supported excluding additional offenses that doing so
could adversely affect prosecutors' plea bargaining leverage. Hearings, supra
note 369. The conferees discussed the case of a highly visible murder of a police
officer in which prosecutors agreed to a plea bargain to second degree murder
with a juvenile in order to obtain his testimony implicating several adult gang
members. See Donna Halverson, McKenzie Convicted in Haaf Slaying, STAR
Tam. (Minneapolis), Oct. 24, 1993, at IA. McGowan emphasized that if the leg-
islature had excluded that "lesser included" offense, prosecutors could not have
obtained the plea, testimony, or conviction.
393. The Sentencing Guidelines Commission estimated that the automatic
certification legislation alone would require 90 additional prison beds. MMNE-
SOTA SENTENCING GUIDELNES Come'N, supra note 371, at 2.
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mandatory imprisonment offense.3 94 Thus, excluding first de-
gree murder from juvenile court jurisdiction is consistent with
the use of the Sentencing Guidelines' presumptive commitment-
to-prison offenses to define presumptive certification and EJJju-
risdiction. That consistency also provides a principled basis by
which to resist further expansion of the list of excluded offenses.
Finally, the legislature also definitively resolved the jurispru-
dential dilemma posed by cases like Dahl and D.F.B.395
Minnesota initiates a first degree murder prosecution by fil-
ing a grand jury indictment.3 96 The new statute automatically
excludes youths charged with first degree murder from the
otherwise "original and exclusive" juvenile court jurisdiction.3 97
The rules of juvenile court procedure attempt to resolve this con-
flict between "original and exclusive" jurisdiction and "auto-
matic exclusion" by allowing prosecutors to file a certification
motion and petition alleging first degree murder and staying
further proceedings pending presentation of the case to a grand
jury for indictment.398
The legislature also reduced juvenile court jurisdiction over
young traffic offenders,3 99 and placed all youths sixteen or sev-
394. See MIN. STAT. § 609.185 (stating that a convicted defendant "shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for life"); MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § V ("First
Degree Murder is excluded from the guidelines by law, and continues to have a
mandatory life sentence.").
395. See supra notes 217-252 and accompanying text (discussing Dahl and
D.F.B.).
396. MINN. R. Camn. P. 17.01 ("An offense which may be punished by life
imprisonment shall be prosecuted by indictment. .. ").
397. MiNN. STAT. §§ 260.015(5)(b), .111(1)(a), .125(6).
398. MINN. R. Juv. P. 32.08, in MNNESOTA RULES, supra note 167. The com-
mentary to the rule explains:
Under Minn. Stat. §§ 260.111, subd. la., 260.015, subd. 5(b) and
260.125, subd. 7 (1994), the accusation of first degree murder by a 16 or
17 year old child takes the case out of the delinquency jurisdiction of
the juvenile court. If this accusation is first made by complaint, and is
followed by an indictment that does not accuse the child of first degree
murder but of some other crime, the proceedings come within the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court, but subject to action of thejuvenile court on any motion for certification of the proceedings to
adult court. In these circumstances, the juvenile court would deal with
an accusation by indictment in the same fashion as proceedings might
otherwise occur on a juvenile court petition. Once adult court proceed-
ings begin on an indictment for first degree murder, regardless of the
ultimate conviction, the proceedings remain within the adult courtjurisdiction.
Id. cmt.
399. MINN. STAT. § 260.193(3) ("A child who commits an adult court traffic
offense and at the time of the offense was at least 16 years old shall be subject to
the laws and court procedures controlling adult traffic violators and shall not be
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enteen years old and charged with alcohol-related misdemeanor
or gross misdemeanor offenses directly into adult court.400 The
legislature concluded that because young drivers enjoy adult
rights, they should also suffer adult consequences, 40' but it lim-
ited any confinement to juvenile facilities. 40 2 Because the De-
partment of Public Safety already includes juvenile traffic
convictions in a youth's driving record, which is a public docu-
ment, concerns about confidentiality of juvenile proceedings are
less significant.
D. THE USE OF JUVENILE CONVICTIONS TO ENHANCE ADULT
CRUMINAL SENTENCES
The legislature charged the Task Force to examine "the re-
tention of juvenile delinquency adjudication records and their
use in subsequent adult proceedings."403 In this Part, I analyze
the Task Force's reluctance to expand the use of juvenile court
convictions, other than those of EJJ youths, because of concerns
about the quality of procedural justice and the'reliability of de-
linquency adjudications. Despite the Task Force's reservations,
however, the 1994 Juvenile Crime Act greatly expands the use
of juvenile convictions to enhance the sentences of adult
offenders.
The use of prior juvenile convictions to enhance adult
sentences has a long lineage.40 4 Prior to the passage of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines, the Minnesota Supreme Court approved the
use of juvenile records to sentence adult offenders.40 5 Thus,
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court."). Prior to the amendment, adult
courts exercised jurisdiction only over youths 16 or 17 years of age and charged
with petty misdemeanor traffic offenses. MIN. STAT. § 260.193(3) (1992). Ju-
venile courts heard all cases of "underage" traffic violators and other criminal
traffic offenses. Id.
400. Id. § 260.193(1)(c)(2) (providing that adult courts have jurisdiction over
all 16- and 17-year-olds charged with drunk driving).
401. Hearings, supra note 369 (when 16- and 17-year-old engages in adult
activity and is held to an adult standard of care, adult court should have juris-
diction) (statement of Rep. Macklin); id. (driving is an adult responsibility, and
consolidates DWI prosecutions in one place) (statement of Sen. Speare).
402. MINN. STAT. § 260.193(3). The statute restricts pre-trial detention and
out-of-home placement of young traffic offenders to juvenile detention and cor-
rectional facilities. Id. § 260.193(7a).
403. TASK FORCE, FnAL REPoRT, supra note 2, at 1.
404. See generally Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, Consideration of Accused's
Juvenile Court Record in Sentencing for Offenses Committed as an Adult," 64
A.L.R.3d 1291 (1975) (discussing cases where adult courts have considered
whether to include juvenile records for sentencing purposes).
405. State v. Johnson, 216 N.W.2d 904, 907-08 (Minn. 1974) ("[W]e see noth-
ing improper in the court's taking into consideration the past conduct of a juve-
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Minnesota, along with other states and the United States Sen-
tencing Guidelines, includes some juvenile prior convictions in
an adult defendant's criminal history score.406
The use of juvenile prior convictions to enhance young adult
offenders' sentence is based on extensive research on the devel-
opment of criminal careers. There is a strong correlation be-
tween age and criminal activity, with the rates of many kinds of
criminality peaking in mid- to late-adolescence. 40 7 Although
most delinquent youths desist after one or two contacts with the
justice system, if a youth becomes a chronic offender (five or
more criminal involvements), there is a substantial probability
that the youth will continue to engage in delinquency and
crime.40° Career offenders begin their pattern of criminal activ-
ity in their early- to mid-teens, persist into their twenties, and
then gradually "mature out" of their criminal involvement.
409
Moreover, the chronic offenders, a relatively small subset of all
delinquents, account for a disproportionately large amount of
the total serious violent and repetitive property crime.
410 Ra-
tional sentencing policy thus requires a standardized means to
identify both juvenile and adult criminally active young
offenders.
A record of persistent offending, whether as a juvenile or as
an adult, is the "best evidence" of career criminality. The tradi-
tional role of confidentiality in juvenile court proceedings to
nile in determining what sentence could be proper. How else could he evaluate
the past performance of a juvenile who had been in trouble before he came
before the court?").
406. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II.B.4.; Feld, supra note 184, at
233-37 (analyzing inclusion of juvenile convictions in Minnesota's Sentencing
Guidelines); see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9721(b) (1982) (juvenile adjudications
may be counted when there was an express finding that the offense constituted
a felony or one of the weapons misdemeanors); UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMv'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(d) (1994) (sentence
enhancements based on "offenses committed prior to age eighteen").
407. 1 BLUMSTEIN Er AL., supra note 195, at 22-23. Studies of the develop-
ment of delinquent careers suggest that serious offenders are best identified by
their persistence rather than by the nature of their initial offense. The criminal
career research indicates that young offenders do not "specialize" in particular
types of crime, that serious crime occurs within an essentially random pattern
of delinquent behavior, and that a small number of chronic delinquents are re-
sponsible for many offenses and most of the violent offenses committed by
juveniles. Id.
408. Id. at 75-76.
409. Supra note 31 and accompanying text.
410. TRACY ET AL., supra note 46, at 279-80 (small group of chronic offenders
account for the majority of all delinquent acts and an even larger proportion of
the most serious and violent crime).
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avoid stigmatizing delinquents often hindered criminal courts'
access to juvenile conviction records. 411 For several administra-
tive and policy reasons, adult criminal courts could not system-
atically consider the juvenile components of an offender's
criminal history at sentencing.412
When the Minnesota Legislature adopted the Sentencing
Guidelines in 1980, it amended the provisions on juvenile court
records to assure that they would be available to criminal courts
when sentencing young adult offenders.413 But the legislature
411. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260.161(2) (1978) (records ofjuvenile courts are
not open to inspection and contents cannot be disclosed without court order); id.
§ 260.211(2) (1978) (repealed 1980) (juvenile court may disclose information to
proper persons "if the court considered such disclosure to be in the best inter-
ests of the child or of the administration of justice"). Policies on access to juve-
nile records pose a conflict between the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile court
and the public safety interests of identifying career criminals.
Juvenile records are of particular concern because of the bifurcation
between the adult and the juvenile criminal justice system. Records of
juvenile adjudications are typically unavailable to the adult criminal
justice system, presumably to avoid lifetime stigmatization as a result
of some minor juvenile escapades. While that principle is certainly
reasonable for individuals whose juvenile involvement is indeed minor
and especially for those who do not persist into an adult criminal ca-
reer, the bifurcation does not seem reasonable for juveniles whose de-
linquency careers are serious and who persist into serious adult
offending. Thus, while juvenile records should continue to be protected
from general public access, the adult criminal justice system should
have access to juvenile records of at least those offenders arrested as
adults on a felony charge.
1 BLUMSTEIN r AL., supra note 195, at 197.
412. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text (discussing how confi-
dentiality requirements coupled with bureaucratic inertia made it difficult to
include a juvenile component of an offender's criminal history); GREENWOOD FT
AL., supra note 197, at 62-63; Petersilia, supra note 199, at 1747-49.
Other impediments to the use ofjuvenile court records include practices of
sealing and purging the records in order to avoid stigmatizing offenders. The
National Academy of Science's study of career criminals concluded that
[tlhe prohibitions against merged juvenile and adult records, the fail-
ure to routinely include juvenile court data in policy record systems,
and the sealing and purging of juvenile records create a situation in
most jurisdictions in which criminal justice authorities frequently
make their decisions with no information about police contacts with
juveniles.... For those who advocate the use of juvenile records, the
challenge is to respond to these concerns by designing systems and pro-
cedures that inform adult just system decision makers more fully
about juvenile delinquent careers without undermining the rehabilita-
tive goal of juvenile courts.
1 BLUmsrEN Er A.., supra note 195, at 193.
413. MiNN. STAT. § 260.161(1) (1980) ("The court shall keep and maintain
records pertaining to delinquent adjudications until the person reaches the age
of 23 years and shall release the records on an individual to a requesting adult
court for purposes of sentencing."). At the time, juvenile court records were not
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carefully limited the impact of a prior juvenile record on the
sentences of young adult offenders. Initially, the Sentencing
Guidelines included in the adult criminal history score only ju-
venile felony convictions obtained after the age of sixteen, and
limited their effect to a maximum of one point.414 In 1989, the
Sentencing Guidelines Commission modified the juvenile compo-
nent of the criminal history score and allowed a young adult of-
fender to receive a maximum of two points if one of the juvenile
convictions was for a presumptive-commitment-to-prison felony
of violence. 415 Even with this expanded juvenile component of
the criminal history score, however, a young adult offender
whose present offense alone is not a presumptive-commitment-
to-prison offense still would not be incarcerated based on a prior
juvenile record, no matter how extensive.
The decision to continue to limit the practical impact of ju-
venile prior convictions on adult sentences stemmed from strong
misgiving about the quality of procedural justice in juvenile
courts and the Sentencing Guidelines Commission expressed se-
rious reservations about "the disparities in the procedures used
uniformly or consistently available. Feld, supra note 184, at 234 ("By recom-
mending the record disclosure amendment, the commission intended to insure
that records of serious and persistent juvenile offenders would be readily avail-
able for use by sentencing authorities under a standardized procedure.").
414. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELNEs § II.B.306 (1982). Significantly, the
Guidelines required two juvenile felony adjudications to achieve the one point
maximum score. Id.
While I applauded the Sentencing Guidelines Commission's policy decision
to make available the records of serious and persistent juvenile offenders to
adult criminal courts, I noted that the stringent limits it placed on the computa-
tion of those juvenile prior convictions practically negated their usefulness in
sentencing young adult career criminals.
The failure of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission to in-
tegrate fully the juvenile and adult records for sentencing purposes
perpetuates the gap in intervention exactly at the peak of chronic and
serious activity. Except for youths who are imprisoned as adults solely
on the basis of a present offense against the person, the inclusion of thejuvenile criminal history will not result in presumptive incarceration
of a chronic young burglar or thief until he or she has committed at
least two additional adult felonies, and even then only if those convic-
tions occur before the age of twenty-one .... Moreover, under the
sentencing guidelines a juvenile with only two juvenile felony convic-
tions is treated the same way as a juvenile with ten felony convictions,
even though persistence is the most reliable indicator of probable re-
cidivism and seriousness.
Feld, supra note 184, at 236-67.
415. See MmNN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § H.B.4. The Sentencing Guide-
lines also assign "weights" to each prior felony in the criminal history score, so
that Severity Level VI and VII felonies are "worth" 1.5 points, and Severity
Level VUI-X offenses are "worth" two points. Id. § lI.B.I.a.
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in the various juvenile courts."416 The Commission was princi-
pally concerned with denial to juveniles of a constitutional or
statutory right to a jury trial,417 and the practical unavailability
of counsel in many of Minnesota's juvenile courts. 41i
The enhancement of adult sentences on the basis of prior
juvenile convictions acquires greater salience as a result of the
1994 legislative changes. The legislature followed the Task
Force's recommendation to count EJJ convictions in the same
manner as adult felony convictions.419 These youths will have
received all adult criminal procedural safeguards, including the
right to a jury trial.420 The Task Force, however, like the Sen-
tencing Guidelines Commission, discouraged additional use of
ordinary juvenile delinquency convictions to enhance adult
sentences because of the continuing procedural deficiencies ofju-
venile courts.421
Once the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission in-
cluded juveniles' prior records in the adult criminal history
score, Minnesota courts had to ascertain the procedural "qual-
ity" of juvenile court convictions. In State v. Little, the Minne-
sota Court of Appeals upheld the use of juvenile adjudications to
enhance the sentence of an adult defendant.422 The court in-
sisted that juvenile court procedures were adequate to include
juvenile convictions in Little's criminal history score, rejected
his claim that convictions obtained without a right to a jury trial
denied him fundamental fairness, and emphasized that he re-
ceived the assistance of counsel in his juvenile proceedings. 423
The Little court's emphasis on the assistance of counsel in
juvenile proceedings was crucial because of two lines of cases,
416. Id. cmt. II.B.406.
417. See infra notes 596-610 and accompanying text (choosing the right to ajury trial).
418. See supra notes 135-136 and infra notes 659-661, and accompanying
text.
419. See TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 8, 37; MUM. STAT.
§ 260.161(1); 1994 Minn. Laws 576, § 60 ("Te sentencing guidelines commis-
sion shall modify the guidelines . . . to provide that an extended jurisdiction
juvenile conviction is treated under the guidelines in the same manner as a
felony conviction.").
420. MIN. STAT. § 260.126(3).
421. "The Task Force supports the Sentencing Guidelines Commissions' po-
sition that juvenile adjudications should continue to have only limited use in
the adult system, when full due process is not accorded the juvenile and it is not
required the juvenile receive effective assistance of counsel." TASK FORCE, FI-
NAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 39.
422. 423 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
423. Id. at 724-25.
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one prohibiting incarceration without representation, and the
other barring enhancement of sentences on the basis of prior,
uncounselled convictions. In Argersinger v. Hamlin, the United
States Supreme Court considered whether counsel must be ap-
pointed for an indigent defendant charged with and imprisoned
for a minor offense. 424 It held that "absent a knowing and intel-
ligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense,
whether classified as petty, misdemeanor or felony unless he
was represented by counsel."425 In Scott v. Illinois, the Supreme
Court clarified an ambiguity in Argersinger by addressing
whether counsel must be appointed because of the statutory
penalty authorized or the actual sentence imposed.426 It held
that in misdemeanor proceedings, only an actual order of incar-
ceration, rather than the possibility of incarceration, requires
appointment of counsel for the indigent.
427
The Minnesota courts have taken a different approach re-
garding when a defendant must receive assistance of counsel.
Shortly after Gideon v. Wainwright,428 the Minnesota Supreme
Court in State v. Borst used its inherent supervisory powers to
require the appointment of counsel in misdemeanor cases
"which may lead to incarceration in a penal institution."429 The
Borst court relied, in part, upon Gault's provision of counsel in
delinquency cases to expand the right to counsel for adult de-
fendants in misdemeanor or ordinance prosecutions that could
result in confinement.430 In light of Scott and Borst, the initial
424. 407 U.S. 25, 26-27 (1972).
425. Id. at 37.
426. 440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979).
427. Id. at 373-74.
428. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In Gideon, the Court held that the Sixth Amend-
ment's guarantee of counsel applied in state felony criminal proceedings as well
as to prosecutions in federal courts. Id. at 344. "[In our adversary system ofcriminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer,
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." Id.
429. 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (Minn. 1967). In Minnesota, there are no limita-
tions on the dispositional authority of juvenile court judges. MIN. STAT.
§ 260.185(1). Any adjudication of delinquency for any underlying offense-fel-
ony, misdemeanor, or ordinance-may lead to removal from the home or com-
mitment to the State Department of Corrections. Thus, every juvenile
proceeding includes the possibility of confinement. Moreover, even routine de-
linquency dispositions may continue until the age of 19.
430. 154 N.W.2d at 891. Like the Court in Gault, Borst recognized the ad-
versarial reality of even "minor' prosecutions:
[Tihe possible loss of liberty by an innocent person charged with a mis-
demeanor, who does not know how to defend himself, is too sacred a
right to be sacrificed on the altar of expedience. Any society that can
afford a professional prosecutor to prosecute this type of crime must
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confinement of an unrepresented juvenile or adult may be
improper.
Moreover, it may be improper to consider prior felony con-
victions obtained without counsel to enhance subsequent
sentences. Significantly, in United States v. Tucker, the United
States Supreme Court remanded for re-sentencing a defendant
whose prior sentence was based on uncounselled convictions. 431
In Burgett v. Texas, the Court noted that because it was uncon-
stitutional to convict a person of a felony without benefit of a
lawyer or a valid waiver of that right, it was also impermissible
to use that conviction to enhance subsequent sentences. 43 2 A
number of courts have applied the principle of Tucker and Bur-
gett in several sentencing contexts involving uncounselled juve-
nile convictions. 433
A defendant must receive assistance of counsel before a
court may use a prior conviction to enhance subsequent
sentences; arguably the lack of a jury trial should also limit the
use of juvenile convictions to enhance adult sentences. 43 4 In de-
assume the burden of providing adequate defense, to the end that inno-
cent people will not be convicted without having facilities available to
properly present a defense.
Id. at 894-95.
431. 404 U.S. 443, 449 (1972) ("The Gideon case established an unequivocal
rule making it unconstitutional to try a person for a felony in a state court
unless he had a lawyer or had validly waived one.'") (quoting Burgett v. Texas,
389 U.S. 109, 114 (1967)).
432. 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967). The defendant must validly waive the right
to counsel on the record when entering a guilty plea for the conviction to be
used to enhance the term of incarceration for a subsequent offense. See, e.g.,
Reeves v. Mabry, 615 F.2d 489, 491 (8th Cir. 1980) ("Where... a jury in impos-
ing an enhanced term of imprisonment... considered or may have considered a
constitutionally invalid prior conviction, the.., sentence that was imposed
must generally be set aside."); United States ex rel. Lasky v. LaVallee, 472 F.2d
960, 963 (2d Cir. 1973) ("If [the defendant] was not represented by counsel [the
court] cannot use the conviction for the purpose of enhancing [the defendant's]
sentence.").
433. See, e.g., Rizzo v. United States, 821 F.2d 1271, 1274 (7th Cir. 1987)("[Tihe judge may have impermissibly relied on the uncounseled [juvenile] adju-
dication in imposing sentence. .. ."); Majchszak v. Ralston, 454 F. Supp. 1137,
1142 (W.D. Wis. 1978) (remanding for resentencing a denial of parole release
because the presentence report included prior uncounseled delinquency adjudi-
cations); Stockwell v. State, 207 N.W.2d 883, 889 (Wis. 1973) (holding juvenile
adjudications obtained without counsel could not be considered in subsequent
sentencing proceedings).
434. Many courts have rejected this argument with a conclusory reference to
McKeiver. See, e.g., State v. Little, 423 N.W.2d 722, 724-25 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988) (stating that defendant had no right to a jury trial when a juvenile and
that use of these convictions to enhance his sentence did not violate fundamen-
tal fairness); United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212, 215 (9th Cir. 1989) ("If it
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nying juveniles the right to a jury, Justice Byron White's concur-
rence in McKeiver emphasized that conviction as a juvenile was
for purposes of treatment rather than punishment. 43 5 Judge
Patricia Wald's dissent in United States v. Johnson questioned
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' "policy of treating adult
sentences and periods of incarceration like juvenile sentences
and periods of confinement for purposes of calculating a defend-
ant's criminal history score."43 6 Because a juvenile's commit-
ment to an institution is often based on the offender's treatment
needs, rather than on the seriousness of the offense, it may con-
tinue longer than the comparable adult penalty.437 It is thus
inconsistent to use less stringent procedures to obtain convic-
tions in juvenile court in the name of rehabilitation, and then to
use those same convictions to enhance subsequent criminal
sentences as adults.438
Thus, because of juvenile courts' persisting procedural defi-
ciencies, both the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission
and the Task Force were reluctant to increase the weight of ju-
venile adjudications in the Guidelines' criminal history score.
The 1994 legislature, nevertheless, greatly expanded their use.
does not violate due process for a juvenile to be deprived of his or her liberty
without a jury trial, we fail to find a violation of due process when a later depri-
vation of liberty is enhanced due to this juvenile adjudication."), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1037 (1990).
435. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,552 (1971) (White, J., concur-
ring). "Supervision or confinement is aimed at rehabilitation, not at convincing
the juvenile of his error simply be imposing pains and penalties." Id.; see infra
notes 452-549 and accompanying text (exploring the line between treatment
and punishment); infra notes 586-714 and accompanying text (arguing that
procedural protection is necessary to achieve substantive justice for juveniles).
436. 28 F.3d 151, 157 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J., dissenting).
437. Id. at 159-60; see supra note 429.
438. As stated by one commentator:
The Supreme Court approves of lower standards for incarceration pro-
cedures only in treatment-oriented proceedings where the government
has disavowed any interest in criminal prosecution or punishment....
Accordingly, courts should not interpret McKeiver to justify using juve-
nile convictions with reduced procedural protections for punitive pur-
poses at the adult level. Interpreted in this manner, McKeiver would
not allow courts to enhance an adult's sentence based on juvenile
sentences obtained during proceedings governed by the lower "funda-
mental fairness" standard.
David Dormont, Note, For the Good of the Adult: An Examination of the Consti-
tutionality of Using Prior Juvenile Adjudications to Enhance Adult Sentences,
75 Mn-N. L. REv. 1769, 1793-94 (1991). Moreover, juvenile courts use less for-
mal and reliable procedures to protect juveniles from the stigma and conse-
quences of conviction as adults. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 540 (Blackmun, J.,
plurality opinion) (stating that a finding of delinquency is substantially less on-
erous than criminal guilt).
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Whereas the Guidelines previously considered only felony of-
fenses occurring after a juvenile's sixteenth birthday, the
amended Guidelines consider felonies "committed after the of-
fender's fourteenth birthday."439
In addition, the legislature extended the time during which
juvenile convictions may be used to enhance adult sentences.
While the juvenile component of the criminal history score pre-
viously applied only to young adult offenders under age twenty-
one at the time they committed a felony, the new legislation ex-
tends their use until age twenty-five." 0 To assure the availabil-
ity of juvenile records to be criminal courts sentencing young
adults, the legislature increased from age twenty-five to age
twenty-eight the period in which juvenile courts must maintain
records of delinquency adjudications. 44 The legislature also
eliminated the two-point maximum "cap" on the juvenile compo-
nent of the criminal history score for all juvenile convictions of
presumptive-commitment-to-prison offenses." 2
The Minnesota House of Representatives initiated the ex-
panded the use of juvenile prior convictions." 3 In support of
their position, House members argued that both the age of onset
and prior juvenile convictions provide strong evidence of career
criminality, and that current limitations on the use of juvenile
records eroded effective social control. Although the House orig-
inally proposed to use prior juvenile convictions to enhance
adult sentences until age twenty-eight, the conferees agreed to
limit their use until age twenty-five. By then, "real" career of-
fenders would have ample opportunity to acquire "real" adult
convictions.
As a result of the Guidelines' changes, a fourteen-year-old
youth who went on a burglary or auto theft "spree" could face
presumptive imprisonment for burglaries committed a decade
later. 4" Similarly, a fifteen-year-old convicted of several aggra-
vated robberies who remained crime-free for nearly a decade
would receive a nearly doubled sentence if convicted of another
439. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES cmt. II.B.403.
440. Id. cmt. H.B.404.
441. MINN. STAT. § 260.161(1).
442. MIN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES cmt. 1.B.405.
443. See MAhN. H.F. 2074, 78th Leg. § 57.2 (1994) (2d engrossment). The
Senate bill contained no provisions expanding the use of juvenile records.
444. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § IV (calculating sentence on Sen-
tencing Guidelines Grid with a Severity Level V crime and criminal history
score of three).
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robbery as an adult.'4 5 Even in the absence of any intervening
offenses, the legislature apparently concluded that these are the
types of "career" offenders meriting scarce penal resources.
There are two important consequences of expanding the
Guidelines' criminal history score component of prior juvenile
felony convictions. Defense counsel have an even greater profes-
sional responsibility to vigorously contest non-serious felonies in
delinquency proceedings because of their collateral enhance-
ment effects. Similarly, the increased significance of each con-
viction may subject the plea bargaining process in juvenile court
to greater constraints, controls, and supervision. Under present
practice, no formal relationship exists between the offense to
which a juvenile pleads and the eventual disposition. As a con-
sequence, prosecutors and defense attorneys are relatively cava-
lier in plea bargaining, because even one admission provides the
court with sufficient legal authority for maximum interven-
tion." 6 When each offense now acquires independent signifi-
cance as part of a young offender's criminal history score,
prosecutors may be less inclined to dismiss some charges in re-
turn for admissions on others. Similarly, defense attorneys may
be less willing to allow their clients to admit to charges. The
increased significance of each offense may foster greater adver-
sariness in both negotiation and litigation.
Expanding the juvenile component of the criminal history
score also has long-term implications for prison populations. In
allocating scarce penal resources and developing the Guidelines'
grid, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission worked
backward from the prison bed-space available, 44 7 determining
the lengths of sentences, in part, by their expected impact on
prison populations. By substantially increasing the role of EJJ
offenses and juvenile offenses in the criminal history score, the
legislature changed an important variable in the equation. As
more adult inmates serve increasingly longer sentences because
of their prior EJJ and juvenile convictions, the prison population
will not "turn over" as quickly and will cumulate gradually over
time. Because the juvenile justice process lacks even rudimen-
tary data about juvenile delinquent careers or criminal histo-
445. Id. (calculating sentence on Sentencing Guidelines Grid based on prior
convictions of Severity Level VII offenses adds 1.5 points each to the criminal
history score). The Severity Level VII presumptive sentence for a criminal his-
tory score of three is 74-82 months, compared with 44-52 months for a criminal
history score of zero. Id.
446. See MINN. STAT. § 260.015(5) (defining delinquent child).
447. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 1.3.
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ries, the Task Force could not determine the extent to which
juvenile prior convictions presently increase adult prison use.448
Nevertheless, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commis-
sion estimated that including prior EJJ offenses and juvenile of-
fenses in the adult criminal history score would have a
substantial bed-impact.449
E. SENTENCING JUVENILE OFFENDERS: "DELINQUENCY
DIsposInoN PRINCIPLES" IN JUvENILE COURT
The 1992 legislature requested that the Task Force study
"the feasibility of a system of statewide juvenile [sentencing]
guidelines," and to consider "the effectiveness of various juvenile
justice system approaches, including behavior modification and
treatment."4 50 In short, the legislature charged the Task Force
to examine fundamental juvenile sentencing policy issues,451
reconcile all of the conflicts of sentencing policy (needs or deeds,
448. Indeed,, the Task Force recommended that the juvenile justice system
expand the type and quality of data it routinely collected to enable it to "track
information by juvenile offender across counties for routine law enforcement
and court purposes," to compile statewide criminal history data about individ-
ual youths, and to conduct analyses and evaluations of juvenile justice adminis-
tration. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 68.
449. The absence of a juvenile data tracking system inhibited the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines Commission's ability to estimate the effects of the statutory
changes in the Guidelines. For example, it could only "guess-timate" the
number of juveniles age 14 to 16 who committed more than one felony, how
many who committed a felony after age 16 had committed another one previ-
ously, and the number of juveniles who committed presumptive-commitment-
to-prison offenses. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COhMN, supra note
371, at 4. In addition, the legislative extension of the use ofjuvenile prior con-
victions from age 21 to age 25 increased the total time "at risk," during which
offenders may serve longer sentences. Despite these data limitations, the Sen-
tencing Guidelines Commission estimated that including EJJ convictions in the
adult criminal history score would require an additional 50 prison beds, id. at 7,
and that the use of juvenile convictions an additional 60 beds, id. at 8, a total
bed-impact second only to that of EJJ probation revocations. Id. at 2.
450. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
451. The Task Force debated whether rehabilitation and treatment provide
a tenable justification to sentence two similarly situated juvenile offenders dif-
ferently, or to sentence juveniles differently than adults. The Task Force also
discussed whether juvenile sentences should be based on individualized assess-
ments of the offender or on the seriousness of the offense. Id. at 64. The Task
Force also considered whether judicial sentencing discretion to address the
needs and "best interests" of a juvenile offender can be reconciled with the rule
of law. Finally, the Task Force confronted the racial implications of discretion-
ary decisions: if sentences based on individualized social circumstances rather
than past behavior have a systematic disparate racial impact, or produces no
tangible benefits, can the exercise of discretion be defended either morally or
legally? Id. at 67.
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offenders or offenses, past behavior or future welfare, retribu-
tion or utility, rules or discretion), and to recommend a sentenc-
ing jurisprudence for young offenders.
This Article contends that the Task Force failed in its mis-
sion to critically re-assess these principles, and that the legisla-
ture's subsequent hesitancy reflects this default. Despite
Minnesota's nominal commitment to rehabilitation, the reality
of juvenile justice is penal social control. In part, the juvenile
court's inevitable subordination of individual welfare to custody
and control stems from its fundamentally criminal focus. Juve-
nile court delinquency jurisdiction is defined by the commission
of a criminal offense for which a youth is responsible, rather by
by characteristics of children for which they are not responsible
and for which intervention could improve their life circum-
stances. This criminal focus reinforces retributive rather than
reformative impulses.
Thus, Minnesota's juvenile courts exercise essentially the
same penal social control function as adult criminal courts. This
implicates policies both about secure facilities and juvenile sen-
tencing guidelines, and criminal procedural safeguards for
juveniles, especially the jury trial. All of the reasons that led
Minnesota to adopt the Sentencing Guidelines for adult criminal
defendants apply equally to juvenile court sentencing practices.
Finally, despite the Task Force's unwillingness to abandon reha-
bilitation as a justification for intervention, this Article suggests
that the Task Force's recommendations and the legislation im-
plementing them signal the first steps toward the development
of an offense-based dispositional framework for juveniles.
In Minnesota, as in most states, after a juvenile is adjudi-
cated a delinquent, a court may order any of a number of dispo-
sitions "deemed necessary to the rehabilitation of the child."452
Courts, as well as legislatures, envision juvenile courts as be-
nevolent treatment agencies making individualized dispositions
452. Mmn. STAT. § 260.185(1) (emphasis added). The statute specifies a va-
riety of dispositions which can be used alone or in combination, including:
counselling the child or the parents; placing the child under the supervision of a
probation officer; transferring legal custody to a county home school, group
home, foster home, or the Commissioner of Corrections; ordering the child to
make reasonable restitution, or to pay a fine of up to $700; and cancelling the
child's driver's license. Id. Similarly, juveniles committed to the Commissioner
of Corrections "for care, custody, and rehabilitation," id. § 241.01(3a)(a), may
not be discharged until the commission is satisfied that "the child has been re-
habilitated." Id. § 241.19. See generally Feld, supra note 9, at 823-25 (tracing
states' juvenile court sentencing legislation from the Progressive era's rehabili-
tative approach through modern retributive changes).
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in the "best interests" of the child rather than as punitive bod-
ies.45 3 As a result, they fail to analyze the differences between
treatment as a juvenile and punishment as a criminal.
The Supreme Court, however, has developed criteria in
other contexts to determine whether seemingly punitive and co-
ercive governmental intervention constitutes punishment.454
Even when a state confines a person for conduct that is criminal,
the question remains whether the purpose of the restraint is pe-
nal.4 55 For example, if a state places a juvenile delinquent in a
453. For example, the McKeiver Court noted that although the guiding con-
sideration for courts of law dealing with threatening conduct should be the pro-
tection of the community, rehabilitating offenders through individualized
treatment is still the most appropriate manner to deal with juvenile offenders.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 546 n.6 (1971) (Blackmun, J., plural-
ity opinion).
454. See generally J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeit-
ures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REv. 379 (1976)
(comprehensive critique of the Court's handling of punishment in various crimi-
nal and civil contexts). For example, the Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Marti-
nez stated:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deter-
rence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be con-
nected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation
to the alternative purposes assigned are all relevant to the inquiry,
and may often point in differing directions.
372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
455. In Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986), the Supreme Court considered
the distinctions between "punishment" and "treatment" in deciding whether a
person incarcerated under a "Sexually Dangerous Persons Act" was entitled to
invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 365.
Even though commitment under the Act was triggered by the filing of criminal
charges and accompanied by many criminal procedural safeguards, the Court
endorsed psychiatrically "compelled" testimony because it concluded that com-
mitment was "'essentially civil in nature'" and that the aim of the statute was
to provide "treatment, not punishment.'" Id. at 367 (quoting People v. Allen,
481 N.E.2d 690, 694-95 (IM. 1985)). Although it acknowledged that a "civil label
is not... dispositive," id. at 369, the Court concluded that the state purpose to
provide "'care and treatment'" and the indeterminate commitment "disavowed
any interest in punishment." Id. at 370 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
105-08 (1985)).
Distinguishing Gault, the Allen Court subtly shifted the rationale of the
Gault Court's Fifth Amendment holding. MThe Court in Gault was obviously
persuaded that the State intended to punish its juvenile offenders, observing
that in many States juveniles may be placed in adult penal institutions for con-
duct that if committed by an adult would be a crime." Id. at 373 (second empha-
sis added). The Allen Court thus implied that it was the possibility of placing a
juvenile in an adult penal institution that required recognizing the privilege
against self-incrimination. But Gaults rationale for requiring the privilege was
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state training school for conduct that would be a felony if com-
mitted by an adult, is the youth's confinement punishment or
treatment?
Several commentators have identified factors that courts
may examine to assess whether a juvenile is being treated or
punished.456 For example, courts might consider juvenile court
legislative purpose clauses and court opinions, conditions of
institutional confinement and evaluations of their effectiveness,
and juvenile court sentencing statutes and sentencing
practices.457
1. The Purpose of Juvenile Court Sanctions
The stated legislative purpose is among the factors the
Supreme Court considers to determine whether seemingly puni-
tive and coercive governmental intervention constitutes punish-
ment or an "alternative purpose" of treatment.458 Most states'
juvenile codes contain a purpose clause that declares the under-
considerably more broad: "[C]ommitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is incar-
ceration against one's will, whether it is called 'criminal' or 'civil." In re Gault,
387 U.S 1, 50 (1967). It was the "deprivation of liberty" per se that accounted
for the Gault ruling, with the Court noting "the equivalence... of exposure to
commitment as ajuvenile delinquent and exposure to imprisonment as an adult
offender." Id.
Finally, the Allen Court concluded that confinement constituted punish-
ment if it was "essentially identical to that imposed upon felons with no need
for psychiatric care." Allen, 478 U.S. at 373. The Court acknowledged that the
"conditions of... confinement [could] amount to 'punishment' and thus render
'criminal' the proceedings which led to confinement." Id. at 374.
456. E.g., Feld, supra note 9, at 838-47 (describing federal and state court
attempts to distinguish punishment from treatment); Martin R. Gardner, Pun-
ishment and Juvenile Justice: A Conceptual Framework for Assessing Constitu-
tional Rights of Youthful Offenders, 35 VAND. L. REv. 791, 809-16 (1982)
(suggesting a conceptual frame work to identify the punitive aspects of the juve-
nile justice system in order to asses juvenile rights); Robert E. Shepherd, Jr.,
Challenging the Rehabilitative Justification for Indeterminate Sentencing in the
Juvenile Justice System: The Right to Punishment, 21 ST. Louis U. L.J. 12, 35-
40 (1977) (discussing treatment and punishment in the context of indetermi-
nate sentencing ofjuveniles); Anna L. Simpson, Comment, Rehabilitation as the
Justification of a Separate Juvenile Justice System, 64 CAL. L. REv. 984, 1003-
17 (1976) (conducting an empirical criticism of rehabilitation as a justification
for the juvenile justice process and proposing a juvenile system similar to the
adult one).
457. Feld, supra note 9, at 838-909 (exploring of the difference between pun-
ishment and treatment); Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile
Court, 75 MIN. L. RIv. 691, 709-17 (1991) (same); Feld, supra note 1, at 245-54
(same).
458. Allen, 478 U.S. at 368-70; Gardner, supra note 456, at 799-800 ("The
Court's conception of punishment turns heavily on an examination of legislative
purpose....").
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lying legislative rationale as an aid to courts in interpreting the
statute. These preambles provide one indicator of the goals of
juvenile court intervention.
Although forty-two states' juvenile codes contain such a leg-
islative purpose clause, in the decades since Gault and McKeiver
about one-quarter of the states have redefined their juvenile
codes' statements of legislative purpose. 459 These recent amend-
ments have downplayed the role of rehabilitation in the child's
"best interest" and acknowledge the importance of public safety,
punishment, and individual accountability in the juvenile jus-
tice system.460
In 1980, the Minnesota Legislature redefined the purpose of
its juvenile courts. 46 ' Minnesota derived its new statement of
purpose from the Juvenile Justice Standards, which recommend
jury trials462 and determinate sentences that are proportional to
the seriousness of the offense and injury.463 Although Minne-
sota's new, more punitive purpose clause marked a fundamental
philosophic departure from its previous rehabilitative orienta-
tion, the legislature did not provide a general right to a jury trial
in juvenile proceedings either in 1980 or in the more recent 1994
reforms.464
459. Feld, supra note 9, at 842 & nn.83-84 (listing statutes).
460. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West Supp. 1995)) ("provide
for the protection and safety of the public"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.001(2)(a)
(West 1988) ("protect society... [while] recognizing that the application of
sanctions which are consistent with the seriousness of the offense is appropri-
ate in all cases"); HAw. REV. STAT. § 571-1 (1985) ("render appropriate punish-
ment to offenders"); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-1-1 (Burns 1987) ("protect[ ] the
public by enforcing the legal obligations children have to society"); Feld, supra
note 9, at 842 & n.84 (listing statutes). A distinguishing characteristic of the
"new" juvenile law is that "in many jurisdictions accountability and punish-
ment have emerged among the express purposes of juvenile justice statutes."
Walkover, supra note 156, at 523.
461. See supra note 225 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 260.011). See generally
Feld, supra note 184, at 197-203 (discussing changes in purpose clauses away
from rehabilitatory goals).
462. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADmIN., ABA, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO ADJUDICATION 4.1(A) (1980).
463. See INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL AMIN., ABA, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS
RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND SANCTIONS 5.2 (1980).
464. See supra note 344, infra notes 623-637 and accompanying text. More-
over, in In re K.A.A., 410 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1987), the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that a juvenile could not voluntarily waive juvenile court jurisdic-
tion in order to obtain a jury trial in an adult criminal proceeding. Id. at 842.
"The legislature could, and apparently did, conclude that allowing a juvenile to
waive juvenile court jurisdiction for some perceived short-term benefit ignores
the best interests of the State in addressing juvenile problems as well as the
overall interest of the juvenile." Id. at 840. By formally recognizing the legiti-
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Some courts recognize that amendments to legislative pur-
pose clauses signal basic changes in philosophical direction,46 5
and increasingly acknowledge that "punishment" is an impor-
tant aspect of a juvenile court's "therapeutic" sentences. 466
Changes in purpose clauses are not simply cosmetic-they pro-
vide a basis for deciding cases. The Minnesota Court of Appeals,
for example, decided to transfer David Brom from juvenile to
criminal court based on the language of the amended purpose
clause.467 Thus, the explicit purpose of Minnesota's juvenile
macy of punitive and deterrent sanctions for criminal offenses juvenile courts
will be properly and somewhat belatedly expressing society's firm disapproval
of juvenile crime and will be clearly issuing a threat of punishment for criminal
acts to the juvenile population.
465. See, e.g., State ex rel. D.D.H. v. Dostert, 269 S.E.2d 401,409 & n.8 (W.
Va. 1980) (holding that a juvenile court cannot justify incarceration in a secure
facility based on rehabilitation alone; specific factors must support such a dispo-
sition). In In re Javier A., 206 Cal. Rptr. 386 (Ct. App. 1984), the court analyzed
changes in juvenile purpose clauses and concluded that "[iUn 1984 the emphasis
is on protecting the citizens of the state of California from the child." Id. at 417.
The court also noted that "the United States Supreme Court had recognized the
actual purposes already were similar to those of the adult criminal system." Id.
at 418.
466. In State v. Lawley, the Washington Supreme Court reasoned with
Orwellian logic that sometimes punishment can be treatment. 591 P.2d 772,
773 (Wash. 1979). It upheld the legislature's conclusion that "accountability for
criminal behavior, the prior criminal activity and punishment commensurate
with age, crime and criminal history does as much to rehabilitate, correct and
direct an errant youth as does the prior philosophy of focusing upon the particu-
lar characteristics of the individual juvenile." Id.; supra note 156 (discussing
Washington State's juvenile sentencing laws and sentencing practices); see also
In re Seven Minors, 664 P.2d 947, 950 (Nev. 1983) (endorsing punishment as a
legitimate purpose of its juvenile courts). In an unusual burst of judicial can-
dor, the court in D.D.H. v. Dostert acknowledged that "it is now generally recog-
nized that caring for the juvenile and controlling the juvenile are often .quite
contradictory processes." 269 S.E.2d at 408-09 (footnote omitted). After
describing the inherent conflicts of the rehabilitative model, the D.D.H. court
"acknowledge[d] what has been an unspoken conclusion: our treatment looks a
lot like punishment." Id. at 415 (emphasis added).
467. In re D.F.B., 430 N.W.2d 475 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). InD.F.B. the court
of appeals emphasized that
the 1980 amendments [to the purpose clause] also reflect a shift in leg-
islative attitude regarding punishment as a goal of juvenile courts.
Prior to the amendments the stated purpose of those courts was to se-
cure care and guidance, and to serve the welfare of the minor child....
Prior to 1980, legislative concentration had been directed toward reha-
bilitating all errant youths, not to punishing them.... Subsequent to
the 1980 amendment,... [flor youths charged with the commission of a
crime, a more punitive approach [has been] emphasized.
Id. at 478. The Minnesota Supreme Court subsequently provided an alterna-
tive rationale for Brom's transfer. See supra notes 237-252 (discussing Minne-
sota Supreme Court's D.F.B. decision).
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courts is not simply to "rehabilitate" young offenders, but also to
punish them.
2. Conditions of Confinement and Evaluations of Treatment
Effectiveness
Juvenile correctional institutions and their effectiveness
provides another indicator of whether involuntary confinement
constitutes punishment or serves a therapeutic "alternative pur-
pose." Indeed, institutional conditions motivated the Court in
Gault to afford juveniles procedural safeguards. 468 Although
the Court has never held that involuntary confinement per se
constitutes punishment,469 the Gault Court correctly perceived
incarceration per se as a severe penalty, a substantial depriva-
tion of autonomy, and a continual reminder of one's delinquent
status, all of which are elements of punishment.470
The Court in Gault recognized the contradictions between
the rhetoric of rehabilitation and the reality of custodial confine-
ment that have characterized juvenile institutions since their in-
ception.471 Evaluations of juvenile correctional facilities in the
years since Gault reveal a continuing gap between rehabilitative
468. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). There, the Supreme Court noted:
The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a "receiv-
ing home" or an "industrial school" for juveniles is an institution of
confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser
time. His world becomes "a building with whitewashed walls, regi-
mented routine and institutional hours .... " Instead of mother and
father and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his world
is peopled by guards, custodians, state employees, and "delinquents"
confined with him for anything from waywardness to rape and
homicide.
Id. at 27 (quoting in part In re Holmes, 109 A.2d 523, 530 (Pa. 1954) (Mus-
manno, J., dissenting)).
469. See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 374 (1986) (Me... cannot say
that the conditions of petitioner's confinement themselves amount to 'punish-
ment .... ' "); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979) ("In a civil commit-
ment state power is not exercised in a punitive sense.").
470. Gault, 387 U.S. at 26-27.
471. David Rothman's study of the early juvenile training schools describes
institutions that not only failed to rehabilitate, but were scarcely distinguish-
able from their adult penal counterparts. RoT mA, supra note 5, at 261-89.
Steven Schlossman provides a similarly pessimistic account of the reality ofju-
venile correctional programs under the aegis of Progressivism. STEVEN
ScHLossMAN, LOVE AND THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT (1977). Indeed, historians
trace the juvenile court's lineage of punitive, custodial confinement in the name
of rehabilitation back to its institutional precursors in the Houses of Refuge.
See, e.g., JOSEPH K HAWES, CHILDREN IN URBAN SocIrY: JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1971) (studying the historical ori-
gins of juvenile delinquency treatment and describing the shortcomings of such
institutions today); DAvID J. ROTHMAN, THE DiscovERY OF THE AsyLum: SociAL
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rhetoric and punitive reality. Studies of juvenile institutions in
several states describe facilities in which staff physically beat
inmates, and frequently failed to prevent inmate abuse by other
inmates.472 One study attributed institutional violence to inap-
propriately designed facilities, inadequate staffing, and substan-
tial overcrowding. 473 Despite the rhetoric of rehabilitation, staff
and inmate violence, predatory behavior, and punitive custodial
incarceration constitute the daily reality for juvenile offenders
confined in many "treatment" facilities.474
During the period of these post-Gault evaluation studies,
lawsuits alleged that the conditions of confinement in juvenile
institutions violated the committed youths' "right to treat-
ment,"47 5 or inflicted "cruel and unusual punishment."476 In
Nelson v. Heyne, the court found that institutional staff rou-
tinely beat inmates with a "fraternity paddle," injected them
with psychotropic drugs for social control purposes, and de-
prived them of minimally adequate care and individualized
ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPuBLIc 235 (1971) (describing a military-
type environment for inmates).
472. See generally CLEMENS BARTOLLAS ET AL., VICTIMIZATION: THE INSTrIU-
TIONAL PARADox 259 (1976) ("The juvenile correctional institution... is or can
be far more cruel and inhumane than most outsiders ever imagine .... [It] is a
culmination of the worst features of a free society."); BARRY C. FELD, NEUTRALMZ-
ING INMATE VIOLENCE: JUVENILE OFFENDERS IN INSTITUTIONS (1977) [hereinaf-
ter FELD, NEUTRALIZING INMATE VIOLENCE] (studying violence in institutions
based upon the characteristics and organization of inmate subculture, staff ide-
ology, and cottages); Barry C. Feld, A Comparative Analysis of Organizational
Structure and Inmate Subcultures in Institutions for Juvenile Offenders, 27
CRIME & DELINQ. 336, 352-56 (1981) (significance of staff-inmate relations to-
wards inmate aggression); Eric D. Poole & Robert M. Regoli, Violence in Juve-
nile Institutions: A Comparative Study, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 213 (1983) (study of
relevant variables which effect inmate aggression and violence from four juve-
nile correctional institutions).
473. See generally Feld, supra note 9, at 893 (discussing research in
California).
474. Id.
475. The right to treatment derives from the state's invocation of its parens
patriae power to intervene for the purported benefit of the individual. Incarcer-
ating an individual without treatment is punishment; subjecting a person to
punishment requires full criminal procedural safeguards. Thus incarceration
without the benefit of criminal procedural safeguards is justified only if rehabil-
itative treatment is forthcoming. See generally David L. Bazelon, Implementing
the Right to Treatment, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 742, 752-53 (1969) (commenting on
the judicial need for a "right to treatment"); Stephen M. Goodman, Right to
Treatment: The Responsibility of the Courts, 57 GEo. L.J. 680, 697 (1969) (argu-
ing that the promise of treatment must be fulfilled in a parens patriae
proceeding).
476. See Feld, supra note 15, at 260 n.461; Feld, supra note 98, at 535-38.
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treatment.477 In Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, the
court found inmates confined in dark, cold, dungeon-like cells in
their underwear, routinely locked in solitary confinement, and
subjected to a variety of punitive practices. 47 8 In Morales v.
Turman, the court found numerous instances of physical brutal-
ity and abuse, including hazing by staff and inmates, staff ad-
ministered beatings, exposure of inmates to tear gas,
homosexual assaults, extensive use of solitary confinement,
repetitive and degrading make-work, and minimal clinical
services.479
Unfortunately, these cases are not atypical.480 Although ju-
venile correctional facilities are not as uniformly deplorable as
most adult prisons,48' rehabilitative euphemisms, such as "[pro-
viding] a structured environment,"482 should not disguise the
punitive reality of juvenile institutional confinement.
The juvenile court "treatment" model assumes that social or
psychological factors cause delinquent behavior, that individual-
ized sentences should be based on assessments of needs, that
release should occur when the juvenile improves, and that inter-
vention will reduce recidivism. Evaluations of juvenile rehabili-
tation programs provide scant support that juvenile confinement
477. 355 F. Supp. 451, 452 (N.D. Ind. 1972), aff'd, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). For a discussion of Nelson v. Heyne, see
Michael Frisch, Constitutional Right to Treatment for Juveniles Adjudicated to
be Delinquent-Nelson v. Heyne, 12 Am. 0iM. L. REv. 209 (1974).
478. 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1358-62 (D.R.I. 1972).
479. 383 F. Supp. 53, 72-85 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 535
F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 322 (1977).
480. See Feld, supra note 9, at 894-95 (discussing other cases); Barry Kris-
berg et al., The Watershed of Juvenile Justice Reform, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 5, 32(1986) (summarizing additional unreported cases and concluding that there is
"growing evidence that harsh conditions of confinement continue to plague juve-
nile detention centers and training schools").
481. See Martin Forst et al., Youth in Prisons and Training Schools: Percep-
tions and Consequences of the Treatment-Custody Dichotomy, 40 Juv. & FAM.
CT. J. 1, 3 (1989).
482. See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, COM-
PREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR SERIOUS, VIOLENT, AN CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFEND-
ERS 21 (Dec. 1993) [hereinafter OJJDP] ("he criminal behavior of many
serious, violent, and chronic juvenile offenders requires the application of se-
cure sanctions to hold these offenders accountable for their delinquent acts and
to provide a structured treatment environment." (emphasis added)); Charles H.
Logan & Gerald G. Gaes, Meta-Analysis and the Rehabilitation of Punishment,
10 JUST. Q. 245, 256 (1993) (stating that rehabilitative euphemisms create a
"facade of fine-sounding programs that masks the harsh reality of doing time").
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in institutions effectively treats rather than punishes, or
reduces recidivism rates.48 3
Recent evaluations of the effects of penal intervention on re-
cidivism rates counsel skepticism about the availability of pro-
grams that consistently or systematically rehabilitate adult or
serious juvenile offenders. A report by the National Academy of
Science's panel on "Research on Rehabilitation Techniques"
concluded:
The research literature currently provides no basis for positive recom-
mendations about techniques to rehabilitate criminal offenders. The
literature does afford occasional hints of intervention that may have
promise, but to recommend widespread implementation of those meas-
ures would be irresponsible. Many of them would probably be waste-
ful, and some might do more harm than good in the long run.
4 84
A meta-analysis of juvenile correctional treatment evaluations
appearing in the professional literature between 1975 and 1984,
and meeting certain methodological criteria, concluded that
"[tihe results are far from encouraging for rehabilitation
proponents."485
483. See Gene G. Kassebaum & David A. Ward, Analysis, Reanalysis and
Meta Analysis of Correctional Treatment Effectiveness: Is the Question What
Works or Who Works?, 2 SocIoLoGIcAL PRAc. REV. 159, 160 (1991) (criticizing
analyses of treatment programs); GENE G. KASSEBAUM ET AL., PRISON TREAT-
mENT AND PAROLE SuRVIVAL: AN EMPmIcAL ASSESSMENT v-vii, 285 (1971). See
generally NEw DIRECTIONS IN THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS (Su-
San E. Martin et al. eds., 1981); Steven P. Lab & John T. Whitehead, An Analy-
sis of Juvenile Correctional Treatment, 34 CRIME & DELINQ. 60 (1988)
(surveying professional literature with approximately half showing no or a neg-
ative impact on recidivism); John T. Whitehead & Steven P. Lab, A Meta-Analy-
sis of Juvenile Correctional Treatment, 26 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 267, 288-91
(1989) (reporting that studies of different types of treatment, subjects, method-
ology, or time periods, show that correctional intervention has discouragingly
little effect on recidivism rates); THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (Lee B. Sechrest et al. eds., 1979) (evaluating effec-
tiveness of rehabilitation in light of random experiments, cost-benefit analyses,
and ethics); CORRECTONS AND PUNISHMENT (David F. Greenberg ed., 1977)
(overview of organizational and social structure of correctional institutions, its
goals and problems).
484. Panel on Research on Rehabilitative Techniques, The Prospects of Re-
habilitation, in THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS: PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS, supra note 483, at 88, 102.
485. Lab & Whitehead, supra note 483, at 77. Meta-analyses are studies of
studies. By coding each evaluation study on a number of variables (e.g., charac-
teristics of the research design, subjects studied, treatment applied, and out-
come measures), and combining and re-analyzing the studies, "meta-analysis
may be able to separate treatment effects from differences due to uncontrolled
characteristics of the subjects, or other deficiencies of research design." Logan
& Gaes, supra note 482, at 247. See generally Steven P. Lab & John T. White-
head, From "Nothing Works' to 'The Appropriate Works: The Latest Stop on the
Search for the Secular Grail, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 405 (1990) (methodological cri-
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Although some studies resist the general conclusion that
"nothing works" in juvenile or adult corrections, the conclusion
has not been persuasively refuted.48 6 Several researchers offer
literature reviews, meta-analyses, or program descriptions con-
tending that some types of intervention may have positive ef-
fects on selected clients under certain conditions. 487 Even an
optimistic assessment of the rehabilitation of "rehabilitation"
concludes only that "several methods seem promising, but none
[has] been shown to usually produce major reductions [in recidi-
vism] when applied broadly to typical composite samples of of-
fenders."488 The most extensive meta-analysis of the most
rigorous evaluation studies concluded that treating delinquents
decreased recidivism rates by about five percent, from fifty to
forty-five percent.489
Because there is little evidence of effective treatment of seri-
ous juvenile offenders, the Task Force recommended independ-
ent evaluation research to assess the efficacy of intervention.490
Significantly, the Minnesota Legislature requested the Legisla-
tive Audit Commission to evaluate both state-run institutions
serving juvenile offenders, and the four largest private programs
into which courts place children who are removed from their
tique of meta-analyses purporting to show effectiveness of correctional
treatment).
486. E.g., NEW DmECTIONS rN TnE REHABILITATION OF CRIMNAL OFFENDERS,
supra note 483, at 3 ("It would be more accurate to say instead that nothing yet
tried has been demonstrated to work.").
487. See, e.g., D. Andrews et al., Does Correctional Treatment Work? A
Clinically Relevant and Psychologically Informed Meta-Analysis, 28 CRaroi-
OGY 369, 375-77 (1990) (effectiveness of correctional treatment is dependent
upon what is delivered to whom in particular settings); Jeffrey Fagan, Social
and Legal Policy Dimensions of Violent Juvenile Crime, 17 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 93, 106-09 (1990) (proportionate correctional interventions, with an
emphasis on community reentry and reintegration furthers rehabilitation); Pe-
ter W. Greenwood & Susan Turner, Evaluation of the Paint Creek Youth Center:
A Residential Program for Serious Delinquents, 31 CRIMINOLOGY 263, 270-75
(1993) (experimental program with intensive intervention services and activi-
ties received significantly better treatment services reviews than traditional
training schools).
488. Ted Palmer, The Effectiveness of Intervention: Recent Trends and Cur-
rent Issues, 37 CRIME & DELINQ. 330, 340 (1991).
489. See Mark W. Lipsey, Juvenile Delinquency Treatment: A Meta-Analytic
Inquiry into the Variability of Effects, in META-ANALYsIS FOR EXPLANATION: A
CASEBOOK 83, 97-98 (Thomas D. Cook et al. eds., 1992).
490. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 61 (legislature should fund
independent evaluations of residential treatment facilities and programs).
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homes.491 The Legislative Auditor conducted a very thorough
analysis of recidivism rates of youths released from state correc-
tional and private facilities in 1985 and 1991.492 While delin-
quents committed to residential facilities constituted the most
serious and chronic young offenders, the majority of youths re-
leased in 1991 faced new charges as juveniles or adults within
two years.493 The vast majority of delinquents released from
state correctional institutions in 1985 continued their criminal
careers into adulthood,494 and an even larger proportion of certi-
fied juveniles released from adult facilities persisted in serious
criminality.495 Despite the state's commitment to rehabilitating
young offenders, the Legislative Auditor concluded that "Minne-
sota's most-used residential programs have shown a limited
ability to change entrenched criminal values and behavior pat-
terns among juveniles."496
There are a variety of reasons why the juvenile courts' claim
of rehabilitation remains "unproven." Many evaluations of
treatment effectiveness lack either methodological rigor497 or
use insufficiently sensitive outcome measures.498 Moreover,
many treatment programs lack a theoretical rationale or consis-
tent intervention strategies based on that rationale. Many stud-
ies fail to assess whether the program staff implemented the
491. 1994 Minm. Laws 576, § 63. The evaluation of state-run programs
focusses on recidivism, program participation, and subjective assessments by
correctional officials and juveniles.
492. OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATrVE AuDrroR, supra note 371, at 51-75.
493. Id. at 64 ("[Bletween 53 and 77 percent of male juveniles ... received
new delinquency petitions or were arrested as adults within two years. The
percentage of juveniles who were adjudicated as delinquent or convicted as
adults ranged from 38 to 62 percent for programs serving males .... ").
494. Id. at 71 (noting high percentage of Red Wing juveniles and Sauk Cen-
tre males who were convicted of at least one adult felony and receive prison
sentences before the age of 23).
495. Id. at 73 ("Eighty-nine percent of certified adults released from St.
Cloud in 1985 were convicted of a felony within five years, and most [84%] of
them returned to prison.").
496. Id. at 75. This conclusion is consistent with evaluations of reoffense
rates of juvenile offenders in other states which report rearrest rates in excess
of 50%. Id. at 113-15 (analyzing recidivism rates in 12 studies).
497. Panel on Research on Rehabilitative Techniques, supra note 484, at 54-
60.
498. See, e.g., Fagan, supra note 487, at 98 (suggesting that rather than
relying upon dichotomous recidivism measures, more sensitive measures of be-
havioral changes, such as a reduction in the rates or severity of crime, or the
time between crime, might better assess the incremental effects of
intervention).
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treatment with integrity. 499 Thus, the inability to measure
treatment effectiveness may reflect either methodological flaws,
poorly implemented programs, or, in fact, the absence of effec-
tive methods of treatment.
Even if some programs might work for some offenders under
some conditions, in the face of unproven efficacy, the possibility
of an effective rehabilitation program cannot justify confining
young offenders "for their own good," while providing fewer pro-
cedural safeguards than are afforded adults. 500 Even if some
"model" programs appear effective, fiscal constraints, budget
deficits, and competition from other interest groups make it un-
likely that such treatment services for delinquents actually will
be provided universally. Even if intervention does produce some
marginal improvements in the lives of some young offenders,
those benefits are not sufficient to justify the inevitable racial
disparities that result from the exercise of individualized discre-
tion.50 1 If significant and effective intervention resources are
not forthcoming, the practical differences between treatment
and punishment will remain unclear.
The legislature also charged the Task Force to assess "the
need for secure juvenile facilities in the state."50 2 Determining
whether to create a secure juvenile facility implicates several
complex issues: the effectiveness of institutional treatment, the
continuum of services from secure treatment to community rein-
tegration, and the procedural safeguards that must precede
long-term confinement in programs of unproven efficacy.
Although Minnesota does not have a physically secure "youth
prison," the Department of Corrections operates several public
juvenile correctional institutions. The state Departments of
Corrections and Human Services license additional private cor-
rectional, residential treatment, and mental health facilities,
499. See Paul Gendreau & Robert R. Ross, Revivification of Rehabilitation:
Evidence from the 1980s, 4 JuST. Q. 349, 354, 355 (1987) (questioning the con-
trol, skill-level, and treatment philosophies of staff in biomedical and diversion
methods of rehabilitation).
500. See, e.g., Logan & Gaes, supra note 482, at 251-52 (questioning whether
rehabilitation, even if effective, is a morally defensible penological justification).
501. See infra notes 537-542 and accompanying text (pointing out the racial
dispartities as juveniles proceed through the system).
502. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 1. The Task Force recog-
nized that a "secure facility" was a place of confinement. "[A] physically secure
facility will generally have secure perimeter fencing utilizing a double fence
and/or razor wire, visual or electronic monitoring of movement within the facil-
ity, and security lighting." Minutes of the Secure Facilities Committee 1 (Oct.
15, 1993) (on file with author).
10791995]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
some of which have a secure capacity.503 In addition, some
courts, particularly those from the metropolitan area, may send
juveniles to secure treatment programs in other states.50 4 The
Task Force recommended that the few youths requiring long-
term secure confinement to protect public safety should be certi-
fied. County correctional administrators from some judicial dis-
tricts, however, expressed a need for a physically secure facility
for serious and chronic young offenders for whom certification is
not appropriate. 50 5
Evaluation research strongly indicates that incarcerating
young offenders in large, congregate juvenile institutions does
not effectively rehabilitate them.50 6 In contrast, some research
503. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 56. The Minnesota De-
partment of Corrections operates about 30-35 physically secure beds in state
correctional facilities, and licenses an additional 30-35 secure treatment beds in
private facilities. Id. at 57. The Department of Human Services licenses "about
90 secure treatment beds, 29 secure beds for adolescent chemical dependency
treatment and about 230 secure beds in inpatient, locked adolescent psychiatric
facilities." Id.; see also OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, supra note 371, at
18-26 (describing secure correctional capacities in institutions).
504. TASK FORCE, FnAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 57. According to a survey
by the Department of Human Services, between January 1, 1992, and October
1, 1993, juvenile courts ordered approximately 125 delinquents into out-of-state
programs, although it could not determine how many of those were physically
secure placements. Id. at 57-58.
A 1994 amendment requires the Department of Corrections to certify that
the out-of-state facility to which Minnesota juveniles are sent meets all Minne-
sota licensure standards for residential treatment programs. MINN. STAT
§ 260.185(6).
505. TAsK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 54-55. Although severaljudicial districts indicated no need for additional physically secure settings,
Hennepin County (Minneapolis) correctional administrators expressed the
"strongest support for physically secure capacity," and estimated that it would
require approximately 30 secure beds to meet the placement needs for serious,
repeat, and younger juveniles. Id. at 55-56.
506. OJJDP, supra note 482, at 21. Evaluations ofjuvenile corrections con-
sistently report that violent inmate subcultures are a function of institutional
security arrangements; the more authoritarian controls are imposed to facili-
tate security, the higher the level of covert inmate violence within the subcul-
ture. See, e.g., ROBERT COATES ET AL., DivrasnTy IN A YOUTH CORRECTIONAL
SYSTEM (1978) (reporting that institutionalization does not result in lower re-
cidivism rates than non-incarcerative sanctions with close supervision in the
community, and may actually increase the rates); FELD, NEUTRALIZING INMATE
VIOLENCE, supra note 472, at 132-38, 163-69 (describing higher levels of vio-
lence in custody-oriented facilities); DAVID STREET ET AL., ORGANIZATION FOR
TREATMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS FOR DELINQUENTS 199
(1966) (asserting that institutional organization affects inmate behavior).
Juveniles sentenced to long terms under "get tough" legislation are the
most serious and chronic offenders, yet facilities designed to handle them often
suffer from limited physical mobility, inadequate program resources, and in-
tense interaction among the most problematic youths in the system. The re-
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suggests that smaller, community-based intensive supervision
programs are less destructive and may reduce or postpone some
delinquents' likelihood or rate of reoffending.50 7 Promising pro-
grams provide a continuum of services from early secure-care in
small, non-debilitating settings, to community reintegration
with extensive aftercare supervision and intervention. 50 8 Suc-
cessful programs for serious young offenders are "part of a con-
tinuum, linked together by principles for intervention... and
tactics such as case management for maintaining the consis-
tency and logic of services in disparate settings."50 9
Because small facilities are preferable to large, physically
secure institutions, the Task Force recommended adding to the
continuum of correctional programming regionally-based secure
facilities with an eight- to twelve-bed capacity.5 10 Although the
Task Force regarded the existing juvenile corrections system as
adequate for most youths, successful implementation of the EJJ
sulting correctional "warehouses" exhibit all of the worst characteristics of
adult penal facilities. See generally DALE G. PARENT ET AL., CONDITIONS OF
CONFInES MENT: A STUDY TO EVALUATE CONDITIONS IN JUVENILE DETENTION AND
CORRECTIONS FACILITIES (1993) (describing institutional crowding as a perva-
sive problem, associated with higher rates of institutional violence and suicide).
507. See generally OJJDP, supra note 482, at 38-39 (summarizing evalua-
tion of research on the effectiveness of community-based programs in Massa-
chusetts and Utah); JAMES F. AusTiN ET AL., UNLOCKING JUVENILE
CORRECTIONS: EVALUATING THE MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERV-
ICES (1991) (analyzing effectiveness of Massachusetts's closing of training
schools); PETER W. GREENWOOD & FRANINm E. ZIMRING, ONE MORE CHANCE:
THE PURSUIT OF PROMISING INTERVENTION FOR CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS
(1985) (assessing the effectiveness of private-sector programs for dealing with
serious juvenile offenders); BARRY KRISBERG & JAMES F. AUSTIN, REINVENTING
JUVENILE JUSTICE 143 (1993) (summarizing the necessary components of effec-
tive juvenile correctional programs); Fagan, supra note 487, at 102-09 (analyz-
ing the effectiveness of programs aimed at reintegrating violent delinquents by
using continuity of intervention and extensive aftercare).
508. E.g., Fagan, supra note 487, at 104, 108 (reporting that programs with
strong implementation of reintegration strategy successfully delayed rearrest
upon a juvenile's return to the community).
509. Id. at 126.
510. Task Force member Senator Jane Ranum strongly advised that the leg-
islature expected the Task Force to recommend some type of secure capacity
and that to fail to do so could undermine the credibility of other Task Force
recommendations. The Task Force endorsed small, 8- to 12-bed regional facili-
ties to avoid creating a custodial warehouse or "youth prison." TASK FORCE,
FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 59. The private sector could provide the secure
capacity, subject to state funding and licensure, or the Department of Correc-
tions could operate such programs. Id. at 61. See generally KRISBERG & AUS-
TIN, supra note 507, at 144-48 (describing Massachusetts's system of small,
regional secure treatment programs, many of which private not-for-profit agen-
cies operate under state contract).
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recommendations might require a secure capacity for some seri-
ous or chronic youthful offenders.511 Accordingly, the Task
Force recommended that facilities use rigorous, objective risk
assessment criteria to screen those youths who would be eligible
for secure placement. 512
The legislature followed the Task Force's recommendations
and endorsed community-based residential and non-residential
treatment programs "to provide a continuum of services for seri-
ous and repeat juvenile offenders who do not require secure
placement."513 The legislature authorized the Department of
Corrections to license several small regional facilities to provide
secure programming for delinquents and EJJ youths. 514 In ad-
dition, the legislature created a Juvenile Programming Task
Force to comprehensively survey existing programs for juveniles
and recommend any additional services necessary to provide a
full continuum of programming.5 15
The Task Force recommendation and the legislation creat-
ing a few small, regional secure facilities reflect a penological
temporizing. The Task Force responded to the political impera-
511. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 58. The Task Force recog-
nized that some non-EJJ youths might be placed in a secure setting and, con-
versely, that not all EJJ youths would necessarily require a secure setting. Id.
at 59.
512. Id. "Risk assessments should be based on clearly defined objective cri-
teria that focus on (1) the seriousness of the delinquent act; (2) the potential
risk of reoffending, based on the presence of risk factors; and (3) the risk to
public safety." Id.
513. MmN. STAT. § 242.32(1) (directing the Commissioner of Corrections to
develop community-based services for residential placement and nonresidential
programming).
514. Id. § 242.32(2). The legislature mandated the Commissioner of Correc-
tions to "license several small regional facilities providing secure capacity pro-
gramming for juveniles who have been adjudicated delinquent or convicted as
extendedjurisdiction juveniles and require secure placement." Id. The legisla-
ture followed the Task Force's recommendation about size and location, re-
quired the secure capacity to be "distributed throughout the state," and
restricted to a "maximum of 100 beds statewide" the number of new residential
programs. Id. § 242.32(3).
515. 1994 Minn. Laws 576, § 62. The law requires the Commissioners of
Corrections and Human Services to conduct a comprehensive survey of residen-
tial and non-residential juvenile programming, determine the process by which
juveniles are placed in those programs, identify the racial and gender charac-
teristics ofjuveniles and staff in the programs, assess the types of services pro-
vided, and identify the sources of payment for such programs. Id. § 62(2); see
MINNESOTA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE
PROGRAMMING, EVALUATION, AND PLANNING (1994) (analyzing existing pro-
grams, additional service needs, and likely fiscal implications of implementing
EJJ and delinquency legislative changes).
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tive to "do something" and "get tough," despite practical uncer-
tainty about the effectiveness of programs for serious youth
offenders or the state's needs for a secure capacity. Although
large, congregate "youth prisons" are clearly the wrong response
to youthful offenders, it does not necessarily follow that small,
regional treatment facilities are the right one. For youths tried
as EJJs and sentenced to secure juvenile facilities, whether or
not their treatment is "effective" is less troublesome, because
they receive proper criminal safeguards, and could be punished
in any event. For youths adjudicated delinquent under less
stringent juvenile court procedures and confined in secure facili-
ties, however, the question of treatment efficacy has greater sig-
nificance and may pose constitutional questions. It is hard to
justify denying them criminal procedural safeguards when long-
term, secure confinement does not produce any significant im-
provement in recidivism rates. Even if confinement occasionally
does confer some ancillary benefit on some youths, it still may
not be a sufficient justification, because sometimes, "treatment
is punishment."
3. The Juvenile Court Sentencing Framework
Juvenile courts' sentencing statutes and dispositional prac-
tices provide another indicator of whether involuntary confine-
ment is punishment or serves a therapeutic, "alternative
purpose." Sentences based on the offense are usually determi-
nate and proportional, with a goal of retribution or deterrence.
Sentences based on characteristics of the offender are typically
indeterminate, with a goal of rehabilitation or incapacitation.5 16
Under indeterminate sentencing, correctional administrators
use the offense only for diagnostic purposes, and decide when an
offender is "rehabilitated." Thus, contrasting offender-oriented
individualized dispositions, which are indeterminate and non-
proportional, with offense-based dispositions, which are deter-
minate, proportional, and based on the past offense provides an-
other indicator of a therapeutic or punitive purpose.517
Historically, juvenile courts focused on the "best interests"
of the child, and imposed indeterminate and non-proportional
516. See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDs SERv. CoMI¢.., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 37
(1971) (explaining that treatment models seek to reduce crime by tailoring
sentences to individual characteristics); MORRIS, supra note 185, at 28-36
(describing the factors currently used in sentencing); HERBERT L. PACKER, THE
LmrTs OF THE CRrMINAL SANCTION 23-28 (1968) (discussing the differences be-
tween punishment models of sentencing and treatment models).
517. See INSTITUTE OF JurncL. ADmN., supra note 163, at 34-37.
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dispositions. 518 Recently, however, many states' juvenile court
sentencing legislation increasingly emphasize punishment.5 19
Despite a history of indeterminate sentencing, about one-third
of the states now formally use the present offense and/or prior
record to regulate at least some juvenile court sentencing deci-
sions through determinate or mandatory minimum sentencing
statutes, or correctional, parole, or administrative release
guidelines.520
According to legal theory, juvenile court sentencing in Min-
nesota is indeterminate. 521 In actual practice, however, a
youth's present offense and prior record strongly determine the
sanctions imposed. In 1980, the Minnesota Department of Cor-
rections administratively implemented a determinate sentenc-
ing plan for youths committed to the state's juvenile
institutions. Based on a juvenile's present offense and prior rec-
ord, the plan "provide[s] a more definite and distinct relation-
ship between offenses and the amount of time required to bring
about positive behavior change."522 Under the Minnesota De-
partment of Corrections institutional release guidelines, a juve-
nile's length of stay is based on the seriousness of the offense
518. From its inception, juvenile court intervention was deliberately flexi-
ble, individualized, and highly discretionary to afford maximum latitude to ju-
venile justice administrators. RoTHMAN, supra note 5, at 58-63, 248-60.
519. See supra notes 459-467 and accompanying text (discussing courts' use
of legislative purpose clauses to determine the nature of juvenile sentences).
520. Feld, supra note 9, at 851 (summarizing state juvenile sentencing
statutes).
521. MINN. STAT. § 260.185. In addition to providing the customary range of
dispositional options, Minnesota's dispositional statute requires a written "find-
ings of fact" for the disposition and includes the following language that was
adopted in 1976: "[The court] shall also set forth in writing the following infor-
mation: (a) why the best interests of the child are served by the disposition
ordered; and (b) what alternative dispositions were considered by the court and
why such dispositions were not appropriate in the instant case." Id.
§ 260.185(1)(h).
522. MINNESOTA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, JuvENILE RELEASE GUIDELINES 2
(1980) [hereinafter JUVENILE RELEASE GUIDELINss]. The Department sets a ju-
venile's projected minimum length of stay based on the present offense and
prior record within seven weeks after admission to an institution. MINNESOTA
DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, OFFICE OF JUVENILE RELEASE § 5-204.4(a) (1985). It de-
termines the actual parole release within the minimum and maximum range
based upon both the presumptive sentence, which reflects aggravating and mit-
igating factors associated with the commitment offense, and subsequent insti-
tutional conduct, including the completion of an agreed upon treatment plan.
Id. § 5-204.2. The Department adopted the guidelines because an evaluation of
institutional release decisions could find no factors, other than the institution to
which a child was committed, to explain the differences in treatment of youths.
DAVID B. Cimi, DECISION MAKING IN JUVENILE CORRECTIONS INSTITUTIONS: RE-
SEARCH SUmmARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1, 35-37 (1976).
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and "risk of failure factors" that are "predictive to some degree of
future delinquent behavior."523 Similarly, juvenile courts in
Dodge-Fillmore-Olmsted ("DFO") Counties use dispositional
guidelines that base presumptive determinate sentences on the
severity of the present offense and the prior delinquency history,
including probation violations. 524  Minnesota's Sentencing
Guidelines for adult offenders, which are explicitly punitive and
expressly designed to achieve "just deserts," employ these same
factors. 525
Some of Minnesota's juvenile courts use informal sentencing
guidelines as well. In In re Welfare ofD.S.F., a juvenile received
a ninety-day sentence of incarceration for an assault.526 Re-
jecting a less restrictive disposition, the trial court confined the
juvenile because "a specific consequence was necessary to im-
press upon D.S.F. the seriousness of his behavior."527 The court
of appeals upheld the disposition as within the judges broad sen-
tencing discretion. 528 The dissent, however, characterized the
disposition as "a purely offense-based determinate sentence of
incarceration as a largely predetermined consequence for a seri-
ous assault."529 The D.S.F. dissent correctly perceived that de-
terminate sentencing strikes at the very heart of the traditional
juvenile court system and undermines the rationale for provid-
523. See JuVENnm RELEASE GUMELINES, supra note 522, at 3.
524. See Juvenile Dispositional Guidelines Project Comm., supra note 157,
at 1-11 (describing experiment using dispositional guidelines in the DFO com-
munity corrections system).
525. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES §§ 1A II.B.
526. 416 N.W.2d 772, 773 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
527. Id. at 774.
528. Id. at 775. InIn re Welfare of M.A-C., 455 N.W.2d 494 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990), the court of appeals reversed a trial court's modification of a first-time
drug-offender's sentence within a few days of his original disposition to impose
a more severe, out-of-home sentence. Id at 499. The trial court modified his
sentence in order to send a signal to the students in the school that possessing
and selling illicit drugs on school grounds would not be tolerated and would
lead to significant consequences. Id. at 496. Significantly, the court of appeals
noted that had the trial court imposed the out-of-home placement disposition
initially, it would not have been reversible as an abuse of discretion. Id. at 498.
529. D.S.F., 416 N.W.2d at 775 (Crippen, J., dissenting). The dissent as-
serts that D.S.F.'s sentence was based on "unpublished sentencing guidelines."
I& at 779. These guidelines to which Judge Crippen refers provide that "in
making dispositional recommendations, juvenile probation officers should be
guided by four primary considerations: 1) the need for public safety, 2) the need
for accountability, 3) the competencies and rehabilitative needs of the child, 4)
concern for the victim." Hennepin County Juvenile Probation Div., Guidelines
for Dispositional Recommendations 1-1 (1991) (on file with author).
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ing with juveniles fewer procedural safeguards than those af-
forded adult criminal defendants. 530
Moreover, Minnesota's courts endorse the principle of pro-
portionality in sentencing juveniles. In In re L.KW., the trial
judge sentenced a first-time misdemeanor shoplifter to a resi-
dential facility 150 miles from her family for ninety to one hun-
dred days.531 In reversing the trial judge's dispositional order,
the court of appeals interpreted the juvenile court sentencing
statute to require consideration of less restrictive alternatives
and proportionality of sanctions.
To measure what is necessary, a trial court must assess two factors,
the severity of the child's delinquency, and the severity of the proposed
remedy. When the severity of intervention is disproportionate to the
severity of the problem; the intervention is not necessary and cannot
lawfully occur. The court must take the least drastic necessary
step.5
3 2
In affirming the relationship between offense and consequence
as a principle of juvenile court sentencing, the L.KW. court ac-
knowledged that "Ir]eason does not permit a distinction between
punitive incarceration and a so-called 'placement' to 'teach you
discipline.'"533
Juvenile court judges decide what to do with a child, in part,
by reference to legal mandates. In Minnesota, the legislative
purpose clause, appellate court opinions, Department of Correc-
tions's juvenile release guidelines, and formal and informal sen-
tencing guidelines emphasize offense considerations. This
emphasis seeks to implement principles of accountability, pro-
portionality, and determinacy in juvenile sentences.
530. See D.S.F., 416 N.W.2d at 777 (Crippen, J., dissenting).
531. 372 N.W.2d 392, 394 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
532. Id. at 398. See generally Sarah J. Batzli, Case Note, Minnesota Articu-
lates Standards for Delinquency Disposition, 13 WM. MTcHELL L. REV. 247
(1987) (arguing that L.KO. exemplifies how judicial discretion may result in
disproportionate sentences for juveniles). But see D.S.F., 416 N.W.2d at 774
(holding that preference of allowing children to remain at home applies only to
children adjudicated dependent or neglected, not to children found to be
delinquent).
533. L.KW., 372 N.W.2d at 399. The court also emphasized the dispropor-
tionality between the sentence L.IW. received as ajuvenile and that which she
likely would have received as an adult. Id. at 398. In In re Welfare of M.R.S.,
the court of appeals reaffirmed its commitment to proportionality in juvenile
dispositions. 400 N.W.2d 147, 151-52 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (MThere is virtually
no relationship in the court's findings between the child's need for treatment
and the disposition rendered. Rather it appears that the child was merely be-
ing punished and that the punishment was disproportional in relation to her
crimes, which were very minor.").
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Analyses of how juvenile court judges actually sentence de-
linquents also indicate that offense factors are the primary de-
terminants of dispositions. Although evaluations of juvenile
court sentencing practices yield contradictory results, two gen-
eral findings emerge. 534 First, the present offense and prior rec-
ord account for most of the variance that can be explained in
sentences. 535 Practical bureaucratic considerations provide an
impetus to base sentences on the offense. Avoiding scandals and
unfavorable political and media attention constrain juvenile
court judges to impose more formal and restrictive sentences on
more serious delinquents. 53 6 Complex organizations that pur-
sue multiple goals develop bureaucratic strategies to simplify in-
dividualized assessments. The present offense and prior record
provide such a basis to rationalize decisions.537 Juvenile courts'
sentencing practices are often more similar to adult courts' in
their emphases on present offense and prior record than statu-
tory language might suggest.538
534. For methodological critiques of prior juvenile sentencing research that
attribute the inconsistent findings to different jurisdictions, different time peri-
ods, different methodological strategies, and differing theoretical perspectives,
see Jeffrey Fagan et al., Blind Justice? The Impact of Race on the Juvenile Jus-
tice Process, 33 CRMnE & DELINQ. 224, 229-30 (1987) (critiquing social class con-
siderations in sentencing), and Belinda R. McCarthy & Brent L. Smith, The
Conceptualisation of Discrimination in the Juvenile Justice Process: The Im-
pact of Administrative Factors and Screening Decisions on Juvenile Court Dis-
positions, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 41, 43-47 (1986) (reviewing prior explanations of
contradictory and ambiguous findings).
535. In multivariate studies, offense variables typically explain about 25%-
30% of the variance in sentencing. See, e.g., Stevens H. Clarke & Gary G. Koch,
Juvenile Court: Therapy or Crime Control, and do Lawyers Make a Difference?,
14 LAw & Soo'y REV. 263, 276-86 (1980) (analyzing factors that affect juvenile
court disposition); Allan Horowitz & Michael Wasserman, Some Misleading
Conceptions in Sentencing Research: An Example and a Reformulation in the
Juvenile Court, 18 CRIMINOLOGY 411, 416-21 (1980) (assessing the weight that
different factors receive in juvenile court decisions). See generally Feld, supra
note 9, at 879-89 (concluding that offense variables account for most of the vari-
ance in dispositions that can be explained); Fagan et al., supra note 534, at 229-
30 (1987) (critiquing social class considerations in sentencing); McCarthy &
Smith, supra note 534, at 43-47 (noting that record and offense severely become
less influencial as screening proceeds).
536. See, e.g., ROBERT M. EMERSON, JUDGING DELINQUENTS: CONTEXT AND
PROCESS IN JUVENILE COURT 86 (1969); cf. MA. BORTNER, INSIDE A JUVENILE
COURT: THE TARNISHED IDEAL OF INDIVIDUALIZED JUSTICE 63-92 (1982) (dis-
cussing external variables in juvenile judges' decision-making process).
537. See MATZA, supra note 5; Irene H. Marshall & Charles W. Thomas, Dis-
cretionary Decision-Making and the Juvenile Court, 34 Juv. & F w. CT. J. 47,
55-57 (1983) (offense factors provide a bureaucratic decisional rule).
538. A survey of juvenile sentencing practices in California reported that,
despite claims of individualization, juvenile dispositions appear to be based pri-
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The second consistent finding is that after controlling for
present offense and prior record, individualized discretion is
often synonymous with racial discrimination.53 9 Scholars report
that black youths are more likely to be detained than are white
youths, and that detained youths are more likely to receive se-
marily on the youth's present offense and prior record. The study concluded
that
[clomparisons of juvenile and adult sentencing practices suggest that
juvenile and criminal courts in California are much more alike than
statutory language would suggest, in the degree to which they focus on
aggravating circumstances of the charged offense and the defendant's
prior record in determining the degree of confinement that will be
imposed.
PETER W. GREENWOOD ET AL., YOUTH CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALiFoR-
NIA 51 (1983).
539. See generally MINORITIEs IN JUVENILE JUSTICE (Kimberly Kempf-Leo-
nard et al eds., forthcoming 1995); Carl E. Pope & William H. Feyerherm, Mi-
nority Status and Juvenile Justice Processing: An Assessment of the Research
Literature (Part I), 22 CraM. JusT. ABsTRACTs 327 (1990) [hereinafter Pope &
Feyerherm, Part)]; Carl E. Pope & William H. Feyerherm, Minority Status and
Juvenile Justice Processing: An Assessment of the Research Literature (Part II),
22 CmRM. JusT. ABSTRACTs 527 (1990); Edmund F. McGarrell, Trends in Racial
Disproportionality in Juvenile Court Processing: 1985-1989, 39 CRIME & DE.
LNQ. 29 (1993); Carl E. Pope, Racial Disparities in Juvenile Justice, OvER.
CROWDED TIMES, Dec. 1994, at 1, 5. The Race Bias Task Force made the same
finding. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
The United States Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, spurred evaluations of racial disparities in juvenile
justice administration in the states. See 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(16) (1988 & Supp.
V 1993) (requiring that state applying for juvenile justice formula grant must
review the overrepresentation of minority youth incarcerated in its juvenile jus-
tice system); H.R. REP. No. 756, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1992), reprinted in
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4229, 4234 (discussing 1988 amendment). Virtually every
state that has examined racial bias in juvenile courts confirms its presence at
pre-trial detention and sentencing. See, e.g., Bridges, supra note 156 (reporting
on Washington); KIMBERLY L. KEMPF ET AL., AN ANALYSIS OF APPARENT DisPARI-
TIES IN THE HANDLING OF BLACK YOUTH WITHIN MISSOURI'S JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM (1990); KMERLY L. KEMPF, THE ROLE OF RACE IN JUVENILE JUSTICE
PROCESSING IN PENNSYLVANIA (1992); Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier,
The Influence of Race in Juvenile Justice Processing, 25 J. REs. C IME & DR.
LINQ. 242 (1988) (analyzing the effect of race on processing of juveniles in a
southern state); KRSBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 507, at 122-34 (analyzing
causes of racial disproportionality in the California juvenile justice system).
See generally CARL E. POPE & WILLIAM FEYPRHERm, MINORITIES AND THE JUVE-
NILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (1992) (comprehensive assessment of empirical research
on racial disparities in juvenile courts). In response to the consistent research
findings, the National Council of Juvenile Family Court Judges recommended
policy changes to reduce pervasive racial disparities at arrest, detention, adju-
dication, and disposition. See National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges, Minority Youth in the Juvenile Justice System: A Judicial Response,
Juv. & FA. CT. J. No. 3A, 1990.
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vere sentences. 540 Although initial screening decisions may not
be overtly discriminatory, racial disparities amplify as minority
youths proceed through the system.541 Studies report that race,
as well as legal factors, influence sequential processing deci-
sions, with black youths at a disadvantage relative to white
youths as they move through the system.542 Accounting for the
prevalence of and reducing racial disparities in juvenile court
case-processing and sentencing are emerging as a primary juve-
nile justice policy objective.543
In pursuit of its mandate to examine the feasibility of dispo-
sitional guidelines for juvenile courts, the Task Force collected
data and initiated several studies of Minnesota juvenile court
sentencing practices. The Task Force conducted a survey of
Minnesota probation officers. It found that the most important
factors influencing probation officers' dispositional recommenda-
tions were the seriousness of a youth's offense and the youth's
criminal history.5 "
Research available to the Task Force conducted by the Ra-
cial Bias Task Force reported that the seriousness of the present
offense, prior record, pre-trial detention status, and a juvenile's
540. MA. Bortner & Wornie L. Reed, The Preeminence of Process: An Exam-
ple of Refocused Justice Research, 66 Soc. Sm. Q. 413, 420-21 (1985); Feld,
supra note 147, at 1269-74; Charles E. Frazier & John K. Cochran, Detention of
Juveniles: Its Effects on Subsequent Juvenile Court Processing Decisions, 17
YoUTH & Soc'y 286, 299 (1986).
541. Pope & Feyerherm, Part I, supra note 539, at 330; see also Barry Kris-
berg et al., The Incarceration of Minority Youth, 33 CRudE & DELINQ. 173, 194(1987) ("Postarrest decisions are very important in understanding differential
incarceration rates.").
542. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 539, at 251, 258. One study stated:
The probability of an initial referral resulting in movement through
the system to a disposition of incarceration/transfer is nearly twice as
great for blacks (10.2%) as for whites (5.4%).... Blacks are more likely
to be recommended for formal processing, referred to court, adjudi-
cated delinquent, and given harsher dispositions than comparable
white offenders.
Id. This research emphasizes the importance of analyzing juvenile justice deci-
sion-making as a multi-stage process, rather than focusing solely on the final
dispositional decision. See Bortner & Reed, supra note 540, at 421 (pointing out
the "indivisibility of focusing exclusively on one juncture of a complex decision-
making process, especially final disposition").
543. See supra note 539.
544. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 63. In a survey of juvenile
probation officers, 53% ranked criminal history including the current offense
first, and an additional 28% ranked offense variable second or third. Memoran-
dum from Janet Marshall to Justice Sandra Gardebring, Probation Officer Sur-
vey Results (Oct. 12, 1993) (on file with author). Of those variables probation
officers considered most important, no other factor besides criminal offense gar-
nered more than 10%. Id.
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race most significantly influenced juvenile court sentences. 545
The Race Bias Task Force also reported substantial geographic
disparities in sentencing that compounded racial disparities. 546
Although empirical evaluations indicate that the seriousness of
the offense, the length of the prior record, and pre-trial deten-
tion status most strongly influence sentencing decisions, the Ju-
venile Justice Task Force found that those variables could
account for little of the variance in dispositions. Thus, according
to the Juvenile Justice Task Force, "the design of a dispositional
order remains individualized to the specific offender."547
Minnesota adopted its Sentencing Guidelines for adult
criminal defendants because it could not justify idiosyncratic ju-
dicial sentencing practices, inequality among similarly situated
offenders, racial disparities, and geographic variations under a
system of statewide criminal laws.5 48 Although identical dispar-
ities exist in the sentencing ofjuveniles, the Task Force was un-
willing to recommend a similar solution. To the contrary, the
Task Force recommended that "[sltatewide juvenile delinquency
545. See supra notes 145-149 and accompanying text.
546. RACIAL BIAS, FiNAL REPORT, supra note 145, at app. D 17-19. The Race
Bias Task Force's findings of geographic and racial disparities in sentencing
paralleled the Minnesota Gender Bias Task Force's earlier findings of gender
and geographic differences in pre-trial detention and home removal decisions
for female juvenile offenders. See Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force for
Gender Fairness in the Courts: Final Report, 15 WM. MrrcHELL L. REv. 825,
907-13 (1989). The Gender Bias Task Force reported gender-based differences
in detention rates and dispositions for male and female juveniles and that those
disparities were especially significant for girls charged with non-criminal status
offenses. Id. at 910-11. Unfortunately, the Task Force recommended only im-
proved data collection to further study the disparities. Id. at 911-12.
547. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 63. The findings of the
Gender Bias Task Force, the Race Bias Task Force, and the Juvenile Justice
Task Force corroborated my own analyses of the salience of offense variables in
sentencing juveniles on the one hand, and persistent patterns of gender, racial,
and geographic disparity on the other. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 147, at 1319,
1344-45; Feld, supra note 67, at 187-94.
548. The statement of purpose for the Guidelines reads:
The purpose of the sentencing guidelines is to establish rational and
consistent sentencing standards which reduce sentencing disparity and
ensure that sanctions following conviction of a felony are proportional
to the severity of the offense of conviction and the extent of the of-
fender's criminal history. Equity in sentencing requires (a) that con-
victed felons similar with respect to relevant sentencing criteria ought to
receive similar sanctions ....
MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § I (emphasis added); see also James K. Ap-
pleby, Legislative History, 5 HAmLwE L. REV. 301, 305-06 (1982) (describing the
disagreement between Minnesota House and Senate members over amount of
and place for discretion in the sentencing process).
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sentencing guidelines should not be established in the State of
Minnesota."549
In rejecting statewide dispositional guidelines, the Task
Force and the legislature failed to follow the logic of their own
policies for sentencing serious young offenders. The fundamen-
tal problem with certification was the subjective, individualized,
and unequal exercise of judicial discretion. The Task Force and
the legislature used the framework of the adult Sentencing
Guidelines to structure presumptive certification and EJJ
designation, used present offense and prior record as the pri-
mary criteria to determine "public safety," and rank-ordered
these criteria.550 In short, they created a form of presumptive
sentencing guidelines with objectively structured discretion to
govern certification.
Although I urged the Task Force to recommend a Juvenile
Sentencing Guidelines Commission to develop dispositional
guidelines and to monitor judicial compliance, 55 1 the Task Force
resisted for several reasons. Many Task Force members were
judges, probation officers, or corrections administrators, and im-
posing guidelines restricts their own exercise of "sound discre-
tion." Because of Minnesota's historical experience with adult
sentencing guidelines, the term "guidelines" carries negative
connotations that many Task Force members were reluctant to
endorse. Moreover, most Task Force members sincerely sub-
scribe to the "rehabilitative" mission of the juvenile court.552
549. TASK FORCE, FnAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 65. "The Task Force is
recommending that Minnesota's juvenile justice system retain the concept of
individualized dispositions. However, there is a balancing need for consistency
and significant support was expressed for a basic level of community standards
relative to juvenile offenders." Id. at 64.
550. See supra notes 279-281 and accompanying text.
551. See, e.g., Memorandum from Barry Feld to Sentencing Guidelines Sub-
committee 1-2 (July 20, 1993) (on file with author) (stating that individualized
sentencing discretion cannot be justified by evaluations of treatment effective-
ness, especially in light of demonstrated racial and geographic disparities in
sentencing otherwise similarly situated offenders).
552. For example, James Hayes, Director of Juvenile Probation, Ramsey
County Community Corrections, wrote several reflective memoranda to Task
Force members articulating the traditional, rehabilitative mission of the juve-
nile court. See, e.g., Memorandum from James H. Hayes to the Juvenile Justice
Task Force, Minority Recommendation: Jury Trials (Aug. 3, 1993) (on file with
author) (stating that juveniles are different from adults; dispositions must be
individualized to respond to their treatment needs; overall, sentencing of
juveniles is basically fair; and disparities result from wider social conditions
that sentencing guidelines cannot remedy).
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Minnesota's Sentencing Guidelines only apply to adults sen-
tenced for felony offenses and presume commitment to prison for
less than a quarter of those offenders. 553 Thus, criminal sen-
tencing of all adult misdemeanants and most felons remains dis-
cretionary and local. Similarly, prosecutors charge the vast
majority of juveniles are charged with misdemeanors, and they
receive local, non-custodial dispositions such as community ser-
vice, fines, restitution, or probation supervision.554 Minnesota
judges removed about seventeen percent of juveniles from their
homes, and placed many of these offenders in group homes or
local treatment facilities rather than committed to the state De-
partment of Corrections-the juvenile analogue of a commit-
ment to prison.555 The Task Force thus concluded that
"Minnesota's juvenile justice system is primarily county-based,
giving us considerable variation that reflects local community
standards, resources, and priorities."556
Rather than mandate a system of statewide juvenile sen-
tencing guidelines, the Task Force recommended that "the
judges of each judicial district, in consultation with county attor-
neys, public defenders, local corrections personnel, and the pub-
lic, reduce to writing and publish, the criteria used by the judges
in determining juvenile delinquency dispositions."557 The legis-
lature enacted the Task Force's recommendation that each judi-
cial district develop and promulgate "delinquency disposition
principles."558
553. See Frase, supra note 289, at 332.
554. TASK FORCE, FiNAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 63 (presenting a survey of
dispositions).
555. Id. (in only 17% of the 15,500 studied cases was the juvenile removed
from the home).
556. Id. at 64. Indeed, many urban-rural geographic disparities in sentenc-
ing juveniles likely reflect differences in the resources and placements avail-
able, a criminological variation of Partinson's Law that "bodies expand to fill
the bed-space allotted." Feld, supra note 67, at 197; see also OFFICE OF THE
LEGISLATIvE AUDITOR, supra note 371, at 48-50 (stating that state-county finan-
cial reimbursement policies, rather than the seriousness of youths' offenses,
tend to determine institutional commitment rates).
557. TASK FORCE, FnAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 65-66.
558. By January 1, 1996, the chief judge in each judicial district shall
publish the written criteria used by judges in the district in determin-
ing juvenile delinquency dispositions. The judges of the district shall
develop the written criteria in consultation with local county attorneys,
public defenders, local corrections personnel, victim advocates, and the
public. Each chief judge shall submit a copy of the written criteria to
the head of the conference of chief judges by September 1, 1995, who
shall submit copies of the criteria to the chairs of the senate crime pre-
vention committee and the house judiciary committee by November 1,
1995.
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Development of a separate dispositional framework within
each judicial district allows for regional variation and flexibility
in sentencing that reflects local options. Requiring the involve-
ment of various participants in the sentencing process also pro-
vides some balance in the formulating criteria. Requiring
judges to reduce to writing and publish the criteria used to sen-
tence juveniles better enables appellate courts to review
sentences, assess departures from formal criteria, and evaluate
the grounds for such deviations.
Juveniles have a right to appeal from "a final order of the
juvenile court affecting a substantial right," which includes ap-
peals from dispositional orders.559 The 1994 Juvenile Crime Act
created a juvenile appellate division within the Office of State
Public Defender to implement this right to appeal.560 Juveniles
rarely appeal their cases, both because many lack counsel at
trial who can make a record, and because even fewer have access
to appellate counsel to perfect an appeal. 561 The only available
empirical analysis of juvenile appellate practices attributed the
differences between juvenile and criminal appeals to the persis-
tence of a parens patriae rehabilitative culture among lawyers in
public defender offices. 562 The study questioned whether
juveniles could practically vindicate their theoretical right to
challenge trial court decisions when there persists among juve-
nile court practitioners "a generally shared set of values, a juve-
nile court subculture, which, in the tradition of parens patriae,
effectively nullifies the autonomy of juveniles and their parents
to decide whether or not to challenge the legality of their adjudi-
cation or commitment."563
The new statutory requirement that each judicial district
promulgate "delinquency disposition principles," coupled with
the creation of an appellate division in the office of the state pub-
1994 Minn. Laws 576, § 59 (emphasis added).
559. MINN. STAT. § 260.291(1)(a). Juvenile court adjudications of delin-
quency and dispositions may be appealed to the court of appeals as a matter of
right. MINN. R. Juv. P. 31.03(1)(A)(3), in MINNESOTA RuLEs, supra note 167.
560. See MINN. STAT. § 611.25(1).
561. See generally Donald J. Harris, Due Process v. Helping Kids in Trouble:
Implementing the Right to Appeal from Adjudications of Delinquency in Penn-
sylvania, 98 Dicm L. REv. 209 (1993) (analyzing impediments to juveniles' exer-
cise of appellate rights).
562. Id. at 223. These lawyers regarded "appeals as an obstacle to getting
the child back on track .... [Miany defenders view the attorney's role as a
combination of advocate and guardian, with a goal of salvaging the children."
Id. at 223. Harris also attributes attorneys' reluctance to advise juveniles of
their appellate rights to their clients' immaturity. Id.
563. Id. at 228.
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lic defender, has the potential to subject juvenile courts to the
accountability of appellate review. Perhaps over time a common
law of juvenile sentencing principles will emerge from appeals of
juvenile sentences. Whether this occurs will depend on the
specificity of the criteria included in the "delinquency disposi-
tional principles." If those "principles" consist of little more than
an undifferentiated "list of factors" such as those that purported
to guide waiver decisions in the past,564 discretion will remain
effectively unrestricted and practically unreviewable. It will
also depend on the autonomy of state public defenders and their
commitment to vigorously appeal actions that may disrupt the
stability of the "courtroom work group."565
a. Restorative Justice
The new legislation includes several other provisions affect-
ing the disposition of young offenders. The Task Force had met
with several proponents of "restorative justice," or the "balanced
approach" to juvenile disposition, which attempts to balance the
community's interests in public safety by holding offenders ac-
countable and enhancing their competency through individual-
ized intervention. 566 Although the basic factors included in a
"balanced" disposition are certainly plausible, there has been
564. See supra notes 182-188 and accompanying text (criticizing lists of fac-
tors used in waiver decisions).
565. JAMEs EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZA-
TIONAL ALYsis OF CRImuNAL CouRTs 294 (1977) (analyzing processing and dis-
position of adult felony cases using the model of a "courtroom work-group").
566. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 20. See generally DEmNIs
MALONEY ET AL., JUVENILE PROBATION: THE BALANCED APPROACH 5 (1988) (not-
ing that "a spectrum of basic values-community protection, accountability,
competency development, and individualized assessment-represent he core el-
ements"). The theme of community protection emphasizes public safety, which
includes both protection of citizens from crime and protection of children from
abuse and neglect. Id. at 6. The theme of accountability makes offenders
"aware of and responsible for the loss, damage, or injury perpetrated upon the
victim," and makes service providing agencies responsible for the efficacy of
their intervention. Id. Competency development refers to individualized
"Itreatment" goals and the acquisition of basic educational, vocational, and cop-
ing skills. Id. at 6-7. Balancing to achieve all three goals simultaneously re-
quired an individualized assessment. Id. at 7, 10-11.
In 1991, the Oregon Legislature enacted elements of the "balanced ap-
proach," and provided funding to encourage counties to develop local juvenile
case management programs. OR. REv. STAT. § 420.860 (Supp. 1994). To apply
for a juvenile justice development grant, a county must provide a detailed plan
that demonstrates juvenile accountability, community protection, and juvenile
skills development. Id. § 420.870. Oregon courts have endorsed the "balanced
approach." See State v. Reynolds, 857 P.2d 842, 849 (Or. 1993) (stating that the
juvenile code is focused on the best interests and welfare of the child).
1094 [Vol. 79:965
JUVENILE JUSTICE
virtually no evaluation of the effectiveness of the strategy. In
the quest for crime control panaceas or quick-fixes, superficially
plausible strategies, for example "scared straight and boot-
camps, 56 7 tend to garner proponents until subsequent evalua-
tion research demonstrates their ineffectiveness. The "balanced
approach" may be the latest fad to join this list, as the Task
Force recommended,568 and the legislature funded, several local
demonstration programs that "implement[ ] restorative justice
principles."569
b. Pretrial Diversion
Although Progressive reformers created the juvenile court
to shift youths from criminal courts, more recent reforms at-
tempt to divert eligible youths away from juvenile court.570 Di-
version is promoted as a strategy to dispose of cases informally,
to refer youths quickly to appropriate services and reintegrate
them into the community, and to avoid the stigma and negative
labelling of formal court intervention.571 The Progressive ideol-
ogy of early identification and treatment, however, is inherently
expansive and lends itself easily to over-reaching. One scholar
contends that diversion programs do not restrict themselves to
youths who would otherwise enter the juvenile justice system,
but also encompass "youngsters who otherwise would have been
counseled and released without further action."5 72 Moreover, di-
version programs allow police, prosecutors, or juvenile court per-
567. See JAMES 0. F NCKENAUER, SCARED STRAIGHT! AND THE PANACEA PHE-
NOMENA (1982); U.S. GENERAL AccoUTrnsG OFFICE, PRISON BoOT CAMPS:
SHORT-TERM PRISON COSTS REDUCED, BUT LONG-TERM IMPACT UNCERTAIN
(1993) (concluding that boot camp graduates have only marginally lower recidi-
vism than similar inmates in traditional prisons and differences diminish over
time); Merry Morash & Lila Rucker, A Critical Look at the Idea of Boot Camp as
a Correctional Reform, 36 CRIME & DELINQ. 204, 218 (1990) (stating that boot-
camps are unlikely to provide panacea for rehabilitation or reduce prison
overcrowding).
568. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 66.
569. 1994 Minn. Laws 576, § 67, subd. 4.
570. H. TED RUiN, JUVENILE JUSTICE: POLICY, PRACTICE, AND LAW 176-77
(2d ed. 1985); see also PREsIDENT's COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUvENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH
CRIME 2 (1967) (recommending that minor offenders and status offenders be
diverted and handled informally); Malcolm W. Klein, Deinstitutionalization and
Diversion of Juvenile Offenders: A Litany of Impediments, in 1 CRIME AND JUS-
TICE: AN ANNUAL REVrEW OF RESEARCH 145, 146 (Norval Morris & Michael
Tonry eds., 1979) (diversion is "legislatively sanctified, theoretically justified,
and socially promoted").
571. RunIN, supra note 570, at 178.
572. Id. at 179.
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sonnel to retain social control over juvenile offenders without
the benefit of establishing jurisdiction.573 Thus, although diver-
sion is theoretically intended to reduce the court's client popula-
tion, it may have the opposite effect of "widening the net of social
control." As the number of juveniles referred to court remains
relatively constant, juveniles who were previously ignored or re-
leased are now subject to other forms of intervention.574 More-
over, diversion provides a rationale to shift discretion from the
juvenile court itself, where it is subject to some procedural for-
mality under Gault, to the periphery, where police, prosecutors,
or intake "gate-keepers" operate on an informal pre-Gault basis
with little accountability.5 75
Although the Task Force did not extensively discuss the pol-
icy of diversion, it recommended that counties implement juve-
nile diversion programs if they have not yet done so. 57 6 The new
statute mandates that "every county attorney shall establish a
pretrial diversion program for offenders,"577 formally strength-
ening prosecutors' "gate-keeping" role in juvenile court.5 78
573. Id. at 184.
574. Id. at 184-85; see also Scott H. Decker, A Systematic Analysis of Diver-
sion: Net Widening and Beyond, 13 J. CIM. JUST. 206, 214 (1985) (arguing that
after controlling for other factors, the number of youths referred to juvenile
court actually increased following the introduction of a court diversion pro-
gram); Kenneth Polk, Juvenile Diversion: A Look at the Record, 30 CRMIx &
DELINQ. 648, 653 (1984) ("[W1f being referred to the diversion program was
backed by a threat of referral to court, then the allegedly nonpunitive agency in
reality becomes an extension of the justice system and the diversion is a legal
fiction.").
575. Professor John Sutton analyzed the history of regulating "stubborn
children," and concluded that diversion "sanctified and encouraged a strategy
for circumventing due process, assured that programs would stay in the discre-
tionary hands of local officials, and encouraged the privatization of long-term
social control." JOHN SUTTON, STUBBORN CHILDREN: CONTROLLING DELIN-
QUENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1640-1981, at 215 (1988).
576. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 65.
577. MINN. STAT. § 388.24(2).
578. See generally John H. Laub & Bruce K. Mac Murray, Increasing the
Prosecutor's Role in Juvenile Court: Expectations and Realities, 12 JuST. Sys. J.
196 (1987) (reporting on research investigating the effect of increased
prosecutorial presence in Massachusetts juvenile courts); H. Ted Rubin, The
Emerging Prosecutor Dominance of the Juvenile Court Intake Process, 26 CRIME
& DELINQ. 29 (1980) (discussing prosecutorial control at intake as a means to
screen cases and determine which are most appropriate to refer to court); Inger
J. Sagatun & Leonard P. Edwards, The Role of the Distrit Attorney in Juvenile
Court: Is the Juvenile Court Becoming Just Like Adult Court?, Juv. & FAm. CT.
J., May 1979, at 17 (analyzing a survey answered by California District Attor-
ney offices after that state strengthened its juvenile code).
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Diversion seeks to avoid formal court referral, reduce juve-
nile court costs and caseloads, and minimize offender recidi-
vism. 5 79 Prosecutors may divert any youth who has not been
diverted previously, and who is or could be charged with any
crime other than an offense against the person.580 Because
youths who have been previously diverted are ineligible for addi-
tional diversion, the statute also mandates the creation of a data
information system to monitor program participation. 58 ' Diver-
sion is not "voluntary" because the prosecutor retains authority
to file a delinquency petition against a youth who does not sat-
isfy conditions of program participation. 5 2 Because filing a pe-
tition is not a prerequisite for referral to a diversion program,
youths do not have access to court appointed counsel. There is
no practical way to assess the legal justification for interven-
tion.583 Like other states' efforts to formalize diversion,58 4 the
new statute institutionalizes low visibility, coercive intervention
without effective oversight, a type of de facto "informal guilty
plea" recently condemned by the Minnesota Court of Appeals.58 5
F. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN JUVENILE COURT
There is an intimate connection between substance and pro-
cedure in juvenile courts. Progressive reformers used informal
procedures to make discretionary substantive decisions in the
child's "best interests." The Supreme Court in Gault insisted on
579. Mni. STAT. § 388.24(2).
580. Id. § 388.24(1)(1)(i), (iii). Diversion programs provide screening serv-
ices to the court, monitor juveniles' compliance with program goals, perform
chemical dependency assessment and make referrals for treatment where ap-
propriate, provide counseling services, administer payment of restitution to vic-
tims, identify community resources, provide educational services, and provide
the juvenile court, prosecutors, and defense attorneys with information about
the diverted offender's performance. Id. § 388.24(3).
581. Id. § 388.24(4) (mandating a report to the Minnesota Bureau of Crimi-
nal Apprehension identifying information about the program participant, in-
cluding date of entry and date of successful completion or failure in the
program). Id. The information becomes part of a youth's "record," and is "en-
tered into and maintained in the criminal history file of the Minnesota criminal
justice information system." Id.
582. Id. § 388.24(1)(2).
583. The statute provides that a child is an offender if "the child is peti-
tioned for, orprobable cause exists to petition or take the child into custody for, a
felony, gross misdemeanor, or misdemeanor offense." Id. § 388.24(l)(1)(i) (em-
phasis added).
584. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 13.40.070, .080 (1993) (providing for di-
version agreement administered by juvenile court intake).
585. In re D.S.S., 506 N.W.2d 650 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); see also infra note
709 (discussing D.S.S.).
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greater procedural safeguards because of the continuing gap be-
tween the rhetoric and reality of rehabilitation. 58 6 Since Gault,
the increased emphasis on procedural formality corresponds
with a shift in juvenile justice theory and practice away from
individualized treatment to punishment based on the offense
committed.58 7 When the Supreme Court decided McKeiver in
1970, states did not use either determinate or mandatory mini-
mum statutes to regulate juvenile court judges' sentencing deci-
sions. Since then, about one-third of the states have adopted
determinate sentencing guidelines, "designated felony" and seri-
ous offender sentencing legislation, mandatory minimum stat-
utes, and correctional administrative or parole release
guidelines.588 Legislative amendments to juvenile courts' pur-
pose clauses, and appellate court decisions endorsing punish-
ment fruther create juvenile courts' rehabilitative premise.58 9
The explicit emergence of punishment as a primary element
of sentencing policy in many states, including Minnesota,590 re-
pudiates juvenile courts' original postulates that children should
be treated differently than adults, that judges act in the child's
"best interest," and that each case is unique and cannot be cir-
cumscribed by fixed-terms based on the offense committed.591
The increased substantive emphasis on punishment in juvenile
courts contradicts McKeiver's assumptions that juveniles re-
quire fewer procedural safeguards than do adult criminal
defendants, and requires a re-assessment of the quality of proce-
dural justice in juvenile courts.
Although Gault provided the impetus for the formal proce-
dural convergence of juvenile and criminal courts, 592 a substan-
586. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text (explaining Gault
decision).
587. See, e.g., Martin R. Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice: Some Observa-
tions on a Recent Trend, 10 IN'L J.L. & PsycHATRY 129, 133 (1987) (discussing
the "emergence of the punitive sanction and its corresponding emphasis on per-
sonal responsibility"); Martin R. Gardner, The Right of Juvenile Offenders to be
Punished: Some Implications of Treating Kids as Persons, 68 NEB. L. REv. 182,
198-208 (1989) (presenting a theory for a constitutional right to be punished).
See generally Feld, supra note 9 (analyzing the change from consideration of
youth's best interest to an emphasis on the "principle of the offense").
588. Feld, supra note 9, 846 tbl. 1.
589. Walkover, supra note 156, at 547-54; see supra notes 458-467 and ac-
companying text (analyzing the purpose of juvenile sanctions).
590. Feld, supra note 9, at 846 tbl. 1.
591. ROBERT COATES ET AL., INsTITuIoNAL CoMmrTMENT AND RELEASE DECI-
SION-MAKING FOR JuvENILE DELINQUENTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF DETERMINATE
AND INDETERMINATE APPROACHES, A CRoss-STATE ANALYSIS 11 (1985).
592. Feld, supra note 1, at 198.
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tial gulf remains between theory and practice, between law on
the books and law in action. In theory, Gault guaranteed delin-
quents the right to formal hearings and the assistance of coun-
sel. In practice, however, many juveniles do not receive even the
limited procedural justice that Gault envisioned. Nearly three
decades ago, the Supreme Court observed that "juvenile justice"
is an oxymoron: "the child receives the worst of both worlds: he
gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous
care and regenerative treatment postulated for children."593
Although juvenile courts increasingly converge with criminal
courts, most states do not provide youths with either procedural
safeguards equivalent to those of adult criminal defendants, or
with special procedures that more adequately protect them from
their own immaturity. Instead, states place juveniles on an
equal footing with adult criminal defendants when formal equal-
ity acts to their detriment, and employ less effective juvenile
court procedures when they provide the state with an advan-
tage.594 Allowing juveniles to "waive" their right to counsel
under the adult standard of "knowing and intelligent" is an ex-
ample of formal equality producing practical inequality, while
denying them the right to a jury trial is an example of the less
adequate juvenile court procedures that confer an advantage to
the state. Young people know what "real trials are like from
viewing courtroom dramas or highly publicized criminal trials.
The contrast between the idealized adult proceedings in which
defense attorneys aggressively represent their clients before a
jury, and the reality of a juvenile bench trial often conducted
without the effective assistance of counsel undermines the legiti-
macy of the justice process. 595
1. The Right to a Jury Trial
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court limited
the extension of procedural rights of juveniles by denying a con-
stitutional right to jury trials in state delinquency proceed-
ings.596 The Court held that the due process standard of
"fundamental fairness" in juvenile proceedings developed in
Gault and Winship, emphasized "accurate fact-finding," an ob-
593. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
594. Feld, supra note 1, at 198-99. See generally McCarthy, supra note 15
(examining pre-adjudicatory constitutional rights of juveniles); Rosenberg,
supra note 15 (analyzing the juvenile court's conflicting feelings about end ac-
tions toward young people).
595. See Ainsworth, supra note 6, at 1119.
596. 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion).
1995] 1099
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
jective as readily attained by a judge as a jury.59 7 In suggesting
that due process in the juvenile context required nothing more
than accurate fact-finding, however, the Court significantly de-
parted from its prior analyses of the dual functions of juvenile
court procedures: to assure accurate fact-finding and to protect
against government oppression.5 98
By identifying accurate fact-finding as the sole underlying
rationale of the fundamental fairness doctrine, the Court ig-
nored its analysis in Gault, which held that the Fifth Amend-
ment's privilege against self-incrimination was necessary to
protect against government oppression, even though it might
compromise accurate fact-finding.5 99 Invoking the mythology of
the sympathetic, paternalistic juvenile court judge, McKeiver de-
nied that juveniles required protection against government op-
pression,600 and rejected the argument that the inbred, closed
nature of the juvenile court system could adversely affect accu-
rate fact-finding.601
The McKeiver Court feared that requiring jury trials would
disrupt the juvenile court's traditional adjudicative practices.602
The Court noted the potential adverse impact of jury trials on
the informality, flexibility, and confidentiality of juvenile court
proceedings.603 According to the court, requiring a jury trial
would both render juvenile courts virtually indistinguishable
from criminal courts and raise the more basic question of
whether there is any need for a separate juvenile court.604
597. Id. at 543.
598. See generally Feld, supra note 15.
599. See id. at 206-08 (discussing Gault's emphasis on procedural
safeguards).
600. 403 U.S. at 550.
601. According to the Court, concern about procedural safeguards such as
jury trials are necessary to assure accurate fact-finding and protection against
governmental oppression ignores the notion of benevolence and compassion as
the premise of the juvenile court system. Id. at 550-51.
602. Id. at 550.
603. Id.
604. Id. at 551 ("If the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process are to
be superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there is little need for its sepa-
rate existence. Perhaps that ultimate disillusionment will come one day, but
for the moment we are disinclined to give impetus to it."); see, e.g., In re Javier
A., 206 Cal. Rptr. 386, 430 (Ct. App. 1984) (denying petitioner a jury trial in a
juvenile proceeding, but urging the supreme court to reconsider prior decisions
in light of evidence that juvenile court proceedings have taken on many attrib-
utes of criminal trial proceedings). In JavierA the court noted that "fj]uvenile
proceedings now feature the same contests over admission of evidence as adult
proceedings since only proof admissible in a criminal trial can be used to sup-
port a finding the juvenile committed the criminal offense." Id. at 419.
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Although McKeiver Court found faults with the juvenile pro-
cess, it asserted that jury trials would not correct those deficien-
cies but would instead make the juvenile process unduly formal
and adversarial. 60 5 The Court did not consider whether its ear-
lier decision in Gault effectively foreclosed renewed concern with
flexibility and informality, what the possible advantages of in-
creased formality in juvenile proceedings might be,60 6 or why
formality at trial was incompatible with therapeutic disposi-
tions. Most importantly, McKeiver did not analyze the crucial
distinctions between treatment in juvenile courts and punish-
ment in criminal courts that justified differing procedural safe-
guards. 60 7 The Court reviewed no factual record of dispositional
practices or conditions of confinement when it asserted that ju-
venile court intervention was benevolent rather than puni-
tive.608 The Court simply noted that the ideal juvenile court
system is "an intimate, informal protective proceeding,"60 9 even
though courts seldom, if ever, realize that "ideal."610
The Supreme Court's decision in McKeiver to deny juveniles
a right to a jury trial emphasized functional parity between the
quality of juvenile and adult adjudications. 611 The assertion of
comparable federal accuracy despite fewer procedural rights,
however, is subject to question. Judges and juries apply Win-
ship's "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" standard differently:
Juries serve special protective fumctions in assuring the accuracy of
factual determinations, and studies show that juries are more likely to
acquit than are judges. Substantive criminal guilt is not just "factual
guilt" but a complex assessment of moral culpability. The power of
jury nullification provides a nexus between the legislature's original
criminalization decision and the community's felt sense of justice in
605. The McKeiver Court noted that providing for trial by jury in juvenile
court "would bring with it ... the traditional delay, the formality, and the
clamor of the adversary system and, possibly, the public trial." 403 U.S. at 550.
606. One of the Court's rationales for imposing procedural formality onjuve-
nile delinquency proceedings was that "[dlepartures from established principles
of due process have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in
arbitrariness." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1967).
607. See infra notes 615-618 and accompanying text.
608. Compare McKeiver with Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986). InAllen,
the Court denied petitioner the protections of the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination in a "sexually dangerous person" commitment pro-
ceeding. Id. at 367. Because the privilege is only available when the State pur-
ports to "punish," the Court based its ruling, in part, on petitioner's failure to
disprove the State's assertion that it provided treatment. Id. at 373-74; see
supra note 455 (discussing Allen).
609. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550.
610. Id. at 547-48.
611. Id. at 543-48.
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the application of laws to a particular case. These tendencies are at-
tributable to various factors, including differences in jury-judge evalu-
ations of evidence, jury sentiments about the "law" (jury equity), and
jury sympathy for the defendant [of which youthfulness garnered the
greatest support]. 612
In Sullivan v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court emphasized that
the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and
the right to have a jury apply it are "interrelated."6 13 Given the
same evidence, a judge in juvenile court is more likely to convict
a youth at trial than is a jury of detached citizens in a criminal
proceeding.6 14
612. Feld, supra note 1, at 245. See generally REED HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE
THE JURY 121-34 (1983) (studying the characteristics of juror behavior); HARRY
KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERIcAN JURY 182-90 (1966) (analyzing sources
of differences between judge and jury "reasonable doubt").
613. 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081 (1993). The Court further stated that "lilt would
not satisfy the Sixth Amendment to have a jury determine that the defendant is
probably guilty, and then leave it up to the judge to determine (as Winship
requires) whether he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. The Court held
that a constitutionally defective reasonable-doubt jury instruction could not be
a harmless error. Id. at 2079.
614. See, e.g., GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 538, at 30-31 (comparing the
attrition rates of similar cases in juvenile and adult courts in California and
concluding that "it is easier to win a conviction in the juvenile court than in thecriminal court, with comparable types of cases").
I have discussed elsewhere Professor Janet Ainsworth's arguments regard-
ing the reasons juvenile court judges convict more readily than do juries:
Fact-finding by judges and juries is intrinsically different, since the for-
mer try hundreds of cases every year while the latter hear only one or
two. As a result of hearing many cases routinely, judges may become
less meticulous in considering evidence, may evaluate facts more casu-
ally, and may apply less stringently the concepts of reasonable doubt
and presumption of innocence than jurors. The personal characteris-
tics of judges differ from those of the members of a jury pool and it is
more difficult for a defendant to determine how those personal charac-
teristics will affect the decision in a case. Through voir dire, litigants
may examine jurors about their attitudes, beliefs, and experiences as
they may bear upon the way they will decide the case; there is no com-
parable opportunity to explore a judge's background to determine the
presence ofjudicial biases. In addition to the novelty of deciding cases,
juries and judges evaluate testimony differently. Juvenile court judges
hear testimony from the same police and probation officers on a recur-
ring basis and develop a settled opinion about their credibility. Simi-
larly, as a result of hearing earlier charges against a juvenile, or
presiding over a detention hearing or pre-trial motion to suppress evi-
dence, a judge already may have a pre-determined view of a youth's
credibility and character, or the merits of the case. Fact-finding by a
judge differs from that by a jury because an individual fact-finder does
not have to discuss either the law or the evidence with a group before
reaching a conclusion. Although a jury must be instructed explicitly
about the law to be applied to a case, the judge in a bench trial is not
required to articulate the law and it is more difficult to determine
whether the judge correctly understood and applied it.
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Moreover, the McKeiver decision simply ignored that proce-
dural safeguards function to prevent governmental oppres-
sion.615 In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court emphasized that
fundamental fairness in adult criminal proceedings requires
both factual accuracy and protection against governmental op-
pression.616 The Duncan Court identified the manifold benefits
of a jury trial: protections from a weak or biased judge, injection
of the community's values into the decision-making process, and
provision of visibility of and accountability for the workings of
the process.617 All of these considerations apply equally in juve-
nile proceedings.618
The increasing role of punishment in juvenile justice raises
a dilemma of constitutional dimensions. Very few states that
sentence juveniles for their offenses provide juveniles with jury
trials. 619 Several states that use offense-based sentencing
Feld, supra note 1, at 220-21 (citations to Ainsworth, supra note 6, inter alia,
omitted).
615. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
616. 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968).
617. Id. The Court stated:
A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to pre-
vent oppression by the Government. Those who wrote our constitu-
tions knew from history and experience that it was necessary to protect
against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and
against judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority.... Pro-
viding an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave
him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous pros-
ecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. If the de-
fendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more
tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he
was to have it. Beyond this, the jury trials provisions ... reflect a
fundamental decision about the exercise of official power-a reluctance
to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to onejudge or to a group of judges. Fear of unchecked power ... found ex-
pression in the criminal law in this insistence upon community partici-
pation in the determination of guilt or innocence.
Id. at 155-56.
618. See, e.g., R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d 27, 58 (Alaska 1971) (holding that
the Alaska constitution guarantees children the right to a public trial); In re
Javier A., 206 Cal. Rptr. 386, 426 (Ct. App. 1984) ("These benefits appear to
have as much meaning for juvenile delinquency proceedings as for adult crimi-
nal court.").
619. Currently, about a dozen states provide for jury trials in juvenile court:
ALAsKA STAT. § 47.10.070 (1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-106(1)(a) (1986 &
Supp. 1994); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 119, § 55A (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); MICH.
Comp. LAws ANN. § 712A.17 (West 1993); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-521 (1993);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-16A (Michie 1988); OzA- STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1110
(West 1987); TEx FAm. CODE ANN. § 54.03(c) (West 1986); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-6
(1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.243(g) (West 1987); Wyo. STAT. § 14-6-224(a)
(1994).
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schemes have rejected requests for jury trials.620 For juvenile
justice operatives, the jury trial has symbolic implications out of
proportion with its practical impact.6 21 Providing a jury trial ac-
knowledges that despite our best intentions, juvenile justice
may be punitive, and that even benevolently motivated govern-
mental coercion requires procedural limitations. Benevolence,
therapy, and rehabilitation are expansive concepts that widen
the net of social control, because no one can be critical of "doing
good."6 22 By contrast, punishment acknowledges that coercion
is harmful and requires procedural limitations and
proportionality. 62 3
The Task Force unanimously agreed that juveniles tried as
EJJs must have a right to a jury trial.6 24 EJJs receive stayed
adult sentences. If they violate the conditions of their probation-
ary juvenile dispositions, the right to a jury is a constitutional
pre-requisite to executing adult criminal sentences and incarcer-
ating them in jail or prison.62 5 Extending juvenile court juris-
diction for additional years, subjecting youths to secure
placements, and using EJJ convictions to enhance subsequent
criminal sentences provide additional rationales for full proce-
dural parity with criminal adult trials.6 26
620. See, e.g., In re Daedler, 228 P. 467, 472 (Cal. 1924) (en banc); State v.
J.K., 383 A.2d 283, 289 (Del. 1977) (reasoning that offense-based mandatory
sentence is an aspect of the rehabilitative efforts); State v. Schaaf, 743 P.2d 240,
250 (Wash. 1987) (focusing on adverse administrative impact of jury trials on
juvenile justice system).
621. Although opponents of jury trials in juvenile court argue that they sub-
stantially disrupt juvenile proceedings, there is apparently no basis for such an
objection, as evidenced both by the dozen jurisdictions that provide juveniles
with the right to a jury and empirical studies of their use. See infra notes 642-
643 and accompanying text.
622. See ALLEN, supra note 5, at 25,36-38 (arguing that professionalism and
devotion to science provide immunity from the usual forms of restraint); Fred
Cohen, Juvenile Offenders: Proportionality vs. Treatment, CmLDREN's RTs.
REP., (Juvenile Research Project, ACLU, New York, N.Y.), May 1978, at 2, 5
(arguing that the rehabilitative ideal is a "noble lie").
623. See, e.g., Sanford J. Fox, The Reform of Juvenile Justice: The Child's
Right to Punishment, Juv. JUST., Aug. 1974, at 2, 4 (noting that the juvenile
justice system requires a compromise between punishment and treatment); Co-
hen, supra note 622, at 5.
624. TASK FORCE, FiNAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 43.
625. Id.; see supra notes 324-326, 344-348 and accompanying text.
626. The Task Force emphasized that
[slince Serious Youthful Offenders will receive special labeling, ex-
tended jurisdiction of the juvenile court, more severe sanctions, poten-
tial incarceration with adults, and the accumulation of a juvenile
record which can be used in later adult sentencing, the extension of a
right to a jury trial to Serious Youthful Offenders is critical. The juve-
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Although the Task Force agreed that EJJ prosecutions re-
quire a right to a jury, it disagreed about extending the right to
a jury trial to other delinquents charged with criminal con-
duct.627 The Task Force majority declined to recommend a right
to a jury in delinquency proceedings. 628 Most members believed
that juvenile courts remain significantly different from criminal
courts, and that their adjudications can be fair and accurate
without a jury.629 They were concerned that providing juries
might impose practical administrative burdens on juvenile
courts. 630 Some Task Force members denied juveniles the right
to a jury based on a political calculus about the impact of such a
recommendation on the legislature.63 1
A minority of the Task Force members initially endorsed
granting all juveniles the same right to a jury enjoyed by adult
criminal defendants. A substantial majority of the Task Force
originally approved granting the right to a jury trial for all six-
teen- and seventeen-year-old juveniles charged with felony of-
fenses. 632 The Task Force, however, later reversed itself and the
nile court for a Serious Youthful Offender will not differ fundamentally
from an adult criminal court, and therefore the Task Force is clear that
Serious Youthful Offenders must be afforded full due process rights
and protections including the option of requesting a trial by jury.
TASK FORCE, FNAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 43.
627. Id, at 41. "The possibility of extending the right to a jury trial to all
juveniles in delinquency cases was discussed extensively by the Task Force."
Id.
628. Id. at 41. According to the Final Report:
[T]he Task Force was concerned about the potential administrative
burden of treating all juveniles like adult defendants. Concerns were
also raised that such a broad based granting of jury trial rights to all
juveniles may spur initiatives to abandon the juvenile justice system
altogether and thus jeopardize portions of the juvenile justice system
that are effective in handling the large majority of juvenile offenders.
Id.
629. See Memorandum from James H. Hayes, supra note 552 (expressing
the opinion of a minority who opposed the Task Force's initial position to recom-
mend a right to jury trials to all 16- and 17-year-old juveniles charged with
felony level offenses because jury is not needed for fairness, will significantly
increase the level of plea bargaining, and will impose administrative burdens).
At its retreat on October 16-17, 1993, a majority of the Task Force adopted the
"minority" position and denied to older juveniles charged with a felony the right
to a jury trial.
630. TASK FORCE, FiNAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 41.
631. Id. at 74.
632. Id. The Task Force stated:
That position was based on simple justice. The rationale was that tri-
als of juveniles 16 or older charged with felonies are already open to
the public, so there are no confidentiality problems. In addition, older
juveniles' felony proceedings typically may result in more serious con-
sequences which require greater procedural protections. Finally, these
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majority recommended that only EJJs have a right to a jury.633
Task Force members feared that equating juvenile and adult
criminal procedures would strengthen the position of "get tough"
legislators who wanted to exclude offenses from juvenile court
jurisdiction and who could argue that procedural equality with
adults should produce correspondingly longer sentences.
Because I have long advocated procedural justice for
juveniles, 634 the Task Force delegated to me the responsibility of
writing a Minority Report on behalf of those members who sup-
ported extending to juveniles a statutory right to a jury.635 In
my report, I contended that the realities of modern day juvenile
courts contradict the historical justifications for denying
juveniles the full panoply of criminal procedural protections. 63 6
Since McKeiver, both nationally and in Minnesota, juvenile jus-
tice theory and practice have shifted from therapeutic individu-
alized dispositions toward an emphasis on public safety, the
seriousness of a youth's offense, and social control.63 7 Conse-
quently, there is very little to distinguish sentencing policies for
youths charged with crimes from those for adults.
638
The Task Force majority denied that the contemporary ju-
venile court is little more than a scaled-down, second-class crim-
are also the cases in which juvenile convictions can result in criminal
history score points that later may be used to enhance adult sentences.
Id.
633. Id. As noted previously, supra notes 340-343 and accompanying text,
the legislature enacted the Task Force's recommendation.
634. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 15; Feld, supra note 147; Feld, supra note 1.
635. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 43-45, 70-74.
636. Id. at 70. I stated in my report:
Because young people brought to juvenile court are charged with
crimes and face the prospect of coercive state intervention, they should
receive the same criminal procedural safeguards as any other citizen,
including the right to a jury trial. There is no principled justification
for denying to young people the same procedural protections that other
citizens receive as a matter of constitutional right. The justifications to
deny juveniles this fundamental right are based on either an historical
vision of an informal, rehabilitative juvenile court that is inconsistent
with contemporary reality or political expediency that sacrifices the
rights of young offenders.
Id.
637. See generally Feld, supra note 9 (analyzing movement from treatment
to punishment models).
638. Earlier, I examined this pattern in Minnesota as evidenced by the
changes in the legislative statement of purpose, appellate court opinions, the
use of determinate sentencing guidelines by the Department of Corrections and
some juvenile courts, and empirical evaluations of juvenile court judges' sen-
tencing practices. Supra notes 458-549 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 79:9651106
JUVENILE JUSTICE
inal court for young people.63 9 It asserted that juvenile
dispositions are benign and therapeutic, and that therefore
youths require fewer procedural safeguards than adults: "The
current juvenile justice system is appropriate and effective for
the great majority of the children coming before it."640 Although
some witnesses at public hearings presented anecdotal evidence
or testimonials, no evaluation research demonstrates that Min-
nesota's juvenile courts consistently or systematically rehabili-
tate, lower recidivism rates, or provide any other long-term
benefit for young offenders, and a considerable body of research
contradicts such claims. In the absence of substantial evidence
that youths sentenced for crimes are rehabilitated, juveniles de-
serve the same protection from coercive intervention that is
available to adults. At a minimum, the burden of proof should
rest with proponents of the status quo to justify procedural dif-
ferences between juvenile and criminal courts with evidence, not
just rhetoric or anecdotes.
The Task Force also rejected a right to a jury trial out of
concern for the administrative impact of juries on juvenile
courts. 64 1 The available empirical evidence, however, contra-
dicts concerns that jury trials substantially disrupt delinquency
proceedings.642 Instead, the right to a jury appears to have, at
most, a marginal practical impact on juvenile justice adminis-
tration. The Task Force surveyed states in which juveniles have
a right to a jury and found that youths, like adults seldom exer-
cised the option.64 3 Some commentators argue that because
adult defendants seldom exercise their right to a jury, its denial
639. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 73 (The basic philosophi-
cal and jurisprudential question whether juveniles should have a right to a jury
on a par with adults is ultimately a value judgment and not an empirical
questiom").
640. Id. at 12.
641. Id. at 41. Concern about administrative impact is a recurring theme in
those jurisdictions that deny juveniles the right to a jury. See, e.g., State v.
Schaaf, 743 P.2d 240, 241 (Wash. 1987) (acknowledging enormous negative im-
pact of jury trials, and inability of juvenile justice system, as presently struc-
tured, to absorb such change without substantial restructuring).
642. See Charles H. Burch & Kathianne Knaup, The Impact of Jury Trials
Upon the Administration of Juvenile Justice, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 345, 358
(1970) (stating that the number of jury trials accounted for less than two per-
cent of total volume of cases heard); Joseph B. Sanborn Jr., The Right to a Pub-
lic Jury Trial: A Need for Today's Juvenile Court, 76 JUmicATUR 231, 237
(1993) (juveniles' right to jury trial has been exercised rarely, thus no adminis-
trative burden); Patricia Shaughnessy, Note, The Right to a Jury Under the
Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, 14 GONZAGA L. REv. 401, 420-21 (1978) (rate of
jury trials ranged between 0.5% and 3% of total petitions).
643. TASK FORCE, FnmAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 72-73.
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to juveniles is of little consequence. 644 Even if the right to a jury
is little more than a chip in the plea-bargaining game, it is not
self-evident why young offenders should be dealt fewer cards
than somewhat older players.
Although I criticized the Task Force majority, I must ac-
knowledge the political astuteness of compromising principle
with expediency. Several previous Task Forces and Commis-
sions maintained the policy high-ground, recommended a statu-
tory right to a jury trial, and failed to achieve any significant
juvenile justice reform.645 Following the Task Force's initial
tentative vote to recommend a right to a jury, some "hard line"
legislators tried to exploit that proposal to discredit the entire
legislative package. The Task Force's subsequent retreat from a
politically charged symbol prevented its opponents from focus-
ing hearings on a peripheral issue, and from using an "idealistic"
recommendation as an opening to disparage and even scuttle the
broader reform proposals.
2. The Right to Counsel
The Supreme Court's Gault decision mandated procedural
safeguards in adjudicating delinquency, including the assistance
of counsel.646 The Gault Court granted juveniles the right to
counsel based on the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause, rather than the Sixth Amendment. 647 It asserted that
as a matter of due process "the assistance of counsel is... essen-
tial for the determination of delinquency, carrying with it the
awesome prospect of incarceration in a state institution."648 The
contemporaneous President's Commission on Law Enforcement
In Oklahoma, for example, about 1% of juveniles received a jury trial
(51/4365), and in Texas, less than 1% (192/21,970) did. In all of Wis-
consin, but Milwaukee, the rate was less than 3% (272/10,000). A dele-
gation of the Task Force visited with Wisconsin juvenile court judges
who indicated that they had very little philosophical or administrative
difficulty accommodating juries in juvenile courts. In short, where
available, juveniles use the jury even less frequently than do adult
defendants.
Id.
644. See Irene M. Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the
Juvenile Court Abolitionists, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 163, 169 (observing that a trial
without a jury is not itself "catastrophic," but is "a chip to be used in the poker
game of plea bargaining").
645. See supra notes 113-133 and accompanying text.
646. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-29 (1967).
647. Id.
648. Id. at 36-37.
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and the Administration of Justice649 strongly influenced the
Gault Court's holding.650 The President's Commission recom-
mended that juvenile courts appoint counsel "whenever coercive
action is a possibility, without requiring any affirmative choice
by child or parent."651 Gault acknowledged that lawyers could
make juvenile court proceedings more formal and adversarial,
but asserted that their presence would impart "a healthy atmos-
phere of accountability."652 Gault's narrow holding, however,
required only that "the child and his parents must be notified of
the child's right to be represented by counsel retained by them,
or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be ap-
pointed to represent the child."6 53
At the time the Court decided Gault, attorneys seldom ap-
peared in juvenile courts. 654 Following the Gault decision,
states amended their juvenile codes to conform with its constitu-
tional mandate to provide counsel in juvenile court.655 Despite
the formal changes of laws on the books, the actual delivery of
legal services to juveniles did not occur as readily. Scholars ex-
amining judicial compliance with the Gault decision found that
many judges did not adequately advise juveniles of their right to
counsel or appoint counsel.65 6 Recent evaluation of rates of legal
representation in several states report that many juveniles still
do not have counsel.6 57 The only study to analyze data from en-
649. PREsiNT's COMM N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JusTiCE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SomTY (1967); PRESIDENTS
COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, supra note
570.
650. Gault, 387 U.S. at 38.
651. Id. The Gault Court extensively quoted the recommendations of the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Jus-
tice's reports the Court, which touted the importance of counsel. Id. at 38 n.65.
652. Id. While conceding that lawyers would make juvenile court proceed-
ings more formal and adversarial, the Court asserted that this was desirable,
because uinformality is often abused." Id.
653. Id. at 41.
654. See, e.g., David R. Barrett et al., Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Po-
lice, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARv. L. REv. 775, 796-99
(1966) (attorneys appear for juveniles in no more than five percent of cases).
655. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317 (West 1984); COL. REv. STAT.
§ 19.1.106(1) (1986 & Supp. 1994); CoNN. GFN. STAT. § 46B.135(a) (West 1986);
IND. CODE ANN. § 31.6.7.2 (Burns 1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43.21.201 (1972);
OHmO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.35.2 (Anderson 1994); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 13.40.140(2) (West 1994).
656. Norman Lefstein et al., In Search of Juvenile Justice: Gault and Its
Implementation, 3 LAw & Soo'y REv. 491, 506-16, 537 n.92. (1969).
657. In North Carolina, the juvenile defender project represented only
22.3% of juveniles in Winston-Salem, N.C., and only 45.8% in Charlotte, N.C.
Clarke & Koch, supra note 535, at 297. Aday found rates of representation of
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tire states reported substantial inter-state variations; in three of
the six states, counsel represented, at most, about half of
youths.658
In Minnesota, evaluations of rates of representation also in-
dicate that many youths appear without counsel.659 More than
a decade ago, I reported significant intra-state variation in rates
of representation, ranging from a high of over ninety percent to
a low of less than ten percent.660 A substantial minority of
youths whom judges removed from their homes or confined in
correctional institutions were unrepresented at their trial or
sentencing hearings.661
There are several explanations for why so many youths still
appear without counsel. Affluent parents may be reluctant to
retain an attorney.662 Public-defender legal services may be in-
adequate or non-existent in non-urban areas. Juvenile court
judges may encourage and readily find waivers of the right of
counsel in order to ease administrative burdens on the courts.
For example, courts may give cursory advisories of rights that
imply that waiver is just a formal technicality. Moreover, tradi-
tional, treatment-oriented judges may resent legal advocacy
26.2% and 38.7% in the jurisdiction he studied. David P. Aday, Jr., Court Struc-
ture, Defense Attorney Use, and Juvenile Court Decisions, 27 Soc. Q. 107, 114
(1986). An evaluation of a large, midwestern county's juvenile court showed
that "Over half (58.2 percent) of [the juveniles] were not represented by an at-
torney." BORTNER, supra note 536, at 139; see also KEMPF ET AL., supra note
539, at 82 (substantial majority of urban and rural juveniles in Missouri ap-
peared in juvenile court without counsel).
658. Barry C. Feld, In re Gault Revisited: A Cross-State Comparison of the
Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court, 34 CReME & DELINQ. 393, 401 (1988) (report-
ing that interstate rates of representation were highly variable: California,
85%; Minnesota, 48%; Nebraska, 53%; New York, 96%; North Dakota, 38%; and
Pennsylvania, about 90%).
659. Feld, supra note 147, at 1214 (reporting that in 1986, rates of represen-
tation ranged from a high of 100% to a low of less than five percent); K. Fine,
Out of Home Placement of Children in Minnesota: A Research Report 48 (1983)
(unpublished report, on file with author).
660. Feld, supra note 15, at 188-90 & nn.161-62.
661. Feld, supra note 147, at 1238.
[O]f the 18.5% of juveniles who were removed from their home, 69.3%
were represented and 30.7% were not. Similarly of the 11.1% of
juveniles who were incarcerated, 73.5% had counsel and 26.5% did not.
In short, more than one-quarter of the juveniles in secure confinement
and nearly one-third of those removed from their homes did not have
counsel.
Id.
662. See supra note 170 (discussing reimbursement provision of Minnesota
law).
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that attempts to limit their discretion. 663 Judges also may de-
cide what a juvenile's likely disposition will be, and decline to
appoint counsel when they anticipate a probationary sen-
tence.664 Whatever the reasons, many juveniles waive their
right to counsel without consulting with an attorney or appreci-
ating the consequences of foregoing their right to counsel, and
confront the coercive power of the state without legal assistance.
Waiver of counsel is the most common reason why so many
juveniles are unrepresented. In most states, including Minne-
sota, courts determine the validity of a waiver of a constitutional
right by assessing whether it was "knowing, intelligent, and vol-
untary" under the "totality of the circumstances." 665 Until the
1994 statutory amendments, the Minnesota Legislature ap-
proved juveniles' "knowing and intelligent" waivers of constitu-
tional rights without either parental concurrence or consultation
with an attorney.666
The United States Supreme Court's decisions in Johnson v.
Zerbst667 and Faretta v. California668 recognize criminal defend-
ants' right to waive counsel and appear pro se. The Court in
Faretta held that adult defendants in state criminal trials had a
constitutional right to proceed without counsel if they volunta-
rily and intelligently elect to do so. 6 69 Although the Supreme
Court has not decided whether juveniles validly can waive their
663. See, e.g., In re M.R.S., 400 N.W.2d 147, 152 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (re-
versing a trial court that had summarily dismissed a juvenile's court appointed
attorney for appealing its decision, noting that "[t]his kind of arbitrary action
can have no other but a chilling effect on conscientious advocacy").
664. Feld, supra note 15, at 190; Lefstein et al., supra note 656, at 531; see
also BORTNER, supra note 536, at 140 (noting that court officials are likely to
recommend counsel only in cases with the potential for serious dispositions).
665. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (articulating re-
quirements for adequate waiver of a juvenile's right to an attorney); Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (finding that a defendant may waive her right
to counsel); In re M.D.S., 345 N.W.2d 723, 732 (Minn. 1984) (placing burden on
state to show a valid waiver of rights); In re L.R.B., 373 N.W.2d 334, 337 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1985) (stating that the totality test must consider all the surrounding
circumstances); State v. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d 752, 755 (Minn. 1980) (upholding
juvenile's waiver of Miranda rights); MINN. R. Juv. P. 6.01(2), in MINNESOTA
RULES, supra note 167 (codifying the state of mind an "totality of circum-
stances" test for waiver of the right to remain silent). See generally Feld, supra
note 15, at 169-90 (detailing waiver of right to counsel jurisprudence in the
juvenile court setting).
666. MINN. STAT. § 260.155(8) (1992) (quoted supra note 137).
667. 304 U.S. 458 (1937).
668. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
669. Id. at 836. The Faretta Court emphasized that the Sixth Amendment
guarantees defendants the "assistance of counsel." Id. at 860. The Faretta
Court noted, however, that in order to represent himself, the waiver of counsel
1995] 1111
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
right to counsel in delinquency proceedings, it has upheld
youths' waiver of their Miranda right to counsel during pretrial
"custodial interrogation" under the "totality of the
circumstances." 670
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court necessarily recog-
nizes an adult defendant's Faretta right to waive counsel and
proceed pro se, it strongly encourages trial courts to appoint
stand-by counsel to assist a defendant at trial and temporary
counsel with whom to consult prior to the entry of a guilty
plea.67 1 In State v. Rubin, the supreme court described the type
of "penetrating and comprehensive examination" that must pre-
cede a "knowing and intelligent" waiver and strongly en-
couraged trial courts to appoint counsel "to advise and consult
with the defendant as to the waiver."672 The Minnesota
Supreme Court reversed several adult defendants' convictions
when their mental competency, youthfulness, or below average
intelligence raised questions about their capacity to waive the
assistance of counsel knowingly and intelligently. 673
Whether juvenile or adult defendants can waive counsel
"voluntarily and intelligently," particularly without consulting
counsel, is the critical question. When the judges who give the
waiver advisories seek predetermined results-waivers of coun-
sel-they compound the problem, as this affects both what they
tell the juveniles and how they interpret their responses. 674
Many scholars have criticized the "totality" approach to
must be "knowing and intelligent." Id. at 835; accord Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464-
65.
670. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 728 (1979). See generally Feld, supra
note 15, at 171-72 (discussing the Minnesota Supreme Court's approach to the
application of the "totality of the circumstances" test to juvenile proceedings).
671. See, e.g., State v. Rubin, 409 N.W.2d 504, 506 (Minn. 1987) ("[A] trial
court may not accept a guilty plea to a felony or gross misdemeanor charge
made by an unrepresented defendant if the defendant has not consulted with
counsel about waiving counsel and pleading guilty."); Burt v. State, 256 N.W.2d
633, 635 (Minn. 1977) ("One way for a trial court to help ensure that a defend-
ant's waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent would be to provide a lawyer
to consult with the defendant concerning his proposed waiver...
672. 409 N.W.2d at 506.
673. See Burt v. State, 256 N.W.2d 633, 636 (Minn. 1977) (ruling that de-
fendant, who was "18 years old, had only a tenth grade education and [low
scores on I.Q. tests,] suggesting strongly that petitioner was of considerably
lower than average intelligence," did not intelligently waive his rights); State v.
Bauer, 245 N.W.2d 848, 856 (Minn. 1976) (reversing trial court conviction after
establishing serious doubt as to defendant's competence to waive rights).
674. Cf In re John D., 479 A.2d 1173, 1178 (R.I. 1984) ("[E]xceptional efforts
must be made in order to be certain that an uncounseled juvenile fully under-
stands the nature and consequences of his admission of delinquency.").
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juveniles' waiver of rights.6 75 Not surprisingly, the empirical re-
search indicates that juveniles are not as competent as adults to
waive their rights in a "knowing and intelligent" manner.676
Particularly for younger juveniles, their capacity to understand
and waie rights is especially problematic:
As a class, juveniles younger than fifteen years of age failed to meet
both the absolute and relative (adult norm) standards for comprehen-
sion .... The vast majority of these juveniles misunderstood at least
one of the four standard Miranda statements, and compared with
adults, demonstrated significantly poorer comprehension of the nature
and significance of the Miranda rights.6 77
Although "juveniles younger than fifteen manifest significantly
poorer comprehension than adults of comparable intelligence,"
the research also questioned whether youths sixteen and older
adequately understood the implications of waiver.678 A few
states recognize the developmental differences between
juveniles and adults, and prohibit waivers of the right to coun-
sel, or incarceration of unrepresented delinquents. 679 In most
states, however, including Minnesota, juveniles may waive their
Miranda rights and their right to counsel in delinquency pro-
ceedings without even consulting an attorney.
680
Attorneys may not represent their juvenile clients effec-
tively even when counsel are appointed for delinquents. The ju-
venile court as an institution actually works against the
adversarial process. 681 Indeed, organizational pressures to
675. See generally Feld, supra note 15, at 173-76; Thomas Grisso, Juveniles'
Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REV.
1134, 1139-40 (1980); Comment, Juvenile Confessions: Whether State Proce-
dures Ensure Constitutionally Permissible Confessions, 67 J. CRM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 195 (1976).
676. See, e.g., THOMAS GmSSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE 106-07 (1981); Grisso, supra note 675, at 1160;
Richard Lawrence, The Role of Legal Counsel in Juveniles' Understanding of
their Rights, Juv. & FAm. CT. J., Winter 1983-84, at 49, 56-57.
677. Grisso, supra note 675, at 1160.
678. Id. at 1157.
679. See Feld, supra note 15, at 187 & nn.152-53 (discussing Iowa and Wis-
consin); see also INSTIrUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN.-ABA Jonr CON[M'N ON JUVENILE
JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS 5.1
cmt. 81 (advocating that the juvenile should have the mandatory and nonwaiv-
able right to effective assistance of counsel at all stages of the proceedings).
680. See, e.g., In re L.R.B., 373 N.W.2d 334, 338 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (up-
holding Miranda waiver by 14-year-old who had a below normal I.Q.). But see
Burt v. State, 256 N.W.2d 633, 635-36 (Minn. 1977) (requiring extensive in-
quiry into defendant's capacity to waive right).
681. Feld, supra note 15, at 187 ("Organizational pressures to cooperate, ju-
dicial hostility toward adversarial litigants, role ambiguity created by the dual
goals of rehabilitation and punishment, reluctance to help juveniles 'beat a
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maintain stable, cooperative working relations with other adult
personnel in the system may impede effective adversarial advo-
cacy on behalf of the child. 68 2
Several scholars question whether lawyers can perform as
advocates in a parens patriae rehabilitative juvenile justice sys-
tem.68 3 Some studies indicate that when lawyers represent
juveniles in more traditional juvenile courts, they actually may
place their clients at a disadvantage at trial or sentencing.68 4
For example, courts appear more likely to incarcerate juveniles
who appear with counsel than they do those without counsel.68 5
In Minnesota, after controlling for the influence of other legal
variables, such as the seriousness of the offense, prior record,
case,' or an internalization of a court's treatment philosophy may compromise
the role of counsel in juvenile court."); Clarke & Koch, supra note 535, at 305
(noting the juvenile courts' treatment of lawyers as an "impediment"). See gen-
erally BORTNER, supra note 536, at 136-39 (illustrating the role of counsel injuvenile court).
682. See, e.g., BORTNER, supra note 536, at 138 (examining the influence of
court personnel on lawyer's perceived role in juvenile court); VAUGHAN STAPLE-
TON & LEE TEITELBAUM, IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF COUN-
SEL IN AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS 102-06 (1972) (discussing the juvenile court
as a "quasi-cooperative system"); Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as
a Confidence Game: Organizational Coaptation of a Profession, 1 LAW & Soo'y
REv. 15, 18-24 (1967) (arguing the impact of institutional pressures upon the
ability of attorneys to maintain advocacy posture).
683. See, e.g., STAPLETON & TEITELBAUM, supra note 682, at 156-64 (finding
juvenile court philosophy limits the ability of lawyers to adequately perform as
advocates); Barrett et al., supra note 654, at 797 (reporting the observations
and interviews of juvenile justice personnel in several jurisdictions and finding
that "an overzealous defense attorney may produce an adverse reaction in the
court"); Fox, supra note 8, at 1236 (characterizing the role of attorneys as ac-
commodating to the institutional needs of the juvenile justice philosophy).
684. See, e.g., BORTNER, supra note 536, at 139-40 (characterizing the disad-
vantages of attorney representation for juvenile defendants); Barrett et al.,
supra note 654, at 797-98 (describing the negative consequences for juvenile
clients of overzealous defense attorneys); Clarke & Koch, supra note 535, at
304-06 (suggesting the absence of an attorney may benefit a juvenile client).
685. BORTNER, supra note 536, at 139-40 ("[Rlegardless of the types of of-
fenses with which they were charged, juveniles represented by attorneys receive
more severe dispositions."); STAPLETON & TErrELBAUM, supra note 682, at 63-
96; Clarke & Koch, supra note 535, at 306; David Duffee & Larry Siegel, The
Organization Man: Legal Counsel in the Juvenile Court, 7 CimM. L. BULL. 544,
552 (1971). An evaluation of the impact of counsel in delinquency proceedings
in six states reported that
it appears that in virtually every jurisdiction, representation by coun-
sel is an aggravating factor in a juvenile's disposition .... In short,
while the legal variables [of seriousness of present offense, prior rec-
ord, and pretrial detention status] enhance the probabilities of repre-
sentation, the fact of representation appears to exert an independent
effect on the severity of dispositions.
Feld, supra note 658, at 418-19.
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and pre-trial detention status, "representation by counsel is an
additional aggravating factor in a juvenile's disposition."68 6
The Task Force findings and recommendations echoed those
of the earlier Supreme Court Juvenile Representation Study
Committee. 687 The Task Force found that
[iun 1992, of the delinquency petitions disposed of statewide, in approx-
imately 50 percent of the cases the juveniles were not represented by
an attorney at the adjudication hearings.
There continues to be enormous variations between counties in the
rates of representation. In 1992, the rates of representation ranged
from seven counties reporting less than ten percent of all the delin-
quency petitions having an attorney present at adjudication, to four
counties reporting a 98 to 100 percent representation rate.
6 8 8
Counsel is essential in juvenile court not only to assure that
findings of delinquency are fair and just, but to assist the court
in making appropriate dispositions.
The Task Force achieved early agreement to reaffirm the
recommendations of the Legal Representation Study Commit-
tee.68 9 It recommended changes in statutes and court proce-
dural rules to require the appointment of counsel, or stand-by
counsel if waived, for all juveniles facing felony or gross misde-
meanor charges, or out-of-home placement.690 Although a juve-
nile charged with a misdemeanor could "knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily" waive the right to counsel, the
Task Force recommended that the youth consult with a lawyer
in person prior to appearing in court, that the juvenile receive
meaningful information about rights and procedures, and that
the attorney accompany the youth into the courtroom as a pre-
requisite to a valid waiver.691 Finally, the Task Force urged the
Supreme Court to revise its Juvenile Court Rules of Procedure
to clarify the role of parents when an attorney consults with the
child. 692
686. Feld, supra note 147, at 1330.
687. TASK FORCE, FNAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 47; see supra notes 134-
142 and accompanying text (referring to Juvenile Representation Study Com-
mittee findings and recommendations).
688. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 48.
689. See supra text accompanying note 144.
690. TASK FORCE, FNAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 53.
691. Id. at 53 (recommending that for juveniles charged with misdemeanors,
"in person consultation with a defense attorney be mandatory prior to the
waiver of counsel").
692. Id. at 49, 53. The Task Force also recommended that attorneys advise
youths of their rights "in language the juvenile can understand and should,
among other things, explain the court processes and the potential consequences
of an adjudication of delinquency." Id. at 49. Furthermore, the Task Force rec-
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The earlier Legal Representation Study Committee's recom-
mendation foundered on its inability to estimate the costs of im-
plementing a full-representation juvenile justice system. The
Task Force encountered difficulty calculating the financial im-
pact of expanding representation. 693 The process of appointing
counsel and the costs of representing juveniles varies through-
out the state. In some judicial districts state public defenders
provide defense representation, and they often cannot determine
the separate costs of the delinquency component of their
caseloads. In other judicial districts, courts or counties contract
with local private attorneys to provide criminal defense repre-
sentation; neither the counties nor the attorneys can ascertain
the portion spent solely on delinquency representation. 694 Thus,
the Task Force could not easily determine how much juvenile
courts currently spend on defense representation, or estimate
the fiscal consequences of doubling those expenditures.
As the chair of the Due Process committee, I proposed two
methods to estimate the costs of a full-representation system.
The first method estimated the costs of full representation based
upon the number of attorneys required to handle the anticipated
volume of delinquency filings. 695 A second method estimated
costs by calculating the average expenditures per case based on
partial financial data from several judicial districts. 696 Using
similar methods to estimate the current outlay to provide partial
and inadequate legal services, the Task Force estimated that the
"additional costs of increasing the representation system for
juveniles would be between $4,849,000 and $5,400,000."697
The legislature enacted the recommendations of the Task
Force virtually without change. The new statute provides that:
The child, parent, guardian or custodian have the right to effective
assistance of counsel in connection with a proceeding in juvenile court.
Before a child who is charged by delinquency petition with a misde-
meanor offense waives the right to counsel or enters a plea, the child
ommended the use of a uniform advisory form throughout the state to inform
juveniles and their parents of their rights. Id.
693. See supra notes 143-144 and accompanying text.
694. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 50.
695. See id. at 51 ("[Alpproximately 24,000 petitions will be filed in 1995.
Estimating that each full time equivalent defense attorney would handle 300
petitions in a year, 80 full time equivalent attorneys would be needed."). The
maximum caseloads were based on professional standards for reasonable repre-
sentation. The estimated costs per attorney included all of the overhead costs
to enable an attorney to function in a professional manner, e.g., partial ex-
penses for an office, secretary, investigators, experts, and transcripts. Id.
696. Id. at 51-52.
697. Id. at 53.
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shall consult in person with counsel who shall provide a full and intelli-
gible explanation of the child's rights. The court shall appoint counsel,
or stand-by counsel if the child waives the right to counsel, for a child
who is:
(1) charged by delinquency petition with a gross misdemeanor or
felony offense; or
(2) the subject of a delinquency proceeding in which out-of-home
placement has been proposed.
698
In short, the assistance of counsel or stand-by counsel is
mandatory in all cases involving felony or gross-misdemeanor
charges or possible out-of-home placement. As a practical mat-
ter, counsel will represent virtually all juveniles charged with
misdemeanors as well. Because an attorney must be present
prior to any court appearance to meet privately with a juvenile
charged with a misdemeanor, and must accompany the child
into the courtroom as a pre-requisite to any waiver, most
juveniles will avail themselves of defense representation. 699
Even if a juvenile charged with a misdemeanor chooses to waive
counsel, the juvenile court still "may appoint stand-by counsel to
be available to assist and consult with the child at all stages of
the proceedings." 700 For youths charged with a misdemeanor or
ordinance violation, the Juvenile Court Rules of Procedure pro-
vide additional incentives for juvenile court judges to appoint
stand-by counsel. No misdemeanor delinquency adjudication
obtained without counsel may provide the basis for any subse-
quent probation violation, contempt proceeding, or home
removal. 701
These rules differ from those the United States Supreme
Court has crafted. In Baldasar v. Illinois, the Supreme Court
prohibited enhancement of the defendant's sentence based on a
698. M~na. STAT. § 260.155(2).
699. The Rules of Juvenile Procedure provide:
In any proceeding in which the child is charged with a misdemeanor,
the court shall appoint counsel at public expense to represent the child
if the child cannot afford counsel and private counsel has not been re-
tained to represent the child, and the child has not waived the right to
counsel. If the child waives the right to counsel, the court may appoint
stand-by counsel to be available to assist and consult with the child at
all stages of the proceedings.
MINN. R. Juv. P. 4.02(2), in MmNOTA RuL.s, supra note 167 (emphasis ad-
ded). The child must be fully and effectively informed of the child's right to
counsel and the disadvantages of self-representation by an in-person consulta-
tion with an attorney, and counsel shall appear with the child in court and in-
form the court that such consultation has occurred." Id. at 4.03(1) (emphasis
added).
700. Id. at 4.02(2).
701. Id. commentary to 4.02.
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prior uncounselled misdemeanor conviction that had not re-
sulted in incarceration. 70 2 In Nichols v. United States, however,
the Supreme Court overruled Baldasar, and held that uncoun-
seled misdemeanor convictions that are constitutionally valid
under Scott because the sentencing court did not order imprison-
ment, could also be used to enhance subsequent sentences. 70 3
The dissent in Nichols objected to using collaterally a conviction
that could not support incarceration initially to extend a period
of imprisonment.70 4 As a result of Nichols, under the Constitu-
tion, trial court judges may deny counsel to misdemeanor de-
fendants, even if they request a lawyer, as long as they do not
incarcerate them at that time. Trial court judges may then use
those convictions to increase substantially a defendant's subse-
quent sentence.
Minnesota law provides greater protections for defendants
than does Nichols. The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines in-
clude prior misdemeanor convictions in calculating a defend-
ant's criminal history score; those prior convictions require the
assistance of counsel or a valid waiver of counsel to enhance
later sentences.70 5 In State v. Nordstrom, the Minnesota
702. 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per curiam). Since Baldasar's initial misde-
meanor conviction resulted only in a fine and probation, but not actual incarcer-
ation, the right to counsel, as announced in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367
(1979), did not apply. 446 U.S. at 222-23; see supra notes 426-427 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Scott). When Baldasar was convicted a second time for a
similar offense, under the enhanced penalty statute, the court used the prior
conviction was used to convert the second conviction into a felony for which the
defendant was imprisoned. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court re-
versed Baldasar's felony conviction. 446 U.S. at 224. Justice Potter Stewart's
concurrence condemned the increased penalty noting that the defendant "was
sentenced to an increased term of imprisonment only because he had been con-
victed in a previous prosecution in which he had not had the assistance of ap-
pointed counsel in his defense." Id. at 224. Justice Thurgood Marshall's
concurrence stated that a defendant's "prior uncounseled misdemeanor convic-
tion could not be used collaterally to impose an increased term of imprisonment
upon a subsequent conviction." Id. at 226.
703. 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1927 (1994). "[Aln uncounseled conviction valid under
Scott may be relied upon to enhance the sentence for a subsequent offense, even
though that sentence entails imprisonment. Enhancement statutes... do not
change the penalty imposed for the earlier conviction." Id.; see Lily Fu, Note,
High Crimes from Misdemeanors: The Collateral Use of Prior, Uncounseled
Misdemeanors Under the Sixth Amendment, Baldasar and the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, 77 MINN. L. REv. 165, 194 (1992) (urging Court to adopt ration-
ale of Baldasar dissent and rule that all constitutionally procured uncounseled
misdemeanor convictions be used for sentence enhancements).
704. See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1931-37 (Blacknun, J., dissenting) (contend-
ing that the rationale of Nichols is inconsistent with Scott).
705. See MINN. SENTENCING GUELUS § lI.B.3; State v. Edmison, 379
N.W.2d 85, 87 (Minn. 1985) (holding that state must "prove that defendant was
1118 [Vol. 79:965
JUVENILE JUSTICE
Supreme Court held that a prior misdemeanor conviction based
on an uncounselled guilty plea may not be used to convert a sub-
sequent offense into a gross misdemeanor absent a valid waiver
of counsel on the record at the prior proceeding.70 6 Similarly, in
State v. Edmison the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a sen-
tencing court may not use a defendant's prior misdemeanor con-
victions to determine the presumptive sentence under the
Guidelines unless the state proves that the prior conviction was
obtained with the assistance of counsel or a valid waiver of the
right.70 7
Finally, in In re D.S.S., the Minnesota Court of Appeals
vacated a juvenile's disposition when the sentencing court relied
upon prior juvenile convictions that had been obtained without
an adequate advisory or waiver of the right to counsel.708 D.S.S.
provides an egregious confirmation of the Sentencing Guidelines
Commission's concerns about procedural injustice in juvenile
courts and the use of juvenile convictions for sentence enhance-
ment.70 9 The Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure follow Minne-
represented by counsel or that there was a valid waiver of the right to counsel
on the record of each of the prior convictions"); State v. Thomas, 374 N.W.2d
586, 588 (Minm. Ct. App. 1985) (reducing sentence based on defendant's convic-
tions outside Minnesota because the state failed to prove he "would have been
prosecuted as an adult in Minnesota under similar circumstances").
706. 331 N.W.2d 90 (Minn. 1983).
707. 379 N.W.2d at 87. The defendant bears the burden of production on
this question, and absent evidence to the contrary the court will presume prior
convictions were not obtained in violation of the right to counsel. State v. Goff,
418 N.W.2d 169, 172 (Minn. 1988).
708. 506 N.W.2d 650, 655 (Minn. 1993). "Because these 'informal' proceed-
ings carried the risk of adjudication and commitment, Gault requires strict ad-
herence to criminal procedure." Id. at 655.
709. See supra notes 416-421 and accompanying text. In D.S.S., the juve-
nile appeared in court on four different petitions, a social worker informally
advised him of his right to counsel, and he admitted to the charges in court
without a formal advisory on the record as required by juvenile rules of proce-
dure. 506 N.W.2d at 651-52. In one of the four appearances, he was adjudi-
cated a delinquent. Id. at 652. Counsel accompanied D.S.S. when he appeared
on several subsequent petitions. Id. When Juvenile Court Judge Dennis Chal-
leen sentenced D.S.S. on his sixth and seventh petition, he denied D.S.S.'s mo-
tion to vacate the prior uncounseled admissions, expunge the one delinquency
adjudication, and refrain from considering the uncounseled offenses in deter-
mining his disposition. Id.
The court of appeals rebuked Judge Challeen, held that the advisories and
waivers of counsel were invalid, and ruled that "[i]n resentencing D.S.S., the
juvenile court must disregard the first four uncounseled admissions and make
no reference to or use of them." Id. at 656. Of course, because juvenile court
judges' sentencing authority is unrestricted, as long as the court does not explic-
itly refer to those earlier convictions, it may impose the identical sentence
based on the present petitions alone. Mnm. STAT. § 260.181.
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sota state law and preclude the use of uncounselled
misdemeanor or ordinance convictions either as a predicate for a
home removal disposition, or to enhance a subsequent sentence
that results in home removal. 710
By mandating defense representation for juveniles, the leg-
islature addressed a decades-long blot on Minnesota's juvenile
justice system. Equally important, it appropriated funds to im-
plement its statutory directive. The Task Force estimated the
additional costs of defense representation at approximately five
million dollars. The State Board of Public Defense requested an
additional $5.8 million to implement the legislation.7 11 In the
final bill, the legislature allocated $2.65 million for the six-
month period from January 1, 1995, to June 30, 1995, with an-
nual appropriations thereafter.7 12
On May 5, 1994, Governor Arne Carlson signed into law the
Juvenile Justice Crime Bill. He hailed it as "one of the most
significant achievements of the 1994 session," and predicted that
it would "go far in addressing our troubling juvenile crime
rates."7 1 3 Unfortunately, Carlson line-item-vetoed all of the fi-
nancial appropriations necessary to implement the substantive
changes. Carlson's veto message criticized the legislature for its
lack of "financial planning." By signing the law mandating ap-
pointment of counsel while vetoing state appropriations to pay
for the requirement, however, Carlson imposed enormous finan-
cial and administrative burdens on public defenders in the many
counties that currently do not provide counsel.711 For example,
710. Mm-N. R. Juv. P. 4.02(3), in MmNESOTA RULES, supra note 167 (provid-
ing that "a child retains an absolute right to withdraw any plea obtained with-
out the assistance of counsel or to obtain a new trial if adjudicated delinquent
without the assistance of counsel, if those convictions provide the underlying
predicate for an out-of-home placement").
711. Funding for Juvenile Justice Bill, BRIEFLY: MRW. SENATE WK. IN REv.
(Senate Pubs., St. Paul, Minn.), Mar. 11, 1994, at 3 (reporting on Crime Preven-
tion Finance Division's consideration of appropriations to implement S.F. 1845:
"Of the appropriations, $5 million is requested for counsel and appellate serv-
ices for juveniles. Kevin Kajer of the State Board of Public Defense presented a
fiscal note of $5.8 million for public defenders and support staff.").
712. 1994 Minn. Laws 576, § 67, subd. 3; see also MNNESOTA DE'T OF COR-
REOTIONS, supra note 515, at 45 (estimating additional funding requirements
for State Public Defender's Office of $ 5.3 million annually for juvenile court
cases).
713. J. HOUSE REP., 78TH SESS. (Minnesota), May 6, 1994, at 8578.
714. Editorials decried Governor Carlson's veto as short-sighted and
counterproductive:
But in the contest for shortsighted vetoes, the slicing of the juvenile
crime bill surely takes the cake.... Carlson assented to the bill's pro-
visions to heighten accountability and stiffen penalties for young law-
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the Public Defender in Minnesota's Third Judicial District found
that in January 1995, juvenile caseloads increased an average of146%.715
CONCLUSION
The 1994 Juvenile Crime Bill incorporates profound
changes in Minnesota's juvenile courts. The new certification
law finally addresses the basic conceptual flaws of the previous
waiver legislation: idiosyncratic subjectivity and "lack of fit" be-
tween juvenile waiver decisions and criminal court sentencing
practices. For nearly two decades, I have argued that Minne-
sota's and most other states' criteria for judicial waiver, "amena-
bility to treatment" and "dangerousness," contain serious
defects.716 Judges lack valid or reliable clinical tools with which
to either assess "amenability to treatment" or predict "danger-
ousness." Asking them to do so reinforces judicial subjectivity,
and encourages inconsistent, idiosyncratic, and disparate appli-
cations of law. Unstructured judicial discretion is antithetical to
the rule of law. The legislature's previous inability to articulate
the public policy that some young criminals are not children ex-
acerbated the lack of integration between juvenile court waiver
decisions and adult criminal court sentencing practices.
The new law uses the conceptual jurisprudence of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines to structure most of the important decisions
in juvenile courts. The legislative change from "amenability to
treatment" to "public safety" significantly alters the framework
breakers ... Nbut... balked at providing the manpower needed to
fulfill the bill's promise. He refused to fund public defenders to repre-
sent the 50 percent of Minnesota youngsters whose right to counsel is
now unfulfiled ....
Crime Fight: Pinching Pennies, Scrimping on Justice, STAR TRm. (Minneapo-
lis), May 16, 1994, at 12A. The 1994 Legislature transferred responsibility to
the State Public Defender to provide defense representation in juvenile delin-
quency cases. See MNN. STAT. §§ 611.14, 611.27.
715. Letter from Candace Rasmussen, Third Dist. Public Defender, to Barry
Feld (Feb. 24, 1995) (on file with author).
716. In my critique of the earlier statutory revisions, I concluded that
the Minnesota Legislature must be faulted for failing to address the
fundamental inadequacies of the waiver criteria-amenability to treat-
ment and dangerousness .... The legislature's insistence that juvenile
courts address and answer these inherently unanswerable questions is
the continuing and fundamental flaw of the entire legislative scheme.
Requiring courts to collect clinical, psychological, and social data,
which ultimately has only marginal utility in making predictive deter-
minations, forces judges to engage in standardless, arbitrary, and dis-
cretionary decisionmaking.
Feld, supra note 184, at 239.
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of the most important sentencing decision in juvenile court. The
public safety offense criteria provide somewhat greater certainty
and objectivity than the previous clinical assessments of "ame-
nability to treatment." Courts can more readily apply the public
safety criteria because they share the same just deserts" princi-
ples embodied in the Sentencing Guidelines. Legislatively as-
signing greater weight to the seriousness of the present offense
and prior record further reinforces the "deserts" bases, and more
closely ties waiver decisions to the sentencing framework of the
adult guidelines. Appellate courts may use the Guidelines'juris-
prudence to review trial judge certification decisions without en-
tering into a morass of conflicting clinical assessments.
By using a consistent definition of serious young offenders
in both the adult and juvenile justice systems, the new statute
rationalizes social control. Explicitly linking presumptive certi-
fication and EJJ prosecutions to the Sentencing Guidelines' pre-
sumptive-commitment-to-prison offenses integrates certification
and criminal court sentencing practices, maximizes juvenile
court sanctioning of the most serious juvenile offenders, and re-
inforces the public policy that incarcerating violent offenders is
the penal priority. The increased use of juvenile prior convic-
tions to enhance adult sentences will further strengthen the sen-
tencing linkages between the two systems.
Formulating legislative waiver policy reflects both empirical
judgments and value choices. The empirical questions concern
such matters as the development of criminal careers, probabili-
ties of recidivism, the relationship between persistent and seri-
ous offending, and the like. But certification "also entails an
explicit value choice about the quantity and quality of youthful
deviance that will be tolerated within the juvenile justice system
before a more punitive adult response is mandated."7 17 By ex-
cluding offenders sixteen years or older and charged with first
degree murder, the new statute clearly defines the limits of leg-
islative tolerance. First degree murder is the only offense to
which the Sentencing Guidelines' presumptive framework does
not apply. It is consistent for the legislature to exclude it from
juvenile court jurisdiction as sui generis. The almost irresistible
legislative tendency, however, is for lists of excluded offenses to
expand. The 1994 Minnesota Legislature nevertheless demon-
strated remarkable responsibility; it did not succumb to the
temptation to use the issue of youth crime demagogically. It re-
mains to be seen whether future legislatures can resist that ap-
717. Feld, supra note 98, at 572.
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peal, particularly if a political opponent frames it as being "soft
on crime." Again, however, the policies and values embedded in
the Guidelines themselves provide the strongest justification to
adhere to the current exclusion.
The EJJ status constitutes a significant sentencing policy
innovation and exemplifies the substantive and procedural con-
vergence between juvenile and criminal courts. Trying youths
with adult criminal procedural safeguards in juvenile court pre-
serves both access to juvenile treatment resources and the possi-
bility of adult sentences if a youth fails as an EJJ or re-offends.
While other states have shrunk the jurisdiction of their juvenile
courts, Minnesota pursues the opposite policy. Providing young
offenders with opportunities to redirect their lives is preferable
to simple custodial confinement, and the prospect of a presump-
tive commitment to prison may provide the motivation to reform
they previously lacked.718 Ultimately, the success of the EJJ
sentencing option hinges on the integrity of its implementation.
If secure facilities are not simply youth prisons, if meaningful
treatment resources are available and implemented with integ-
rity, and if continuous aftercare successfully re-integrates
youths into the community, then the EJJ concept may prove a
promising legislative strategy.
The new certification and EJJ legislation contain several
unknown features. Standing alone, the enactment of presump-
tive-certification legislation, the shifting of the burden of proof to
the juvenile, and the greater emphasis on offense factors would
likely increase the numbers of youths transferred to criminal
court. The EJJ provisions, however, greatly expand the sentenc-
ing authority of juvenile court judges. Except for those older,
chronic youths charged with the most serious offenses, juvenile
court judges can impose EJJ juvenile sentences comparable to or
even greater than those available in criminal courts. The EJJ
option provides judges with a potential win-win scenario. If a
court uses the EJJ option in lieu of certification and a youth suc-
cessfully completes juvenile probation, so much the better. If a
youth fails to complete treatment or re-offends, a judge may
then revoke the probation and execute the previously stayed
adult sentence. While presumptive certification pushes youths
into criminal court, EJJ furnishes a counter-pull to retain them
718. But see OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, supra note 371, at 73-75
("Our findings for certified adults suggest that these offenders-who have been
in prison and know that they may return to prison for new offenses-still reof-
fend at relatively high rates [89%].").
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in juvenile court. The Sentencing Guidelines' jurisprudence and
judicial assessments of presumptive offenders' "amenability to
probation" provide the only indicators of the likely implementa-
tion of the analogous EJJ provisions. Because of the many vari-
ables, most conspicuously youthfulness, there is no way to
anticipate how many more, or fewer, youths will be certified as a
result of the new legislation.
Depending on the resolution of the tension between certifi-
cation as an adult or sentencing as an EJJ, the question of
whether the new legislation ultimately provides serious young
offenders with one last chance at rehabilitation, or whether it
consigns less serious youths to the adult corrections system
without the benefit of a certification hearing poses a second un-
known feature. EJJ may provide judges with a sentencing alter-
native for some youths who otherwise would have been certified.
If courts, however, use EJJ more extensively for many youths
who would not be certified either previously or under the new
regime, and these youths violate their juvenile probations, then
EJJ may have a net-widening effect and increase the number of
youths consigned to adult facilities. Ironically, in these cases, a
juvenile court judge already has determined that EJJ youths do
not pose a threat to "public safety" requiring adult incarceration.
And yet, a new offense, which itself would not warrant certifica-
tion, may provide the basis to revoke probation and execute the
adult sentence. Again, how often this will occur cannot be pre-
dicted in advance.
One of the most troubling aspects of the legislative changes
is its likely impact on racial minorities. Under the former refer-
ence law, juvenile court judges waived primarily chronic, older
property offenders. The new presumptive-certification provi-
sions address "public safety" and violent offenders. Because mi-
nority juveniles commit violent crimes at higher rates than do
white youths, they will likely be presumptively certified at even
greater rates than under the previous discretionary regime. De-
spite the racial population differentials, the majority of pre-
sumptively certified youths will likely be minority juveniles
charged with violent crimes; the bulk of youths entering the EJJ
status will likely be white, chronic property offenders who ear-
lier might have been certified.
While the presumptive-certification and EJJ provisions are
important and may affect five to ten percent of youths, the new
legislation requiring appointment of counsel for the majority of
juveniles currently without representation is more fundamental
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and far-reaching. Perhaps, finally, juvenile justice will no longer
be an oxymoron; nearly three decades after Gault, its promise of
counsel may be realized. The new legislation requires appoint-
ment of counsel or stand-by counsel for all youths charged with
felony or gross misdemeanor offenses, or possible out-of-home
placement. It also restricts any use of misdemeanor convictions
obtained without counsel. The Minnesota Legislature and
Supreme Court finally acknowledged that allowing immature
and impressionable young juveniles to "waive" their right to
counsel under the "totality of the circumstances" was unwork-
able and gave judges unlimited and unreviewable discretion to
deprive juveniles of their most fundamental procedural
safeguard.
Again, the substantive convergence between juvenile and
criminal courts reinforces the need for comparable procedural
safeguards. Juvenile court convictions acquire greater long-
term significance. The legislative modifications of the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines to include all juvenile felony convictions in the
criminal history score, to extend the period during which crimi-
nal courts may use juvenile convictions to enhance adult
sentences, and to eliminate the two-point maximum cap for
juveniles convicted of violent crimes, impose a greater responsi-
bility on defense counsel. Thus, quite apart from any current
disposition, defense counsel must always consider collateral con-
sequences. Because every felony counts, especially presump-
tive-commitment-to-prison offenses, effective defense counsel
should seldom allow clients to plead guilty to felonies, and either
insist on pleas to reduced charges or go to trial in hopes of ac-
quittals, dismissals, or convictions on lesser included offenses.
For youths in EJJ proceedings, juvenile court is criminal court.
Although the serious short- and long-term consequences of
juvenile convictions impose additional responsibilities on de-
fense counsel, whether attorneys can satisfy those obligations is
less clear. Certainly, without adequate funding for defense serv-
ices, attorneys cannot professionally accommodate the dramatic
increases in caseloads that the new law mandates. Moreover,
the role of counsel in juvenile court remains more ambiguous,
and the co-optative pressures are greater even than those in
criminal courts. It is unclear what it means to be an effective
defense attorney in a court system in which many of the partici-
pants, juvenile court judges, probation officers, prosecutors, and
even defense attorneys, do not regard an acquittal as a "victory."
When virtually all youths may be convicted of some offense, it
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becomes difficult, if not impossible, for attorneys to become more
familiar with dispositional alternatives and more effective advo-
cates for the substantive interests of their clients.
The uneasy relationship between procedure and substance
persists in juvenile court. Minnesota provides a premier exem-
plar of the "criminalizing" of juvenile justice. The changes in ju-
venile court purpose, the use of formal or informal offense-based
guidelines by the Department of Corrections and courts, the
practical significance of offense variables at sentencing, the du-
bious efficacy of penal intervention, and the legislative move-
ment toward "principles of sentencing" all evidence the
convergence between juvenile and criminal courts. Despite the
penal reality of juvenile justice, neither a majority of the Task
Force nor the legislature could acknowledge that penal social
control requires all criminal procedural safeguards, including
the right to a jury trial.
Young delinquent offenders are brought to juvenile court be-
cause they have committed a crime. No amount of "rehabilita-
tive rhetoric" can negate that central fact. The fundamental
shortcoming of the juvenile court is not a failure of implementa-
tion, but a failure of conception. The original juvenile court was
conceived of as a social service agency in a judicial setting, a fu-
sion of welfare and coercion. Legislatures, however, define juve-
nile courts delinquency jurisdiction by criminal law violations,
rather than by needs for social services. Juvenile court inter-
vention inevitably subordinates care to control, and reinforces
punitive rather than rehabilitative impulses. Instead of using
characteristics for which children are not responsible and which
identify needs for affirmative intervention, such as lack of de-
cent education or adequate housing, unmet health needs, deteri-
orated family and social circumstances, juvenile court law
focuses on violations of criminal law that are their fault and for
which they are responsible. As long as juvenile courts empha-
size the characteristics of children least likely to elicit sympathy
and ignore the social conditions most likely to engender a desire
to nurture and help, the law reinforces retributive, rather than
rehabilitative, impulses.
If the child is a criminal and the primary purpose of formal
intervention is penal social control, there is no need for a sepa-
rate juvenile court. Young offenders could be tried in criminal
courts alongside their adult counterparts. Shorter sentences for
reduced responsibility is a more modest rationale to treat young
offenders differently from adults than the rehabilitative claims
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of Progressive childsavers. 719 If youthfulness is a "mitigating
factor," adult courts can impose shorter sentences for reduced
culpability and legislatures can explicitly provide youths with
categorical fractional reductions of adult sentences. This could
take the form of a formal "youth discount" at sentencing. For
example, a fourteen-year-old might receive thirty-three percent
of the adult penalty, a sixteen-year-old sixty-six percent, and an
eighteen-year-old the full penalty, as is presently the case. A
proposal for explicit fractional reductions in youth sentences can
be made only against the backdrop of realistic, humane, and de-
terminate adult sentencing practices in which courts can deter-
mine, and then discount, "real-time" sentences. Minnesota's
Sentencing Guidelines already include a non-exclusive list of
mitigating factors with which "youthfulness" would be consis-
tent.7 20 Even explicitly punitive youth sentences do not require
incarcerating juveniles in adult jails and prisons, as increasingly
719. Although Task Force members briefly indulged my "abolition" argu-
ment, they did not engage in any fimdamental reconsideration of the juvenile
court as an institution. For a summary of this approach see Feld, supra note 1,
at 260-67.
Elsewhere I have argued that "youthfulness" mitigates criminal responsi-
bility and proposed a rationale to sentence young offenders differently, and
more leniently, than older defendants. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 9, at 892-902;
Feld, supra note 1, at 260-67. There are a variety of doctrinal and policy justifi-
cations for sentencing young people less severely than their adult counterparts.
The original juvenile court assumed that children were immature and irrespon-
sible. Ainsworth, supra note 6, at 1097. The assumptions about youths' lack of
criminal-capacity build upon the common law's infancy mens rea defense.
Walkover, supra note 156, at 509-13. Common law infancy and other dimin-
ished responsibility doctrines reflect developmental differences that render
youths less culpable or criminally responsible and provide a conceptual basis
for shorter sentences for juveniles than for their adult counterparts.
The Supreme Court in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), ana-
lyzed the criminal responsibility of young offenders and provided additional
support for shorter sentences for reduced culpability even for youths older than
the common-law infancy threshold of age 14. In vacating Thompson's capital
sentence, the plurality concluded that "a young person is not capable of acting
with the degree of culpability that can justify the ultimate penalty." Id. at 823.
Deserved punishment must reflect individual culpability and "[tlhere is
also broad agreement on the proposition that adolescents as a class are less
mature and responsible than adults." Id. at 834. Although Thompson was re-
sponsible for his crime, because of his age he could not be punished as severely
as an adult. The Supreme Court in Stanford v. Kentucky subsequently upheld
the death penalty for youths who were 16 or 17 at the time of their offenses on
the narrow ground that there was no clear national consensus that such execu-
tions violated "evolving standards of decency" in the Eighth Amendment's pro-
hibition against "cruel and unusual" punishment. 492 U.S. 361, 377-78 (1989).
720. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II.D.2.a.(3) ("lacked substantial
capacity for judgment"); id. § fl.D.2.a.(5) ("other substantial grounds exist
which tend to excuse or mitigating the offender's culpability").
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will be the case following presumptive certifications and EJJ
probation revocations.
Despite the profound statutory reforms, no amount of juve-
nile or criminal justice legislative tinkering with the boundaries
of youth or adulthood will significantly reduce the amount of
crime in the community, offenders' probabilities of recidivism, or
increase public safety.721 Providing for child welfare ultimately
remains a societal responsibility, rather than a judicial one. It is
unrealistic to expect juvenile courts, or any other legal institu-
tion, to resolve all of the social ills afflicting young people or to
have a significant impact on youth crime. Despite claims of be-
ing a child-centered nation, we care less about other people's
children than we do our own, especially when they are children
of other colors or cultures. There are a number of profoundly
disturbing demographic forces that auger ill for youth and crime
in the coming decade: increasing numbers of children growing
up in single parent families, living in racial isolation and con-
centrated poverty, without hope for the future.7 22 Without a
commitment to social justice and a social welfare system that
adequately meets the minimum family, health, housing, nutri-
tion, and educational needs of all young people, the juvenile
court provides only a mechanism for involuntary control, how-
ever ineffective it may be in delivering services or rehabilitating
offenders. As long as juvenile courts operate in a societal con-
text that does not provide adequate social services for children
in general, intervention in the lives of those who commit crimes
inevitably will be for purposes of social control, rather than so-
cial welfare.
721. The Task Force emphasized that
juvenile crime is directly related to the quality of life in a community-
not to the degree of punishment handed out by the government....
The inter-relationships among family, religion, health care, education,
housing, employment, community values, and crime mean that all seg-
ments of the community must play an active role in combatting juve-
nile delinquency.... [Tihe solution lies in the broader social and
economic context of the society.
TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 16.
722. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
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